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ABSTRACT
The Influence of Instruction Set and Test Format 
on the Detection of Malingering
by
Teri J. Forrest
Dr. Daniel N. Allen, Examination Committee Chair 
Associate Professor o f Psychology 
University o f Nevada, Las Vegas
It is increasingly common for individuals involved in civil litigation to undergo 
neuropsychological evaluation. This trend increases the possibility that individuals 
receive trade-secret test information from their attorneys before evaluation in order to 
maximize their ability to appear injured. However, no known research has examined 
what effeet this knowledge may have on an individual’s ability to successfully evade 
detection as a malingerer. The current investigation examined the performance of 
archival brain-damaged individuals, normal controls, and individuals in three 
malingering groups on both previously and newly developed malingering indices for the 
Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST) and the Halstead Category Test (HCT). The three 
malingering groups differed as to the extent o f prior coaching they were given 
specifically regarding the nature, content, and requirements o f the WCST. Results 
indicated that individuals given the most explicit coaching about the WCST were able to 
escape detection on more malingering indices than individuals in the other malingering
111
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groups. However, these individuals were also more likely to be classified as normal 
controls using discriminant function analysis. Results indicated that the most effective 
indices for discriminating between malingering and non-malingering groups in the 
current study are failures to maintain set, sub-threshold failures to maintain set, and a 
potential malingering composite variable for the WCST, and total errors and errors on 
Subtests I and II for the HCT. It was also found that explicitness o f coaching generalized 
from the WCST to the HCT, such that individuals given explicit instruction on the 
WCST performed better than other malingering groups on the HCT, although they were 
given no explicit instruction regarding the HCT. Principal components analyses revealed 
that dimensions that closely reflect potential malingering strategies in the eurrent sample. 
For both tests, these dimensions include making many errors overall and making bizarre, 
unusual errors. The implications o f these results on the integrity o f forensic 
neuropsychological evaluations are discussed, as are the limitations o f this study and 
avenues for future research.
IV
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
In the increasingly litigious climate o f the twenty-first century, it is becoming more 
common for individuals involved in civil litigation for personal injury claims to undergo 
a neuropsychological evaluation prior to trial or settlement. However, this increased 
likelihood suggests another serious threat to the inherent validity o f such evaluations, 
which is that personal injury attorneys will become increasingly knowledgeable about the 
nature and content o f neuropsychological tests. This knowledge may increase the 
probability that the clients of these attorneys will be provided with trade-secret 
information about psychological and neuropsychological tests in order to present a 
maximally accurate picture o f disability and thus benefit from litigation. This threat to 
validity appears viable in that recent studies indicate that overwhelming majorities o f law 
students and attorneys alike feel that it is their obligation to discuss the nature of 
psychological evaluations with clients prior to evaluation (Wetter & Corrigan, 1995). 
These potentialities endanger the confidential nature o f psychological testing instruments 
and can contaminate and completely invalidate such examinations.
In spite o f this potential risk, few studies have examined how different levels of 
instruction given before an examination can increase a malingering plaintiff s likelihood 
of “passing” a test so that he or she appears brain-damaged but not dishonest. For
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example, it is unclear whether providing explicit instructions about the nature o f  
neuropsychological tests and the cognitive deficits resulting from brain injury provide a 
significant advantage for litigants moreso than does simply conveying the importance of 
appearing impaired on neuropsychological tests. Additionally, the nature of some tests 
may make them more susceptible to successful malingering. Tests that are structured 
with clear expectations of performance may be easier to malinger than tests that are 
ambiguous in nature and for which the responses leading to optimal performance are not 
easily deduced. Finally, some tests that are commonly used in forensic settings have not 
been extensively evaluated with regard to the impact of malingering or instruction set on 
test performance.
Two such tests, the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST; Berg, 1948; Grant & Berg, 
1948) and the Halstead Category Test (HCT; Halstead, 1947), are widely viewed as 
measures o f abstraction and problem solving abilities. These tests assess what have 
generally been referred to as executive functions, which include abilities such as 
cognitive flexibility, working memory, response inhibition, and nonverbal abstraction 
(Osmon, 1999; Spreen & Strauss, 1998). They require individuals to deduce principles 
that allow them to successfully sort geometric figures, with no instruction as to how to 
do so and with either no warning as to when the sorting principle will change (WCST) or 
with such warning (HCT). The abstraction and problem-solving abilities required to 
perform successfully on these tests are believed to be primarily mediated by the frontal 
lobes, although other brain structures are certainly involved in performing these complex 
tasks. Because the frontal lobes are among the sites most vulnerable to damage following 
traumatic brain injury (TBI), plaintiffs involved in litigation stemming from TBI are
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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often administered the WCST and HCT during neuropsychological evaluation. The 
current study aims to investigate how giving participants instructions on how to malinger 
TBI, as well as prior knowledge of the nature and content of the WCST, can increase 
their chances o f successfully malingering a mild head injury on this measure compared 
to participants who are simply instrueted to malinger. Secondarily, malingered 
performance on WCST, a neuropsyehological measure that is fairly ambiguous when 
given under standard instructions, will be compared to that of the HCT, which is a more 
structured evaluation procedure. These comparisons will provide a basis for determining 
the effects o f instruction set and task ambiguity on the ability o f participants to 
successfully malinger TBI.
In order to fully understand the nature o f the WCST and HCT and their role in 
detecting malingering in forensic neuropsychological evaluations, the following review 
will examine previous attempts to use the measures for the detection o f malingering. It 
will also inelude an overview of general issues in the study o f malingering and attorney 
influence and coaching in preparation for neuropsychological evaluation.
Impact o f Instructional Modification on WCST Performance 
Briefly, in order to successfully complete the WCST, individuals are required to sort 
cards to one o f four stimulus cards, which are marked with geometric figures that vary in 
color and the number o f figures depicted on each card. Individuals are instructed to sort 
the cards according to an unspecified principle (color, form, or number) which they must 
deduce through trial-and-error card placement. The only reinforcement given regarding 
test performance is feedback (right or wrong) as to whether the card placed matches the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
4
current principle. Once an individual correctly sorts ten cards according to the principle 
currently in effect, the principle changes without notice and the individual then must 
determine the nature o f the new principle without external input or assistance. The test 
ends when the individual has either correctly completed sorting to three categories twice 
or when s/he has exhausted the complete supply o f 128 total cards. The standard order 
for completing categories is: color, form, number, color, form, number.
Many studies have investigated the impact o f instructional modification on WCST 
performance. Grant and Berg (1948) were interested in determining if  the degree o f 
reinforcement o f individual correct responses on the WCST influenced a participant’s 
ease in shifting to new response sets. They suggested that although one would expect 
increased reinforcement to make it more difficult to shift to new ways o f responding, it 
might also serve to distinguish specific characteristics o f a situation and thus encourage 
more selective responding. Degree of reinforcement was manipulated in that participants 
received feedback on either three, four, five, six, seven, eight, or 10 trials that would 
reinforce the individual to continue sorting to a particular principle before a set shift. 
Results indicated that the average number o f errors (total, ineluding perseverative errors) 
decreased as the number o f reinforcing trials increased. Simultaneously, participants 
were able to adopt new, correct solutions more readily after abandoning response sets 
that were suddenly no longer reinforced, as they were able to become more selective in 
the mamier in which they shifted to other response sets. They concluded that increased 
reinforcement served primarily to facilitate the formation of new solutions, and that 
“confirmation reduces the ambiguity o f the situation, the complexity o f which is so great 
that it requires several trials to produce closure” (p. 410).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Modifying the nature of the WCST instructions was investigated early on by 
Gormezano and Grant (1958), who desired to determine the difficulty examinees 
encountered when sorting to color or number when the other irrelevant principles were 
intermittently reinforced either 0%, 25%, 50%, or 75% of the time. The task was 
completed with an unsystematic deck o f 48 cards designed to contain cards that allowed 
for the above percentages o f ambiguity. Results indicated that number ambiguity 
percentages o f  50% and 75% made sorting to color significantly more difficult, and a 
similar pattern was found for form ambiguity when sorting to number. These results 
indicated that “when the percentage o f ambiguity is increased, this means an increase in 
the amount o f intermittent reinforcement given the irrelevant dimension” (p. 626).
After these early investigations, most recent research on instructional sets has 
focused on coaching individuals with schizophrenia or other organic brain dysfunction 
on the WCST in order to obtain better performance. Nelson (1976) , building on prior 
research, followed up on the issue of ambiguous reinforcement, reasoning that “if 
performance on the sorting task can be impaired for different reasons, it is obviously 
important to know what strategies (if any) the patient is employing, to be able to 
determine what category concept he has in mind with each response card that he sorts”
(p. 314). Further, since over half of the cards o f the WCST share at least two attributes, it 
is difficult to reinforce examinees for exactly which aspect o f the sorted cards relate to 
the current correct sorting principle. Nelson believed that by excluding cards from the 
test protocol that shared two or more attributes with any key card (color, form, number), 
much of the task’s ambiguity might be removed. The removal o f such ambiguity may
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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provide an opportunity for individuals with brain damage, who had demonstrated 
difficulty grasping the nature o f the WCST, to improve their performanee.
Nelson (1976) administered 53 inpatients with unilateral cerebral lesions a modified 
version of the WCST, consisting of two decks of 24 cards which shared no more than 
one common attribute with any o f three key cards and no attribute with the remaining 
key card. Whichever category was first chosen by an individual examinee to sort to was 
scored as correct. After six correct sorts to that category, the examinees were told that 
they would then be required to sort to a new principle, also o f their choosing. After the 
examinee sorted to the three required principles, the task was repeated, with categories 
being completed in the same order that the examinee had chosen to complete them the 
first time. The task was terminated following completion of all six categories or when all 
48 cards had been sorted. Dependent variables included number o f categories eompleted, 
total number o f errors, and a qualitative assessment o f the types o f errors made.
Results indicated that even on this easier task, patients with frontal lesions completed 
fewer categories and made significantly more perseverative errors than patients with 
lesions in other regions. No difference was found between patients with right frontal and 
left frontal lesions. Thus, it was concluded that it was not the ambiguous nature o f the 
standard WCST that created problems in WCST performance for individuals with frontal 
lobe damage, as such deficits were apparent on this much easier and more 
straightforward task. Frustrated patients were able to verbalize full understanding o f the 
requirements o f the modified task but eontinued to perseverate to the wrong categories. 
However, de Zubicaray and Ashton (1996) reviewed literature on Nelson’s (1976) 
Modified Card Sorting Test and concluded that there is weak evidence to suggest that the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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test can be considered psychometrically equivalent to the WCST and that it has any 
differential ability to identify frontal lobe dysfunction. Thus, it is unclear what benefit 
using this modified task would have over the use o f the standard form of the WCST.
There is also a moderate body of literature examining the influence o f modified 
instructional sets on the WCST performance of individuals with schizophrenia. This is 
likely because frontal lobe dysfunction is common in the disorder and tasks believed to 
be mediated by the frontal lobe, such as problem solving and planning, are often 
diminished in these individuals. Goldberg et al. (1987) administered the WCST to three 
groups o f patients with schizophrenia on six consecutive occasions. One group served as 
a control, and was administered the WCST in its standard form. Another group was 
provided with information regarding the nature o f the three sorting principles after 
sorting the first 64 cards. After sorting the second group o f 64 cards, this information 
was reiterated along with new information concerning the unpredictable nature o f the set 
shifts. After sorting the third group of 64 cards, participants received explicit card-by- 
card instruction as to how to sort each card, including to which principle to sort and 
which two principles to disregard. Thirty-two cards were sorted in this fashion, followed 
by a group o f 32 cards which participants were instructed to sort by themselves with no 
instruction. Participants were then administered a set o f 64 cards approximately two 
weeks later with no further instruction. Participants in Goldberg et al.’s third group 
received an identical testing protocol with the exception that they received set-shifting 
information after the first set o f 64 cards was sorted, and information regarding the 
nature o f the three sorting principles after the second group of 64 cards was sorted. Both 
groups were informed before test administration that the information provided would
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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help them maximize their performance. Variables o f interest included percent correct 
responses, percent perseverative responses, and number o f categories completed.
Results indicated that regardless o f the explicitness o f instruction provided, these 
participants with schizophrenia were uniformly unable to incorporate the information 
and feedback in order to correctly alter their pattern o f responding. Further, participants’ 
responses returned to a baseline level immediately following card-by-card instruction. 
Participants appeared to have been taught to a sufficient degree, as most could repeat 
back the instructions they had been given, and did show superior performance relative to 
controls during the card-by-card instruction period. Participants across groups averaged 
three completed categories for the first 128 cards administered. Notably, participants 
appeared to perseverate on form more than any other category.
Bellack et al. (1990) hypothesized that the demands o f the standardized WCST could 
simply be too difficult for individuals with schizophrenia, and that prior training 
paradigms had allowed for participants to experience a great deal o f failure before 
beginning the training. They also observed that in other studies participants were 
provided with little incentive to improve their performance. Thus, Bellack and 
colleagues proposed the need for a training regimen that would be in place across many 
trials to maximize generalization as well as one that required participants to leam for 
themselves how to complete the task and not rely on examiner directives. One group of 
participants was involved in each of four experimental phases (standardized testing, 
testing with incentive, standardized testing, and standardized testing the following day). 
The second group o f participants underwent a similar experimental sequence but their 
second condition involved testing with instruction and incentive instead o f just incentive.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Results indicated that the brief.training regimen provided to the second group of 
participants resulted in significantly improved performance (percent correct responses, 
percent perseverative errors, and number o f categories completed) that reached levels 
similar to those demonstrated by normal controls. Gains were also maintained in later 
sessions on the same day as well as the next day.
The researchers noted two substantive differences between their training regimen and 
that o f Goldberg et al. (1987): during testing, participants were asked about their chosen 
method for going about the task and given positive or corrective feedback as warranted. 
Further, participants’ understanding was reinforced and reiterated as needed during 
testing. Thus, this protocol differed from Goldberg et al.’s in that their training paradigm 
relied upon non-interactive instruction given once during training. They noted that these 
two elements are believed critical to social skills training and rehabilitation efforts with 
individuals with schizophrenia.
Green et al. (1992) administered the WCST to individuals with schizophrenia four 
times during a single session. The fixed sequence o f testing included a baseline, 
standardized administration, administration with monetary reinforcement, administration 
with monetary reinforcement and detailed instruction similar to that in Goldberg et al. 
(1987), and finally another period o f administration with monetary reinforcement. Each 
administration period consisted o f 64 trials. Results indicated significant short-term 
improvement in performanee in terms o f total eorreet responses, perseverative errors in 
each condition, and number o f categories completed. However, reinforcement alone (at 
two cents per correct response) did not improve performance in the absence o f explicit
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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training. It was the training that accounted for a significant improvement in performance, 
which was maintained for a short period after its withdrawal.
Goldman, Axelrod, and Tompkins (1992) noted that due to the hypofrontality 
inherent in the disorder, patients with chronic, severe schizophrenia have repeatedly 
demonstrated an inability to benefit from instructional feedback by which to improve 
their performance on the WCST. They also suggested that providing intertrial feedback 
could confound performance on subsequent trials, and thus proposed initiating training 
before beginning the test to determine the effectiveness o f such training before 
participants had had a chance to develop preconceptions based on prior exposure to test 
stimuli. Dependent variables included total errors, perseverative responses, perseverative 
errors, non-perseverative errors, and number of categories completed. Results found that 
patients in the cued conditions (in which information was provided about the three 
sorting sets and dynamic nature o f the sorting requirements) performed significantly 
better than participants provided standard WCST feedback (consisting o f “correct” or 
“incorrect” after each card placement). Further, the patients showed the greatest decrease 
in number o f perseverative errors. Performance was found to be unrelated to severity of 
illness. The researchers suggested that the much-researched deficits demonstrated by 
patients with schizophrenia on the WCST may be based on the inability to formulate an 
effective response strategy, and not on an inability to implement or discontinue its use.
Metz et al. (1994) administered the WCST to 50 hospitalized patients with 
schizophrenia, an affective disorder, or schizoaffective disorder. After demonstrating 
adequate performance on a simple match-to-sample test, patients were administered the 
full WCST on computer. If patients performed poorly on this test, they were given
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incremental amounts o f help based on how poorly they performed. Instruction was based 
on the protocol o f Goldberg et al. (1987). It consisted o f either Level 1 help (that there 
are three potential categories to which to sort), Level 2 help (that only one feature is 
relevant at a time and that this relevant category will change without warning), or card- 
by-card instruction. Dependent variables included number of categories achieved, 
percent perseverative errors, and percent conceptual level responses. Results indicated 
that patients with schizophrenia improved steadily and significantly and demonstrated 
levels o f performance similar to those o f the patients with an affective disorder. Further, 
patients with schizophrenia who had received instruction maintained gains at a six-week 
retest to a similar degree as did the patients with affective disorder.
Stratta et al. (1994) proposed that remediation o f WCST deficits in schizophrenia 
could be had with a much less directive-driven method than specific task instruction, 
such as an information-processing strategy requiring participants to interpret a card on 
the basis o f context and prior experienee. Twenty patients with sehizophrenia were 
administered four sets o f WCST cards. The first three sets of cards were administered 
with standard instructions, but that on the second deck participants were required to 
verbally express the appropriate principle for sorting before the card was placed. The 
fourth set o f cards was administered in standard fashion the following day. Results 
indicated that eight o f 13 participants classified as poor performers based on first deck 
performance were able to substantially improve performance on the second deck without 
explicit task instruction. However, gains were not maintained on the third and fourth 
decks. The researchers felt that this method allowed the patients to take extra time and 
pay closer attention to task detail than during standard administration, but in fact it
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
12
appeared that patients did not take a significantly longer time analyzing the cards o f the 
second deck. However, this was a crude estimation, as no response time measurements 
were taken. A further hypothesis was that the method of verbally expressing the principle 
to which to sort reinforced the patients’ working memory, crucial to concept formation 
and problem solving. When this method was taken away, patients would have then 
resorted back to baseline performance.
Young and Freyslinger (1995) employed a scaffolded instruction procedure to further 
investigate WCST performance deficits in patients with schizophrenia. The technique 
involved providing reinforcement and feedback on tasks where the participant was 
unable to proceed unassisted and removing assistance on tasks where mastery had been 
demonstrated. A second experimental group was provided with explicit didactic 
instruction on the sorting principles and how they would periodically be required to shift 
to a new strategy. The researchers measured successful performance as the number of 
successfully completed categories. Young and Freyslinger found that participants who 
had received scaffolded instruction performed significantly better on the WCST than 
participants in the didactic condition, and that at one-month follow-up, this improvement 
was stable and maintained. The researchers suggested that generalization o f learning had 
occurred and thus that such a scaffolded instruction technique could be applied to assist 
patients with schizophrenia in learning other tasks in which abstract reasoning and 
cognitive flexibility are required. However, they noted that even in the scaffolded 
instruction group, number o f perseverative errors, although decreased, was still 
abnormally high, suggesting that perseveration could be a core cognitive deficit in 
schizophrenia unresponsive to remediation.
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Stuss and colleagues (2000) administered the WCST to 46 patients with single focal 
lesions under three conditions o f test administration. This was based on Stuss’ previous 
research that had found that following frontal lobotomy, participants demonstrated 
impaired performance after being told the three necessary sorting criteria needed to 
successfully complete the task. The researchers hypothesized that having this 
information at their disposal made the participants consciously aware o f what they would 
typically do unconsciously, thus making the test more supervisory. They suggested that 
manipulating WCST instructions could be useful in making the test maximally sensitive 
to pathology in different brain regions. The patient group was administered the following 
test sequence within one testing session: 128 cards with standard instructions, 64 cards 
after being told o f the three sorting criteria, and 64 cards after being additionally told 
after successfully sorting 10 cards that the sorting criterion would be changing. The 
testing sequence was identical for controls except that the last set o f 64 cards was not 
administered due to the participants already performing at ceiling. Dependent variables 
included number o f categories completed, perseverations to the preceding category, 
perseverations o f a preceding response, and failures to maintain set (defined as sorting to 
an incorrect category after already correctly sorting five to nine cards to the current 
correct category).
Results indicated that patients with non-frontal lesions were not impaired relative to 
matched controls on any measure. Frontal patients had significantly more perseverative 
errors and failures to maintain set. However, as in Nelson (1976), these errors did not 
seem to be secondary to a concept formation deficit, as frontal patients were able to 
spontaneously express the three sorting principles. Thus, the researchers felt that “in
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most patients with focal frontal lobe damage, it is not the lack o f  knowledge but the use 
o f  knowledge that is most detrimental” (p. 399, italics in original). More interestingly, the 
effect o f alerting patients to an impending category shift was to bring performance to 
ceiling in patients with nonfrontal and inferior medial lesions. Performance further 
improved for frontal patients with superior medial and left and right dorsolateral lesions. 
These patients decreased their numbers o f perseverative errors and completed more than 
twice as many categories, although these patients remained somewhat impaired 
compared to other patients on all measures. Specifically, individuals with right 
dorsolateral damage continued to fail to maintain sets even after the second set o f 
instructions. Thus, highly explicit and directive instructions were able to significantly 
improve test performance of individuals with frontal lobe lesions. However, this had the 
drawback o f reducing the WCST’s sensitivity to frontal damage.
Use of the WCST in the Detection o f Malingering 
Although the WCST is a widely-used neuropsychological test employed by clinical 
and forensic psychologists alike (Lees-Haley, Smith, Williams, & Dunn, 1996), 
relatively little interest has been shown in using it as a possible aid in detecting 
inadequate effort or feigned symptomatology. In fact, only seven known studies have 
investigated its potential usage in detecting malingering, defined in the fourth edition of 
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual o f  Mental Disorders (DSM-IV; 1994) as “the 
intentional production o f false or grossly exaggerated physical or psychological 
symptoms, motivated by external incentives” (p. 683). Bernard, McGrath, and Houston 
(1996) noted that an essential assumption of malingering is that those who engage in the
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behavior are typically unable to differentiate easier items from harder items and thus 
make an inordinately high number of errors on easier items relative to number of errors 
on harder items. To this end, they hypothesized that malingerers would demonstrate a 
statistically unusual pattern o f performance on the WCST to include a decreased number 
o f categories completed (constituting a more obvious factor) proportionate to number of 
perseverative responses and perseverative errors (constituting a more subtle factor). The 
researchers were able to discriminate a group o f simulated malingerers from control 
participants, patients with closed head injuries, and patients with other central nervous 
system pathology with a sensitivity ranging from 58-100% and specificity of 92-100%. 
As expected, the malingerers completed a far lower number o f categories (obvious task) 
and had only twice the number of perseverative errors (subtle task) than did the patients 
with closed head injury. They also note that if  an individual demonstrates poor Category 
Test performance, one must also show an elevation in perseverative errors on the WCST 
to be considered truly impaired.
Bernard et al. (1996) further suggest that even with coaching, feigning a WCST 
response pattern similar to that o f a patient with true brain injury (i.e., completing few 
categories while committing many perseverative errors) should prove exceedingly hard. 
However, Inman and Berry (2002) subjected the Bernard et al. discriminant function 
(based on number o f categories completed and number o f perseverative errors) to cross- 
validation using normal controls and college students with a history o f mild head injury 
told either to malinger or to respond honestly. Malingerers demonstrated significantly 
fewer categories completed as well as higher numbers o f perseverative responses and
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perseverative errors. The specificity was 100% but the overall hit rate was low (58%), 
due to a low sensitivity o f 9%.
Bonders (1999) sought to replicate the Bernard et al. (1996) findings with a group of 
psychiatric patients, notably excluding any individuals involved in litigation seeking 
financial compensation for injury in order to evaluate the malingering formula with 
individuals with no clear incentive to malinger. Results indicated that the formula 
evaluating number o f categories completed relative to number o f perseverative errors 
misclassified 5% o f the sample, or seven individuals, as malingerers. Notably, Bonders 
noted that these seven patients had a mean age somewhat higher than that o f the total 
patient sample, suggesting that as age increases, so does the likelihood o f a false positive 
result. However, he noted that positively, the results suggested no reason to suspect 
premorbid psychosocial difficulty in individuals classified as malingerers by the Bernard 
et al. formula.
Suhr and Boyer (1999) agreed to the need for a participant sample that included true 
suspected malingerers involved in litigation or other methods culminating in 
remuneration (e.g., workers’ compensation claims). They hypothesized that since failures 
to maintain set on the WCST had been found to be insensitive to brain damage, this 
score could serve as another subtle pattern of performance variable. In an undergraduate 
sample, a logistic regression equation containing number o f categories and failures to 
maintain set was able to distinguish between simulated malingerers and normal controls 
with 71% sensitivity and 87% specificity. This formula was even more accurate in 
distinguishing participants suspected o f malingering from control patients with brain 
injury (82% sensitivity and 93% specificity). However, Suhr and Boyer noted that it was.
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o f course, impossible to know if the participants suspected of malingering aetually were. 
Suhr and Boyer’s findings were elose to those o f Bernard et al. (1996), but were not 
entirely replicated. For example, Suhr and Boyer included failures to maintain set, which 
was not a variable investigated in the Bernard et al. study, and did not include number of 
perseverative errors, whieh was highly correlated with number o f categories completed.
Greve and Bianehini (2002) used data eolleeted from adequate-effort undergraduates 
and neurological patients to replieate and extend Bernard et al.’s (1996) and Suhr and 
Boyer’s (1999) findings for deteeting malingering in these samples. Both formulae 
produced high numbers o f false positive errors. Relying on factor analytic data 
conducted on the WCST, the researchers point out that there are several hypothesized 
indicators for malingering as put forth by Bernard et al. and Suhr and Boyer that may in 
fact be valid indicators o f deficit in certain neurologieal samples (to include high 
numbers o f FMS errors in conjunction with few categories completed) and not produeed 
as a result o f conscious or unconscious insufficient effort. They also suggest that 
homogeneity of strategy eannot be assumed among malingerers, which can compromise 
discriminant function analyses (DFA) and other related statistical approaches used as the 
principal method for identifying insuffieient effort. Greve and Bianehini further suggest 
that cluster analysis may be effective in elassifying multiple strategies for feigning 
impairment. They eonclude that the poor performance o f the Bernard et al. and Suhr and 
Boyer formulae in classifying participants in the current study stems primarily from the 
assumptions inherent in DFA (i.e., that a particular pattern of results must indicate 
malingering as opposed to a true deficit, and that all malingerers must produce the same 
patterns).
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Greve, Bianehini, Mathias, Houston, and Crouch (2002) attempted to further utilize 
the Suhr and Boyer (1999) and Bernard et al. (1996) formulae to classify TBI patients 
assigned to suspected-malingering and non-malingering group on the basis of 
predetermined eriteria for determining the possible presence o f malingered performance. 
They also examined two Unique indicators (traditional Other responses and “missed 
perfect matches”) for validation as potential indicators o f insufficient effort in this 
sample. “Missed perfect matches” are defined as the incorrect sorting of a card that 
matches a key card in all possible ways (i.e., to color, form, and number). In an 
administration utilizing all 128 cards, there are eight such perfect matches possible 
(cards 16, 29, 41, and 62 in each deck o f 64 cards). They note that these type o f 
responses almost never occur in samples o f brain-injured individuals and therefore may 
be useful in identifying potential malingerers.
Results indicated that suspected malingerers performed significantly worse than 
nonmalingerers on indices measuring total errors, nonperseverative errors, categories 
completed, and trials to complete first category. However, groups did not differ 
significantly on Other responses, missed perfect matches, or Suhr and Boyrer and 
Bernard et al. formula scores. None o f the participants had more than one missed perfect 
match. Greve et al. noted that the results from their samples revealed three primary 
malingering strategies. The first was to avoid making too many consecutive correct 
responses, thereby committing many FMS errors; this was the m ost common strategy, 
favored by approximately half o f the probable malingerers. The second strategy was to 
avoid matching cards to any o f the three criteria, although Other responses were 
uncommon, with no probable malingerer making more than four Other responses.
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However, three probable malingerers made Other responses by missing at least one 
perfect match. The third strategy was for malingerers to demonstrate “superficially valid” 
performance (p. 190), perhaps dismissing the importance of the WCST in demonstrating 
cognitive defied.
King, Sweet, Sherer, Curtiss, and Vanderploeg (2002) conducted a series o f studies 
to attempt to eross-validate previously described indicators o f insufficient effort as well 
as to validate newly created indieators primarily examining length o f strings o f errors 
relative to correct color matches. The newly created indicators could not effectively 
diseriminate patients with brain injuries of various durations giving good effort from 
probable malingerers. Across studies, the most effeetive indicators in discriminating 
adequate-effort patients from insufficient-effort patients were number o f categories 
completed and number o f FMS errors.
Nature o f the Halstead Category Test 
The Halstead Category Test (HCT), in its various forms to include the Booklet 
Category Test (BCT) and various computer-administered versions, at first glance appears 
to be quite similar to the WCST. In order to suceessfully complete the HCT, individuals 
make guesses as to what number (either one, two, three, or four) they are reminded o f by 
a series o f geometric figures. They must then use feedback they reeeive from their 
correct and incorrect guesses to infer the overarching rule behind each o f seven subtests. 
No clues or instruction are given as to what the rules might be. The HCT consists o f 208 
items divided between seven subtests, each of which is guided by a different principle
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with the exception o f Subtest VII, which is a compilation of items similar to those 
presented in the first six subtests.
The HCT is in fact often used interchangeably with the WCST in neuropsychological 
assessment as a measure o f cognitive flexibility and problem solving. However, this 
assumption that the HCT measures abstract reasoning has been questioned. Choca et al. 
(1997) noted that across studies, the HCT has been purported as a measure o f various 
disparate constructs, including attention, incidental memory, abstraction, complex spatial 
reasoning, and general and/or fluid intelligence.
Boyle (1988) administered a validated, shortened version o f the HCT to a 
heterogenous sample including brain-damaged patients, normal controls, and paraplegic 
non-brain-damaged individuals) and used archival data to compare this sample with a 
more homogenous sample o f neuropsychiatrie male inpatients originally tested by 
Halstead using the full HCT. A factor analysis indicated that the HCT loaded 
predominately on a general intelligence faetor but was more sensitive to 
neuropsychological dysfunction than the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS). In 
both samples, the HCT demonstrated higher factor loadings on verbal ability than non­
verbal ability factors. There was also some evidence to suggest that memory played a 
lesser role in HCT performance. These findings suggest that the HCT may not have as 
much in common with the WCST as previously thought.
Similarly, Johnstone, Holland, and Hewitt (1997) wished to determine if the HCT 
measured a construct substantially different than that measured by the WAIS or its 
successor WAIS-R. A sample o f 308 individuals referred for neuropsychological testing 
were administered the WAIS-R and HCT, among other measures. Results indicated that
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the HCT measured abstract reasoning as a construct distinct from other common 
measures o f intelligence and problem solving. Factor analysis revealed a three-factor 
solution for the HCT, only the latter two o f which could be considered factors measuring 
reasoning (symbol recognition / counting, spatial positioning, proportional reasoning). 
This study, in contrast to the previous, lent support to the contention that the HCT may 
have more in common with tests like the WCST than with purer measures of 
intelligence. However, further studies (see Relation o f the Halstead Category Test to the 
WCST) have shed new doubt on this purported relationship between the WCST and the 
HCT.
One o f the drawbacks o f the HCT is the cumbersome period o f time required to 
administer it. Researchers have attempted to ameliorate this drain on examiner time by 
developing alternate forms o f the test, namely computer-administered versions, that 
require minimal examiner involvement and whose results are yet still robust and 
statistically similar to the original HCT.
Beaumont (1975) was the first to attempt to develop a computerized version of the 
HCT. “Organic” and “non-organic” psychiatric inpatients were administered a version of 
the HCT identical to that as used in standard administration except that a LINC-8 
computer initiated slide change and monitored and recorded responses and response 
time. Further, the computer automatically administered feedback at a fixed time after 
response and halted automatically at appropriate points for the examiner to read 
instructions to the participant. This was the only role played by the human examiner in 
the administration process. After testing, the computer proceeded to calculate test scores
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and mean response times for correct, incorrect, and total trials. It then listed responses to 
eaeh trial and a summary of results.
Results indicated no significant difference between the HCT scores o f the psychiatric 
controls and the brain-damaged group. No difficulties were reported in the formulation 
or use o f the automated HCT, and Beaumont (1975) concluded that sueh a version could 
be used as an equivalent to the standard HCT. The only significant finding was unrelated 
to method o f administration, and involved the fact that the HCT was unable to 
diseriminate between the brain-damaged patients and the psychiatric controls. 
Misclassification across groups approximated 50%.
Choca and Morris (1992) compared their computerized version of the HCT (Choca, 
1987) to the standard projector-administered HCT using a sample o f neurologically 
impaired adults. Eaeh participant was administered the test using both methods (interval 
between tests approximating 1-2 days), although order o f administration was 
counterbalanced across participants. Results indicated that the two seores for each 
participant approximated what would be expected for a test-retest administration using 
the same method. Although participants tended to commit more errors on the 
eomputerized version, score differences were not significant whereas the eorrelation 
between the two sets o f scores was significant at the .001 level (r = .90). These findings 
provided support for the eontention that computerized versions o f the HCT are 
psychometrically very similar to the original HCT. Further benefits o f  using a 
computerized version were discussed, and included the assurance of an error-free 
administration, the collection o f additional technical information including response 
time, and a signifieantly reduced time eommitment required from an examiner.
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Berger, Chibnall, and Gfeller (1994) conducted the only study known that has found 
a significant difference between participant performance on standard and computerized 
versions o f the HCT. Ninety-five participants were culled from referrals to a private 
practice. All participants were administered a comprehensive neuropsychological battery. 
Approximately half o f the participants took the standard HCT and the remaining 
participants took a computerized version. However, participants were not randomly 
assigned to either condition due to practical considerations, including time constraints 
and computer availability. The researchers found that the only significant difference in 
the two groups’ neuropsychological performance was attributable to the HCT. 
Participants taking the computerized version committed significantly more errors than 
those administered a standard HCT. However, the researchers were careful to warn that 
the results must be interpreted in light of the nonrandomized conditions o f testing, and 
that performance subsequently could have been affected by extraneous factors. Other 
factors which distinguished this study from others, such as Choca and Morris (1992), 
was that the current examination o f the HCT was integrated into a comprehensive 
neuropsychological evaluation, while Choca and Morris examined HCT performance in 
isolation. Further, while the examiner was always present during computerized 
administrations in the Choca and Morris study, such was not the case in the current 
investigation. Berger et al. noted, “With an examiner present, task persistence and effort 
m aybe optimized through interaction and encouragement” (p. 257). This may have 
played an especially prominent role in the current investigation, which employed 
participants with a wide range o f neuropsychological problems.
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Berger, Chibnall, and Gfeller (1997) conducted an investigation o f the construct 
validity o f Choca’s (1987) computerized HCT in relation to the standard HCT. The 
researchers administered 105 private-clinical patients a comprehensive 
neuropsychological battery to include either the standard HCT (N = 49) or the 
computerized HCT {N=  56). Factor analysis revealed equivalence between the two HCT 
versions in that they both factored highly on a “spatial abilities” factor. The standard 
version loaded significantly higher on this factor than did the computerized version (61% 
versus 16%, respectively); however, the lower loading o f the computerized version more 
closely approximated loading reported in other research for the standard HCT using 
considerably larger samples.
Mercer et al. (1997) administered 49 normal controls and 45 brain-injured adults one 
o f three versions o f the HCT (standard, booklet, and Miller’s [1993] computerized 
version) in order to demonstrate the equivalency o f the computerized version to the well- 
validated booklet and standard versions. No statistically significant differences were 
found between the three versions, although some differences between individual subtests 
were found, specifically, on Subtests 3 and 6. While the researchers were not surprised 
by finding differences on Subtest 3 due to the computerized version presenting the 
information in a monochrome format, differences on Subtest 6 were unexpected. The 
researchers, on closer examination o f the results, felt the differences were most likely 
sample-specific. Further, there were no significant differences between hit rates on any 
of the three versions. Overall, the results were consistent with prior research suggesting 
the HCT is robust to differences in administration. Interestingly, the standard version of
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the HCT was the least successful in discriminating brain-damaged participants from 
normal controls.
Bowers (2001) noted many advantages to the use o f a computerized version o f the 
HCT, including the possibility o f calculating more detailed scores, including response 
time and pattern analyses, and the benefit o f a maximally standardized administration. 
However, some disadvantages include lack of normative data for computerized 
administration, and thus confusion as to what norms should be applied to individuals 
taking such a test. Bowers put forth preliminary normative data on 149 individuals 
undergoing HCT administration by computer, and noted that findings for both clinical 
and normal populations were similar to those found in the commonly-used normative 
sample described by Heaton, Grant, and Matthew (1991) for the traditional HCT.
Use o f the HCT in the Detection o f Malingering
A moderate body of literature has accumulated regarding the use o f the Halstead- 
Reitan Neuropsychological Battery (HRNB), and specifically the HCT, in detecting 
feigned impairment and insufficient effort during neuropsychological assessment.
Heaton and colleagues (1978) were among the first to administer a full 
neuropsychological examination, including the HRNB, WAIS, and Minnesota 
Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPl), to participants in order to attempt to 
distinguish 16 malingerers from 16 individuals with head trauma who were not litigating 
and were cooperative. Test protocols were then provided to ten blind clinical 
neuropsychologist judges. Results indicated that malingerers demonstrated similar levels 
o f impairment as did individuals with head trauma, but simultaneously demonstrated
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irregular patterns o f deficit. Malingerers tended to perform especially poorly on motor 
and sensory tests but did relatively better on several of the cognitive measures especially 
sensitive to brain damage. Individuals with true head trauma performed significantly 
worse on the HCT than did malingerers (67.4 errors versus 46.1 errors, respectively).
A discriminant function analysis based on neuropsychological test results was able to 
correctly classify all 32 participants. However, the overall correct classification rates 
obtained by the neuropsychologists were modest (chance to approximately 20% greater 
than chance), but Heaton and colleagues (1978) suggest that it was “unlikely that any of 
them have had previous experience with known malingerers” (p. 899). Further, the 
neuropsychologists were not provided with much pertinent information, including details 
o f injuries, neurological findings, length o f time since injury and quality o f recovery 
since, or behavioral observations during testing. Some criticism (e.g., Tenhula and 
Sweet, 1996) has noted that this study contained severe methodological flaws, including 
the fact that there were more predictors included in the discriminant function than there 
were participants in the study.
Goebel (1983) conducted research with 52 patients with document cerebral 
impairment and 202 university students either assigned to a normal control group or 
instructed to feign either right, left, or diffuse brain damage with very little training as to 
how to do so. A nonspecific group was told simply to fake brain damage. All participants 
were administered a comprehensive neuropsychological evalaution, and those instructed 
to malinger were also administered a comprehensive debriefing interview in order to 
determine each participant’s compliance with the instructions to malinger as well as their 
confidence in their performance.
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Results indicated that patients performed significantly worse on the HCT than did 
either controls or combined malingering groups (86.2 errors versus 30.3 errors and 46.1 
errors, respectively). Goebel served as the single clinical judge, and was able to correctly 
subjectively classify 94.4% of the 195 total participants into brain-damaged and normal 
groups. A further discriminant analysis was able to correctly classify between 94.9 % to 
97.2% o f the entire sample based on various base rates o f malingering. Overall, 
malingerers were exceedingly inept at demonstrating believable patterns o f lateralized 
cortical deficit. In terms o f the results o f the debriefing interview, only 40% o f the 
malingering participants had any special neuropsychological knowledge that would aid 
in their production o f believable deficits. Most participants were not confident in their 
ability to malinger, particularly without the benefit o f specific coaching. Others were 
either personally uncomfortable with the idea o f malingering or were made 
uncomfortable by the presence o f an examiner who continually encouraged them to do 
their best.
Goebel’s (1983) study has significant drawbacks. One includes the fact that true 
malingerers would certainly have more to gain from faking deficits than do university 
volunteers, and would probably not feel uncomfortable doing so (although the incentive 
to malinger without the requisite expertise would also not produce believable deficits). 
Further, much has been made of methodological shortcomings o f the study; for example, 
Tenhula and Sweet (1996) noted that Goebel served as the only clinieal judge, and that 
he had preexisting knowledge o f all o f the documented cases o f brain damage, as well as 
o f the malingering base rate for the sample. Although the study provides good insight 
into the subjective, qualitative experience o f participants instructed to malinger and
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information on how they attempted to do so, one must be skeptical o f the explicit success 
o f the researcher in correctly classifying his participants.
Laatsch and Choca (1991) used item analysis to distinguish items on the HCT that 
could be excluded based on their inability to distinguish between participants o f different 
ability levels due to being exceedingly easy or difficult. The researchers took into 
account the fact that since HCT items are interdependent, an item could be considered 
difficult for some participants due to its placement at the beginning o f a subtest, when 
the new category principle has yet to be learned. Item analysis revealed that 45 items 
could be extracted from the HCT while leaving it essentially unchanged 
psychometrically. Further, all Subtest I and II items were found to not contribute to HCT 
scores, as almost all participants were able to answer all o f these items correctly. Thus, 
item order appeared to have no bearing on participant performance. Other items 
excluded included Item 17 from Subtest III, Items 18, 27, 30, 35, and 36 from Subtest V, 
Items 4, 18, 21, 27, 30, and 32 from Subtest VI, and Items 2, 6, 10, 13, and 16 from 
Subtest VII. On Subtest IV, it was noted that participants seem to have greater difficulty 
recognizing and labeling Quadrants III and IV, and often confuse the two. All items from 
this subtest were retained as this difficulty appeared to discourage learning from previous 
items. Following removal o f the 45 poor discriminators, scores from the original HCT 
and the shortened HCT were almost identical (r = .9919, p  < .001). Archival data were 
taken from 195 inpatients administered the full HCT in its original form.
Mittenberg et al. (1996) administered 40 normal control participants instructed to 
feign cognitive impairment and 40 non-litigating matched individuals with head trauma a 
comprehensive neuropsychological evaluation. In a subsequent cross-validation study, an
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additional 40 simulators and 40 patients with head trauma were administered a similar 
battery. Results indicated that simulators made significantly more errors on the HCT than 
did the head trauma patients in both samples. A formula consisting o f 10 predictors 
including HCT errors yielded an overall hit rate o f nearly 89% {p < .001).
Tenhula and Sweet (1996) noted that since the HCT is intrinsically a forced-choice 
test, a popular format for symptom validity tests designed speeifically to detect 
malingering, below-chance performance on this commonly administered 
neuropsychological measure would potentially serve as a valuable tool for the detection 
o f feigned cognitive impairment. They also cited other advantages to using the HCT in 
this eapaeity, including the test’s inclusion of a wide range o f item difficulties and its 
tapping o f a large number o f diverse cognitive abilities. All o f these advantages would 
theoretieally allow the researchers to test the hypothesis that malingerers would be 
unable to correctly judge the difficulty o f the entire test or individual items. They 
hypothesized that in particular, the number of errors committed on Subtests I, II, and VII 
would be effective in diseriminating between simulated malingerers and normal controls. 
These subtests include 18 items identified by Bolter and colleagues (1985) as being 
infrequently missed, as well as 19 somewhat overlapping items missed by 5% of non­
malingerers in their own sample and 15 items designated as “difficult” because less than 
50% of their non-malingerers passed them. Bolter et al.’s (1985) “easy” items are noted 
to include items 27, 30, and 33 from Subtest V, items 4, 18, 21, 24, and 30 from Subtest 
VI, and items 6, 10, and 13 from Subtest VII (Spreen & Strauss, 1998). Participants 
included 34 normal eontrols, 33 normal individuals instructed to simulate brain injury, 
and 29 patients with documented neurological evidence o f traumatic brain injury. These
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
30
participants were administered the HCT as part o f a comprehensive neuropsychological 
battery. In a second study, results from the first study were cross-validated with 24 
normal comntrols, 18 simulators, and 25 patients with documented brain injury.
Results indicated that simulators performed worse than normal controls and brain- 
injured patients on each of the HCT’s seven subtests as well as on overall test 
performance. In both studies, discriminant functions based on total errors and 
performance on difficult items were the least able to correctly classify simulators, and 
functions based on each of the seven subtest scores and performance on the 19 easy 
items were most able to discriminate between participant groups. A double cross- 
validation was then performed by developing functions based on Study 2 data and 
analyzing Study I data using these functions. Hit rates were nearly identical across all 
three analyses. The researchers developed six potential cutoff scores based on total 
number o f errors, total errors on Subtests I and II, total errors on Subtest VII, the number 
o f Bolter et al.’s 18 easy items missed, the number of the researchers’ 19 easy items 
missed, and the number of the researchers’ 15 difficult items missed. Overall, the best 
method devised for detecting malingering was based on total errors on Subtests I and II. 
Further, this study replicated Bolter et al.’s “easy” items, and suggested that examining 
performance on supposed “easy” items may be instrumental in detecting feigned 
impairment. However, the researchers caution that depending on severity o f injury, 
patients with documented brain damage may also miss items in Subtests I and II, thus 
confounding the detection o f malingering. This caution was reiterated by Ashendorf,
O ’Bryant, Constantinou, Weber, Palav, and McCaffrey (2001), who found that Bolter’s 
“easy” items were unable to sufficiently identify potential malingerers in a private
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neuropsychological clinic sample o f 41 patients when used in conjunction with either the 
Test of Memory Malingering (TOMM) or the Rey 15-Item Test. Thus, although further 
validation is needed. Bolter’s items may potentially identify possible malingerers in 
some samples less optimally than in others.
Tenhula and Sweet (1996) also debriefed simulating participants in order to 
determine which strategies for feigning impairment were most employed. Popular 
methods included responding at a slow or variable pace, forgetting previous responses, 
acting fatigued, uninterested, or inattentive, reversing a particular subtest principle, or 
trying to respond erroneously only on items they arbitrarily determined to be difficult.
McKinzey and Russell issued two studies in which they cross-validated HRNB 
formulas for the detection of malingering developed by Trueblood and Schmidt (1993; 
1997a) and Mittenberg et al. (1996; 1997b), respectively. Using HRNB data from 796 
individuals, including normal controls, individuals with psychiatric disturbance, and 
various types o f brain damage, they found that Trueblood and Schmidt’s formula 
incorrectly designated 32% of the sample as feigning impairment. Further, 32% of the 
120 brain-damaged participants were designated as faking. Using the Mittenberg et al. 
formula, 27% o f the entire sample and 22.5% of the 120 brain-damaged individuals were 
incorrectly classified as malingerers. The Mittenberg et al. formula is especially 
noteworthy as it is the only one o f the two that includes the HCT within its predictors. 
These studies revealed that work remains to be done in order to develop a malingering 
formula based on the HRNB that does not grossly misclassify large numbers of 
individuals.
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DiCarlo, Gfeller, and Oliveri (2000) recruited undergraduate participants to 
constitute coached simulator, uncoached simulator, and control groups for their researeh 
on the utility o f the booklet form of the HCT in deteeting feigned cognitive impairment. 
These groups were also compared to a sample o f 30 patients with traumatic brain injuries 
(TBI). Results largely confirmed those o f Tenhula and Sweet (1996) in the usefulness of 
five HCT malingering indicators, to include number o f errors on Subtests I and II, 
number o f errors on Subtest VII, total HCT errors, number of errors on 19 “easy” items 
(those infrequently failed by most individuals), and number o f eriteria exceeded. 
Significantly more coached simulators were able to eseape detection than were those in 
the uncoached sample. However, the coached simulators did perform significantly worse 
than TBI patients, thereby demonstrating that they had not been coached to a sufficient 
degree to approximate the performanee of true patient samples.
The criterion o f making more than one error on both Subtests I and 2 was found to 
be the most consistent and accurate indicator o f malingering across all samples, correctly 
classifying 76% of all simulators and 100% of controls and TBI patients. This finding 
supported the widely held belief in the malingering literature that individuals who make 
more errors on simple tasks than on harder tasks are more likely to be feigning 
impairment. Overall, these findings are significant in that the research protocol included 
the use o f eoached simulators. There is growing evidence in the literature (e.g., 
Youngjohn, 1995) that many individuals engaged in litigation may receive coaching on 
neuropsychological assessment techniques prior to evaluation. Even simple instruction as 
to how to take tests believably may hinder detection of malingerers in the elinieal setting.
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Relation o f the Halstead Category Test to the WCST 
As mentioned previously, the HCT is often used interchangeably with the WCST in 
neuropsychological assessment as a measure of cognitive flexibility and problem 
solving. Osmon (1999) noted that “whereas the main component o f the conceptually easy 
WCST is simply to identify the relevant attribute and maintain that mental set, the 
[Category Test] includes the additional requirement to leam the rule used to guide 
behavior” (pp. 197). Woodruff (1996) noted that a conceptual reasoning factor accounted 
for a significant amount o f variance in errors on the booklet form of the HCT, WCST 
percent perseverative errors, and WCST percent total errors. However, several 
researchers have investigated the relationship between participants’ scores on the two 
tests and have found that they may not necessarily be measuring the same constructs. It 
has been suggested (e.g., Donders and Kirsch, 1991) that this may in some part be due to 
the differences in instructional explicitness (structure) between the two tests.
Pendleton and Heaton (1982) were among the first researchers to find that the HCT 
and WCST, while similar in some ways, in fact measure different constructs and are thus 
complimentary, and not redundant, in a single neuropsychological battery. They 
attributed some of the tests’ differences to the fact that the WCST may require simpler 
concept-formation abilities due to the greater similarity between stimuli. The researchers 
felt that the WCST was a more accurate measure o f perseverative tendencies, while the 
HCT tended to be a more difficult measure o f  the ability to think abstractly and develop 
novel concepts as required.
Machines, Golden, McFadden, and Wilkening (1983) compared a variety o f WCST 
and BCT variables in order to determine if, in a regression equation, the two tests would
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appear highly correlated. They hypothesized that if  adding in several WCST variables 
did not significantly increase the correlation between the two tests, the interchangeability 
o f the measures would be in question. Results indicated that scores for normal controls 
and patients with neurological disorders on the two tests shared no more than 27% o f the 
common variance, suggesting that the two tests are measuring different constructs. They 
suggest that this could be due in large part to the fact that the structured BCT instructions 
allow for participants to be warned of upcoming set shifts. However, on the more 
unstructured WCST, participants must deal with unpredictable set shifts, which might 
require greater cognitive flexibility in order to successfully complete the test. Further, 
BCT performance showed a much greater negative correlation with age than did WCST 
scores.
However, Bond and Butchel (1984) argued that correlational procedures comparing 
the BCT and WCST are o f questionable value in determining the relationship o f one test 
to the other. They noted that such an approach necessitates assuming that any o f the 
various scores produced by either test is inherently perfectly reliable and that the two 
tests are o f identical difficulty. Further, an assumption must be made that the two tests 
measure identical constructs, which has been questioned in previous literature. 
Regardless, they noted that the tests do share some superficial similarities and thus 
practice effects must be considered when administering both tests to a single individual.
Brandon and Chavez (1985) administered non-brain-impaired college students both 
the HCT and WCST. The first tests were administered in a counterbalanced order, and 
the second test was subsequently administered either immediately following the first test 
or 1 or 24 hours after the first test. Results indicated that administering the HCT first
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
35
significantly improved WCST performance as measured by both perseverative response 
and total error scores. Neither length of time delay nor administration of the WCST first 
appeared to have a significant influence on subsequent HCT performance. The 
researchers hypothesized that the HCT includes a wider range o f abstract concepts that 
may enhance subsequent WCST performance. They concluded that due to these results, 
the WCST should precede the HCT in clinical settings where both tests are to be 
administered to a single individual.
Rothke (1986) considered instructional differences in his effort to determine whether 
differences in the structure o f instructional sets provided to participants resulted in the 
HCT and WCST measuring different cognitive constructs. The WCST was given either 
first or second and both tests were presented with either no set-shifting cues or with set- 
shifting cues, resulting in four experimental conditions. In sum, in each condition, one 
test was given with standard instructions for that test and one test was given with non­
standard instructions. With regard to the WCST, set-shifting instructions included 
information provided before the test was administered that participants would be sorting 
to a specific idea and that that idea may change unexpectedly from time to time.
Results indicated that while inpatient males’ performance on the WCST was 
significantly altered by the provision o f different (nonstandardized) instructional sets, 
performance on the HCT was not. Rothke suggested that the removal o f set-shifting cues 
did not alter performance on the HCT because the significant change in stimulus 
appearance across subtests may in itself alert participants to the fact that set shifts are 
occurring. However, he noted that these significant differences might disappear when 
testing normal individuals, who tend to perform well on the WCST even in the absence
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o f cueing. Parenthetically, differences in instruction structure did not result in a larger 
correlation between the WCST and HCT, providing further support for the contention 
that in their standard forms, the two tests are measuring different constructs. Also, order 
o f test administration was not found to significantly affect performance on either test.
Perrine (1993) also noted the lack o f substantial covariance between the WCST and 
HCT. He suggested that the difference may be due to the fact that the HCT appears to be 
a somewhat harder task, and also that the WCST may be measuring the attribute 
identification aspect o f concept formation, while the HCT may be measuring rule 
learning. This could also be reflective o f instructional differences, in that successful 
WCST performance relies upon the ability to maintain focus on one idea until 
information is presented that refutes the current set. On the other hand, participants 
taking the HCT have already been alerted to the set-shifting potential and can thus shift 
that mental energy to ignore irrelevant stimulus features that do not aid in basic task 
performance. However, Perrine noted that failing to abandon an outmoded principle 
appears to account for the majority of the tests’ covariance. Other possible similarities 
included deducing a viable, novel sorting principle, using it until it is demonstrated to no 
longer be relevant, and abandoning it in search o f a new principle.
Franzen, Smith, Paul, and Maclnnes (1993) investigated the influence o f order 
effects on WCST and BCT performance. Results indicated that administering the BCT 
first marginally improved subsequent scores on the WCST (but to a nonsignificant 
degree), but administering the WCST first actually resulted in poorer performance on 
subsequent testing using the BCT. The researchers suggested that perhaps administering
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
37
the BCT first causes participants to form a cognitive set that directs that set shifting will 
necessarily be required on subsequent tests that appear at all similar to the BCT.
Rockers (1996) administered the BCT to 88 normal adults, 44 o f whom received the 
test with standard instructions and 44 o f whom received revised instructions in which 
information alerting participants to an upcoming set shift between subtests was deleted. 
Results indicated that this change in the structure o f the instructions significantly altered 
BCT performance; specifically, participants administered the test with revised results 
committed significantly more errors than did those administered the standard BCT. 
Interestingly, neither version of the BCT used in this study correlated significantly with 
WCST performance, thereby questioning the proposal that differences in explicitness of 
instruction may account for differences between HCT and WCST performance.
Wolfe (1993) devised modified WCST and HCT administration protocols that 
required participants to verbally express their rationale for item response. A second 
group o f participants were administered the WCST and HCT under standardized 
conditions. WCST scores between groups were highly correlated, and factor analysis of 
the scores o f each group revealed that WCST scores were highly influenced by three 
factors (perseverative responding, nonperseverative errors to the number principle, and 
the ability to maintain set). HCT performance was found to be related to participants’ 
ability to understand concrete perceptual attributes, the ability to organize such attributes 
into abstract patterns, and the ability to relate the patterns to corresponding number 
responses.
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The Influence o f Attorney Coaching on Neuropsychological Test Performance 
One serious threat to neuropsychological test security and validity, especially in cases 
involving litigation, is the potential that examinees will be exposed to test procedure and 
even content prior to neuropsychological evaluation. Taylor, Harp, and Elliot (1992) 
have written for attorneys what Youngjohn (1995) considered a “ ’how-to’ manual on 
preparing mild head injury plaintiffs” (p. 280). Stating that “any lawyer involved in TBI 
litigation must become thoroughly familiar with the nature o f TBI” (p. 65), they proceed 
to give an appropriate broad background on the topic, including prevalence, symptoms, 
and mechanisms of traumatic brain injury (TBI). Further, they attempt to present tips on 
how attorneys ean capitalize in court on their elients’ symptoms and enhance them to 
make them appear o f maximal seriousness during testimony. The authors encourage 
attorneys to provide clients with written instructions on how to present themselves 
appropriately during testimony, and that testimony itself should emphasize the lack of 
premorbid difficulties in all arenas and the postinjury onset o f all difficulties. It is clear 
that attorneys are certainly involved in all aspects o f their clients’ cases, including 
coaching for neuropsychological evaluation.
Psychologists (e.g., Youngjohn, 1995; Lees-Haley, 1997) note that many attorneys 
feel that a failure to educate clients on assessment methods and materials is tantamount 
to legal malpractice. This “preparation” can also include edueating clients on symptoms 
associated with various mental disorders. Further, clients are routinely instructed by their 
counsel to deny that any coaching has taken place at all. Youngjohn (1995) presented 
evidenee o f a case in which toward the end of a neuropsychological evaluation, a elient 
made mention o f the fact that prior to arriving for assessment, he had had access to an
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article written by Youngjohn on the nature o f a symptom validity technique. Although he 
stated it had been given to him by a “friend,” his attorney later admitted that he himself 
had provided the article. Youngjohn noted, “While [the client] lost his case, his attorney 
was not subjected to any rebuke, disciplinary action, or even comment by the judge” (p. 
282).
Lees-Haley and Brown (1993) acknowledged the influence on litigation on symptom 
presentation. They noted that the many ways in which personal injury litigation affects 
the lives o f plaintiffs may undermine the validity o f psychological testing, as might the 
coaching or other influence of counsel. They cited other work that agreed that the 
presence o f litigation may increase false-positive rates o f findings o f neuropsychological 
impairment. Thus, “litigation is a context which appears to have different base rates and 
different evaluation requirements” (p. 204).
The researchers administered 50 normal controls and 170 personal injury claimants 
prior to interview or assessment a 37-item checklist covering neuropsychological 
symptoms commonly encountered following injury. Participants were explicitly 
excluded if  they were filing claims based on neuropsychological impairment, and also if 
they had any known history o f neuropsychological impairment stemming from any 
etiology. The claimants reported high rates o f neuropsychological complaints, including 
anxiety or nervousness (93%), sleep disturbance (92%), depression (89%), headaches 
(88%), fatigue (79%), concentration deficits (78%), irritability (77%), impatience (65%), 
feeling disorganized (61%), confusion (59%), memory problems (53%), dizziness 
(44%), numbness (39%), and trembling or tremors (30%). Overall, 23 symptoms were 
endorsed significantly more frequently by claimants than by controls ip < .05), including
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four distrac tor items not related to neuropsychological impairment, and litigants 
attributed the majority o f them to the events leading to them filing the subject personal 
injury claim. The researchers note that caution is warranted when relying on client self- 
report o f symptoms because “psychologically significant complaints may arise from ... 
the stresses o f litigation,... malingering,... or influence o f third parties” (p. 206). These 
results are striking considering that individuals filing claims based on 
neuropsychological deficit were excluded from the study and that these base rates were 
obtained from individuals filing non-neuropsychological claims. The researchers also 
noted that interestingly, they had desired to include a control group o f 50 non-litigating 
individuals with mild brain injury but were unable to obtain such a large number o f such 
individuals not involved in some form of legal process.
Wetter and Corrigan (1995) surveyed 70 attorneys and 150 law students to examine 
legal attitudes toward informing clients about the content of psychological tests. Almost 
50% of attorneys and over one-third o f students reported that they should always or 
almost always be informed o f methods for determining symptom validity. Overwhelming 
majorities o f students and attorneys alike felt that it was their obligation to discuss the 
nature o f psychological evaluations with clients prior to evaluation. Further, 22% of 
students and 42% of attorneys believe that as much information as possible regarding 
specific psychological tests should be provided to clients. However, due to the design of 
the questions, it is unclear whether “providing information” means just that or whether it 
means explicit coaching on various tests.
Lees-Haley (1997) noted that attorneys influence psychological and 
neuropsychological evaluation in many ways, by instructing clients on how to respond to
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test material and as to what information they should and should not disclose and 
emphasize to examiners. All o f these legal tactics can constitute serious threats to test 
security and validity. Additionally, attorneys can advise clients “take actions that affect 
the clinical history and create misleading data concerning the impact o f an injury” (p. 
322). Lees-Haley also noted that legal custom is to try to influence psychologists to 
disclose what tests they routinely administer to specific client populations, and even to 
provide attorneys with actual copies o f testing protocols. However, attorneys may not 
need to directly contact psychologists for such information, as it is readily found in 
psychological literature. For example, Lees-Haley and colleagues (1995) published a list 
o f the most commonly-used tests in forensic neuropsychology based on reports on adult 
personal injury evaluations obtained from 100 examiners identified as 
neuropsychological experts. Parenthetically, results indicated that all forms of the HCT 
were the eighth most commonly used technique, endorsed by 32% o f examiners, 
followed in ninth place by the WCST, endorsed by 29% of examiners. Since such 
information is publicly available, most plaintiffs are likely to be sophisticated about 
some o f the tasks to which they will be exposed on examination.
Essig and colleagues (2001) surveyed 66 members o f the National Academy of 
Neuropsychology (NAN) and 52 members of the Association o f Trial Lawyers (ATLA; 
Motor Vehicle Collision, Highway, and Premises Liability section) regarding current 
practices in forensic neuropsychology. The attorneys admitted to spending an average of 
one hour preparing clients for evaluation and educating them on topics including test 
content, strategies for detecting malingering, and symptoms common to their alleged 
injury. Seventy-three percent of attorneys admitted to asking neuropsychologists to
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educate them about neuropsychology, while 67% of the neuropsychologists said that this 
was something they were typically asked to do. Thirty-eight percent o f attorneys 
admitted to asking neuropsychologists to provide information to be used to prepare a 
plaintiff for neuropsychological evaluation, while only 12% of the neuropsychologists 
said that this was something they were typically asked to do. This suggests that perhaps 
neuropsychologists are not fully aware o f or forthcoming about what purposes the 
information they provide is actually used for. Further, 44% of attorneys admitted to 
routinely asking for disclosure o f the specific instruments that will be administered to 
their clients, and 41% admitted to routinely receiving such information. Most 
neuropsychologists admitted to occasionally providing such information, although only 
17% comply in a majority o f cases.
Flowever, one of the most disturbing findings o f this survey is that “the modal 
attorney response indicates that almost half (44%) of attorneys receive raw data in 75% 
to 100% o f their brain injury cases, whereas the modal neuropsychologist response 
(32%) indicates that they provide raw data to the opposition in one fourth or less o f their 
forensic cases” (p. 286). Essig et al. (2001) suggest that this discrepancy could reflect 
attorneys attempting to appear as zealous advocates and/or neuropsychologists 
attempting to downplay unethical behavior by denying such practices. Further, only 88% 
o f neuropsychologists indicated that they have never had an attorney sit in on a forensic 
evaluation. Thus it would logically follow that “once an attorney has observed the testing 
materials and watched the tests being administered there is nothing to stop him or her 
from using that information to prepare other clients for similar examinations” (p. 288).
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This survey provides provocative evidence that test security and examination validity are 
certainly in question.
Malingering, Simulation Research, and Coaching 
Malingering has become an increasingly popular topic o f recent psychological 
inquiry, likely due to the increased role o f psychologists in the legal forum and thus the 
increased chance that psychologists will evaluate individuals who feign impairment in 
order to secure some form of secondary gain. Malingering can take any o f four possible 
forms: invention (an individual fraudulently represents having symptoms when none 
exist), perseveration (an individual alleges that symptoms continue to exist when they 
truly did exist but have since ceased), exaggeration (an individual presents with true 
symptoms but represents them to be worse than they are), or transference (true symptoms 
unrelated to a cause o f action are fraudulently attributed to that cause of action) (Lipman, 
1962, cited in Nies and Sweet, 1994). Nies and Sweet (1994) note that the most common 
methods for the experimental study o f malingering have traditionally involved 
instructing undergraduates to feign cognitive impairment, given various levels of 
instruction on how to do so. They note the inherent paradox o f this method, as originally 
described by Rogers and Cavanaugh (1983), which involves “’asking subjects to comply 
with instructions to fake in order to study subjects who fake when asked to comply’” (p. 
509). In general, they note that the most commonly-accepted hallmark of malingering 
appears to be inconsistency either in pattern o f performance or between performance and 
claimed disability (Lezak, 1983, cited in Nies and Sweet, 1994). However, they note that 
sophisticated malingerers may be able to determine on which tests they should perform
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less than optimally to convey a specific deficit. Thus, these malingerers would not feign 
impairment on all tests and may then be harder to detect as malingering.
Nies and Sweet (1994) put forth suggestions for future malingering research in order 
to maximize its clinical applicability. These include using homogeneous comparison 
groups, use o f  ecologically valid monetary incentives resembling those involved in 
litigation, thorough coaching o f participants in the “art” o f malingering rather than 
simply reading them simple vignettes, and the use o f more detailed exit interviewing of 
participants, particularly those that went undetected, in strategies they used to evade 
detection. They also encourage further study on commonly used neuropsychological 
measures for unusual patterns o f performance rarely seen in true clinical populations, 
including measures, such as the HCT, which are inherently forced-choice tests for which 
below-chance performances can be identified and evaluated. But perhaps the most salient 
recommendation o f the researchers is that “when malingering instruments are well- 
validated and become widely used, they may need periodic revisions, because complete 
test security cannot be guaranteed across time, especially in the necessarily ‘public’ 
scrutiny o f the court systems” (p. 545).
Ample literature (e.g., Martin et al., 1992, Nies and Sweet, 1994) has shown that 
examinees who are coached on how to feign cognitive impairment with some 
sophistication are less likely to be identified as malingerers than those who are not given 
specific instruction on test-taking strategies and cognitive symptomatology specific to 
their alleged injury. Specific successful test-taking strategies may include performing 
above chance levels, committing more errors on easier items than harder items, and
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committing these errors in a non-sporadic fashion (Martin et al., 1992). It is likely that 
individuals engaged in litigation could be similarly coached by their counsel.
Rogers et al. (1993) provided an overview of methodological considerations in 
research regarding the malingering of neuropsychological impairment. They note that the 
study and assessment o f malingering is crucial in neuropsychological research, due to the 
extremely attractive remuneration available to personal injury litigants and findings that 
as many as 67% of individuals assessed in forensic environments may exaggerate or 
entirely confabulate symptom presentations. The researchers described simulation and 
known-group designs to be the most common methods by which malingering is 
investigated. However, simulation research is known to have several drawbacks, 
including its unknown generalizability to true forensic populations and the fact that little 
is known about how malingerers prepare for and go about the feigning of impairment. 
Additionally, not all studies employ the use of incentives and manipulation checks to 
determine if  participants actually followed instructions to malinger, and further often do 
not provide adequate preparation o f participants. Preparation may take two forms, 
education about specific disorders or about how to elude detection on specific measures. 
The researchers suggest that providing simulators with sufficient time to prepare and 
sufficient information about either a specific disorder and/or assessment procedure may 
significantly aid in the ability to generalize simulator findings to true malingering 
populations. They further suggest that it is likely that a malingerer would choose to feign 
specific deficits on specific relevant measures than feign global impairments across all 
measures.
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Rogers et al. (1993) propose six detection strategies that may also significantly aid in 
the detection of feigned impairment, including floor effects, performance curves, 
magnitudes o f errors, symptom validity testing, atypical presentation, and psychological 
sequelae. Floor effects and atypical presentation are of particular interest here. Floor 
effects may be useful in that a participant’s failure on very simple items that even grossly 
impaired individuals would pass and success on more difficult items may be singularly 
useful in detecting malingering. Performance curves are related and calculated based on 
number o f easy items missed and difficult items passed, supposing that most malingerers 
do not consider item difficulty in choosing items to fail. The researchers suggest that the 
WCST may be particularly amenable to calculations o f magnitude o f error, the 
examination of “near miss” and absurd responses, because near misses as well as grossly 
absurd error scores could be calculated (p. 261). Atypical presentation may also be of 
interest as significant deviations of performance on tests o f similar abilities or on 
repeated administrations o f the same test may indicate dissimulation.
The researchers concluded by proposing that the detection o f malingering may be 
significantly more successful by “embedding items that measure the floor effect within 
standardized measures” that are more face valid than some symptom validity tests, which 
can “tip o f f ’ examinees to the fact that they may be under consideration o f malingering 
due to the very simple nature o f such tests. They suggest that the use o f “easy items,” 
such as those o f Bolter et al. (1985) for the HCT, may be very useful in the detection of 
malingering.
Haines and Norris (2001) noted that using undergraduate volunteers may be a serious 
limitation in malingering research because they found student simulators to be
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significantly harder to detect than psychiatric patients and inmates instructed to simulate 
cognitive impairment. They suggest that this could be due to the higher intelligence of 
college students and the lower education usually associated with malingering. They 
further propose that “findings based on student simulated malingerers may generalize 
better to malingering populations typically seen in private practice settings where civil 
suit litigants may be more like the students (e.g., higher education levels, premorbid 
cognitive functioning in the average or higher range)” (p. 179), thus leaving a place open 
in malingering research for the use o f student samples.
Edens et al. (2001) provided 540 normal participants from university and community 
samples with instructions to feign either psychosis, mood or anxiety disorders, or 
cognitive impairment. Feigned psychosis was measured using the Psychosis scale o f the 
Structured Inventory o f Malingered Symptomatology (SIMS), mood and anxiety 
disorders with the Atypical Response scale o f the Trauma Symptom Inventory, and 
cognitive impairment with the Neurologic Impairment scale o f the SIMS. The Symptom 
Checklist -  90 -  Revised was also administered in order to assure that participants had 
endorsed a significant level of psychopathology. Only 60 participants across groups were 
able to successfully feign their respective impairments. Successful malingerers were 
significantly more likely to base answers on their own personal experiences.
Unsuccessful malingerers were significantly more likely to answer “true” to very bizarre 
or unusual items, or to try to look depressed, “erazy,” or emotionally numb or 
disconnected for others. This implies that successful malingerers tend to be more 
conservative in their symptom presentation while still endorsing clinically significant 
levels o f psychopathology.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
48
Summary
It is apparent from the neuropsychological literature that as the neuropsychological 
evaluation o f plaintiffs in civil litigation becomes increasingly common, the likelihood 
increases that attorneys will become knowledgeable about the nature and content o f 
neuropsychological tests. This in turn increases the likelihood that the clients o f these 
attorneys will be provided with this trade-secret information in order to present a 
maximally accurate picture o f disability in order to benefit from litigation. These 
potentialities endanger the confidential nature o f psychological testing instruments and 
can completely invalidate and contaminate such examinations. However, few studies 
have examined how different levels o f instruction given before an examination can 
increase a malingering plaintiffs likelihood o f “passing” a test so that he or she appears 
brain-damaged but not as dishonest. The literature suggests that differences in the 
structure o f instructional sets can significantly influence performance on tests of 
abstraction and so they may also influence an individual’s ability to successfully 
malinger poor performance. The current study aims to investigate how giving 
participants in malingering conditions a priori knowledge of the nature and content o f a 
test that is fairly ambiguous when given under standard conditions can increase their 
chances o f successfully malingering a mild head injury. These malingering conditions 
will be further elaborated upon below and will include malingering -  standard 
instruction (MS), malingering -  vague instruction (MV), and malingering -  explicit 
instruction (ME) conditions.
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Hypotheses
In addition to indices noted in the literature as potentially sensitive to malingering, 
specific WCST and HCT indices will be developed for the current study that will be 
designed to be maximally sensitive to malingering. Significant differences will be 
present between the malingering groups when compared to normal control and brain­
damaged groups on all of these WCST and HCT indices.
The explicitness o f the instructions given to the malingering groups will be directly 
associated with the participants’ ability to escape detection; those given more explicit 
instructions will escape detection more often. Individuals in the MV and ME 
conditions will be more successful in escaping detection on WCST indices that are 
sensitive to malingered test performance than will individuals in the MS condition. 
The format o f the test (structured vs. unstructured) makes some neuropsychological 
measures more susceptible to successful malingering. Individuals in the malingering 
conditions will more frequently escape detection on a test o f problem solving with 
relatively structured, unambiguous instructions (HCT) compared to a test o f problem 
solving with relatively unstructured, unambiguous instructions (WCST).
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METHOD
Participants
Participants included 100 University of Nevada, Las Vegas undergraduate students 
between the ages o f 18 and 60. Participants were 66% female and 60% Caucasian. 
Participation was limited to those whose native language was English. Individuals who 
had a history o f insult to the central nervous system were excluded. Participants were 
recruited from the Psychology Department Subject Pool during the Fall 2002 and Spring 
2003 semesters by way of voluntary sign-up for research credit. This research credit 
served as partial fulfillment o f course requirements or as course-specific extra credit. All 
participants provided fully informed written consent before participating in any of the 
tasks. Twenty-five volunteers were recruited for one normal control condition (NC) and 
for each o f the three malingering conditions (standard instruction [MS], vague 
instruction [MV], explicit instruction [ME]). Participants were randomly assigned to 
these four groups according to their order of presentation for participation. Instruction 
sets for the four conditions will be described below under Procedure. Additionally, 
approval for research involving human subjects was obtained from the University of 
Nevada, Las Vegas Institutional Review Board before commencing data collection.
50
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Measures 
Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST)
In order to successfully complete the WCST, individuals are required to sort cards to 
one o f four stimulus cards, which are marked with geometric figures (circles, crosses, 
squares, or triangles) that vary in color (red, blue, green, or yellow) and the number of 
figures depicted on each card (one, two, three, or four). Individuals are instructed to sort 
the cards according to an unspecified principle (color, form, or number) which they must 
deduce through trial-and-error card placement. The only guidance in test performance 
given is feedback (right or wrong) as to whether the card placed matches the current 
principle. Once an individual correctly sorts ten cards according to the current given 
principle, the principle changes without notice and the individual then must determine 
the nature o f the new principle without external input or assistance. The test ends when 
the individual has either correctly completed sorting to six categories (color, form, 
number, color, form, number) or when they have exhausted the complete supply of 128 
total cards.
Participants were administered the WCST via computer using Wisconsin Card 
Sorting Test: Computer Version 3 for Windows Research Edition computer software 
(WCST: CV; Heaton, 1999). Commonly reported dependent measures provided by this 
program’s printed report include total errors (raw score and percent o f total responses); 
perseverative responses (raw score and percent o f total responses); perseverative errors 
(raw score and percent o f total responses); nonperseverative errors (raw score and 
percent o f total responses); conceptual level responses (raw score and percent o f total
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responses); categories completed; trials to complete first category; and failures to 
maintain set.
Halstead Category Test (HCT)
In order to complete the HCT successfully, individuals are asked to indicate o f what 
number they are reminded by a series o f geometric figures (either one, two, three, or 
four). They must then use feedback they receive from their correct and incorrect guesses 
to infer the overarching rule behind each o f seven subtests. No clues or instruction are 
given as to what the rules might be. The HCT consists o f 208 items divided between 
seven subtests, each o f which is guided by a different principle with the exception of 
Subtest VII, which is a compilation o f items similar to those presented in the first six 
subtests. Participants are instructed as to when one subtest ends and the next begins.
Participants were administered the HCT via computer using Category Test:
Computer Version 1 for Windows Research Edition (CAT: CV) computer software 
(DeFilippis et al., 2002). Dependent measures provided by this program’s printed report 
include total errors, number o f errors made on each subtest (I -  VII); total test time; time 
to complete each subtest; average item response time (total and for each subtest); average 
response time for correct responses; average reaction time for incorrect responses; and 
number o f Bolter Validity Items missed.
Post- Video Questionnaire 
Following the viewing of a video providing information appropriate to each 
participants’ assigned group (NC, MS, MV, ME), participants were administered a short 
post-video questionnaire which assessed participant comprehension and retention of 
information provided by the video (see Appendix III for copies o f post-video
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questionnaires). The questionnaires ranged in length from 4 to 13 questions because the 
videos for some groups (e.g., ME) contained more information than those for other 
groups (e.g., explicit instruction on the WCST as well as information on how to 
successfully malinger poor performance). Questions covered such topics as the nature 
and content o f the WCST and the nature o f the “accident” in which the participant was 
involved. The content o f the questionnaire was appropriate to each participant’s group 
assignment. Before viewing the video, participants were informed that they would have 
to complete a post-video questionnaire and that they would have to obtain a score of 
75% correct or greater to continue to participate in the study.
Procedure
All data was collected by the author. Prior to data collection, the author was 
thoroughly trained in the use o f software necessary to administer the computerized 
versions o f the WCST: CV and the CAT:CV, and in the particulars o f the study, 
including the ethical treatment o f human participants. Computerized versions o f the tests 
were utilized in order to assure maximal interrater reliability. Research (e.g., Choca & 
Morris, 1992; i Fortuny & Heaton, 1996) suggests that the commercially available 
computerized versions o f both tests are psychometrically equivalent to the original non­
computerized versions.
After volunteering to participate, all individuals provided informed consent and were 
then randomly assigned to one o f the four groups (NC, MS, MV, and ME). All 
participants in the malingering conditions were then coached on a specific brain 
dysfunction (i.e., frontal lobe injury) before being administered the WCST and HCT.
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Coaching consisted o f participants in the malingering conditions watching a video that 
presented information on a scenario involving a motor vehicle accident in which the 
participant was supposed to have sustained a mild TBI, which indirectly resulted in the 
loss o f a job. The resulting loss o f income produced a financial incentive to feign severe 
brain injury during neuropsychological evaluation in order to maximize the potential that 
a large monetary settlement would result from the lawsuit brought against the driver o f 
the vehicle who caused the accident. Information was also presented on the effects of 
mild TBI on cognitive and emotional functioning. This information was presented in a 
video format in order to ensure that all participants received identical information in a 
standardized presentation. Participants in the malingering vague- and explicit- 
instruction conditions (MV, ME) also received information on the WCST and how to use 
this information to most accurately feign severe brain injury. Transcripts from the videos 
are contained in Appendix II.
After watching the video, participants were given a post-video questionnaire by the 
examiner appropriate to their assigned level o f coaching to determine how much 
information from the training video they retained (see Appendix III for post-video 
questionnaires). Those who obtained 75% correct or greater continued in the study.
Those who did not obtain 75% or greater correct were given the option o f discontinuing 
the study or reviewing the video and taking the post-video questionnaire again. Only 
three participants were required to watch the video a second time due to scoring below 
75% on the first post-video questionnaire, and all three subsequently completed the post­
video questionnaire a second time with a passing score.
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The WCST was administered before the HCT in all conditions based on research 
(e.g., Brandon & Chavez, 1985; Franzen, Smith, Paul, & Maclnnes, 1993) suggesting 
that this order may prevent the structured HCT instructions from influencing subsequent 
WCST performance. Participants got no information before taking the WCST and HCT 
on how to complete the HCT, other than what is contained in the standardized HCT 
instructions presented immediately before testing. A personal computer equipped with 
WCST and HCT administered the tests and subsequently collected and summarized all 
responses.
Malingering Instructions 
Before undergoing testing, individuals assigned to participate in all o f the three 
malingering conditions were required to watch a video that described specific features of 
a mild frontal lobe brain injury incurred in a motor vehicle accident and the details of the 
resulting litigation (see Appendix II for transcripts o f the instructional videos). 
Information on how to potentially malinger successfully on the WCST was gathered 
from research on how individuals with mild head trauma typically perform on the test 
(e.g., Wiegner and Bonders, 1999). These participants were also provided with either no 
information about the WCST (MS condition) or else vague or explicit instruction on how 
to perform on the WCST (MV and ME condtions). After watching the video, participants 
were given a post-video questionnaire by the examiner appropriate to their assigned level 
o f coaching to determine how much information from the training video they retained 
(see Appendix III for post-video questionnaires). Participants were given the opportunity 
to ask questions regarding their role in the experiment. They then underwent the
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neuropsychological evaluation. The examiner administered the computerized versions of 
the WCST and HCT to participants with standard instructions packaged with the 
computer testing materials.
Normal Control Instructions 
Before undergoing testing, individuals assigned to participate in the standard- 
instruction normal control condition were required to watch a video. This video 
described a scenario in which the participant was involved in a motor vehicle accident 
but sustained no brain injury and subsequently was sent to undergo a neuropsychological 
evaluation before returning to work. These control participants received no information 
about the WCST before the evaluation. After watching the video, participants were given 
a quiz by the author appropriate to their assigned level o f coaching to determine how 
much information from the training session they retained (see Appendix III for post­
video questionnaires). Participants were given the opportunity to ask questions regarding 
their role in the experiment. They then underwent the neuropsychological evaluation.
The examiner administered the computerized versions o f the WCST and HCT to 
participants with standard instructions packaged with the computer testing materials.
Variations o f WCST Instruction 
The MV condition received information about the WCST that was more specific to 
test content than are standard instructions. This information was based on the description 
o f the WCST that is provided in Spreen and Strauss (1998) and contained general, 
nonspecific details about test content, such as that there are three criteria to which they
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will need to sort and the dynamic nature o f the criterion to which to shift. Participants in 
the ME condition were provided with highly specific information about how to complete 
the WCST, such as that they would need to sort cards according to the criteria color, 
form, number, color, form, number, and that ten correct sorts would he required for each 
sorting criterion to be considered complete.
Participants assigned to malingerer conditions additionally received information on 
how to use the frontal lobe injury information they were given in order to present a 
maximally accurate and convincing portrayal o f such injury on the WCST. This 
information was based on data in the literature (e.g., Suhr & Boyers, 1999; Bernard et al., 
1996; Wiegner & Bonders, 1999; Maclnnes et al., 1983) that outlines typical 
performance o f individuals with mild head trauma. Participants assigned to the NC 
condition, however, were told only that they should try their best to do as well as 
possible throughout the evaluation.
Because the instructions for the HCT are more explicit than those for the 
standardized administration of the WCST, the HCT was administered second to all 
participants, and no additional information regarding the HCT was provided to any 
participants.
After all participants completed the neuropsychological evaluation, they were 
provided with a short exit questionnaire containing questions similar to those described 
in Bernard (1990; see Appendix III for post-test questionnaires). This questionnaire was 
given in order to assure that all participants gave sufficient effort in attempting to carry 
out the instructions given to them in the video. Only the data from participants who 
indicated that they “tried hard” (by circling 3, 4, or 5 on a five-point Likert-type question
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assessing effort) were included in final analyses. The exit questionnaire also assessed 
participants’ confidence in their performance and assured that they had thoroughly 
understood the role they were instructed to play in the experimental process. No 
individual indicated that they put forth less than adequate effort during the experiment 
(by marking 1 or 2 on the aforementioned scale).
Malingering Indices 
Two methods were used to select malingering indices with which to test the 
hypotheses o f the current study. First, the literature was reviewed for indices that have 
been previously reported as sensitive to potential malingering on the WCST and HCT. 
Second, because there have been relatively few studies that have examined malingering 
detection using either the WCST or the HCT, a number o f unique indices were 
developed.
Development o f  Unique Indices 
Unique indices were developed specifically for the current investigation. After 
reviewing the literature, various scores from the HCT and WCST were used to develop 
indices that would potentially be sensitive to errors that might be made by malingerers.
In order to develop these indices, existing data sets containing patient performance on 
the HCT and WCST were examined. The psychometric properties o f the newly 
developed indices were evaluated based on data from normal comparison groups and 
clinical populations, including individuals with confirmed hrain damage and those with 
neuropsychiatrie disorders. This preliminary evaluation allowed for specification o f cut­
off scores to be used to identify potential malingerers. Evaluating these cut-off scores
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with existing patient data ensured that they would not misclassify a significant number of 
patients with documented brain damage as malingerers. Ideally, the most suitable cutoffs 
were found to not misclassify more than 10% o f the archival patient populations as 
malingering. This point will be further discussed in the Results and Discussion sections.
These archival data sets were also used in the analysis o f participant data for the 
current study in order to evaluate the performance o f malingering groups relative to not 
only the NC group but also to samples o f individuals with documented brain dysfunction 
with no known incentive to feign impairment or put forth less than adequate effort.
Using this additional patient data in the evaluation o f the hypotheses o f the current study 
helped to illuminate differences in the ways that individuals attempting to malinger 
approach test taking in order to appear more cognitively impaired than they truly are. 
Halstead Category Test (HCT)
A  data set was provided by Gerald Goldstein, Ph.D., VA Pittsburgh Healthcare 
System. This data set was used to develop the unique indices for the HCT, and included 
neuropsychological data on 601 individuals (195 with schizophrenia [SZ], 177 with 
various forms of brain damage [BD], and 229 VA patient comparisons with no brain 
dysfunction [PC]). As the participants assigned to malinger in the current study were 
asked to feign a mild head injury, the BD and SZ groups were primarily evaluated 
because they were the groups with the most relevance to the present study. The BD 
group included patients with substance-related dementia (V =  68), head trauma (77= 41), 
vascular disorders (N  = 27), brain malformations (N  = 8), and degenerative / 
demyelinating disorders (N=  13). Mean age for the BD group was 43.5 (SD = 11.7) and 
mean years o f education were 11.3 (SD = 2.4). Mean age for the SZ group was 41.6 (SD
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
60
= 9.7) and mean years o f education were 12.0 (SD = 2.45). Mean age for the PC group 
was 42.5 (SD = 11.4) and mean years o f education were 11.7 (SD = 2.6).
Unique indices developed to identify potential malingering on the HCT included an 
analysis o f error rate proportions on Subtests I-VI versus Subtest VII (VI-VII), and an 
analysis o f error rate proportions on Subtest V versus Subtest VI (V-VI). The first index 
may reveal malingering in that it would be expected that normal individuals would 
perform better proportionally on Subtest VII, which is in essence a memory task 
composed o f items already presented during Subtests I through VI (Reitan & Wolfson, 
1993). However, unsophisticated malingerers may attempt to perform consistently poorly 
on all measures and thus demonstrate no improvement on Subtest VII.
Preliminary analysis o f the Goldstein data set revealed that, consistent with 
expectations, the BD, SZ, and PC groups did perform significantly better on Subtest VII 
(p < .001) than they did on Subtests I through VI (see Figure I). This was demonstrated 
by calculating a weighted error score for Subtests I through VI (sum of the number of 
errors per subtest divided by the number o f items per subtests) and then subtracting a 
weighted error score for Subtest VII. A one-way ANOVA of the data presented in Figure 
1 revealed no significant differences between groups (F  (2,598) = .902, p  = .407), 
indicating no significant difference in Subtest I-VI versus Subtest VII performance 
between the BD, SZ, and PC groups.
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Figure 1
Performance o f  PC, SZ, and BD groups on H CT Subtests I-VI versus Subtest VII
HCT
0.45
0.35
0.25
Subtest VIISubtest I-VI
0.35 0.29PC
0.40 0.33SZ
0.43 0.38BD
Note. PC = patient comparison, SZ = schizophrenia, BD = brain damage (Goldstein data 
set).
Across the three groups, 74.1% of the individuals performed at the same level or 
better on Subtest VII than they did on Subtests I-VI. These results indicate that regardless 
o f the presence or absence o f brain dysfunction, individuals putting forth adequate effort 
typically perform better on the memory-oriented Subtest VII than on the subtests on 
which Subtest VII’s review concepts are based. Thus, any deviation from this pattern in 
terms o f worsened performance on Subtest VII than on Subtests I through VI may be 
considered statistically abnormal and may be indicative o f malingering or inadequate 
effort. For malingerers, it is expected that the difference between errors on Subtests I-VI
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versus Subtest VII would be smaller, because they will make more errors on Subtest VII 
than is statistically normal based on these analyses.
Similar logic dictated the development o f the second index, the analysis o f total 
errors on Subtest V versus Subtest VI. Since Subtest VI is governed by the same 
principle as Subtest V, one would expect that normal individuals would make fewer 
errors on Subtest VI compared to Subtest V. Excluding Subtest VII, this is the only 
instance o f a principle being repeated in more than one HCT sub test (Reitan & Wolfson, 
1993). However, as discussed above, unsophisticated malingerers, in their attempt to 
maintain consistently poor performance, may unwittingly violate this assumption and 
reveal their deception.
Preliminary analysis of the Goldstein data set revealed that, as expected, performance 
did improve during Subtest VI across all three groups (see Figure 2). A one-way 
ANOVA indicated a significant difference between the groups {F (2,598) = 5.22, p  <
.01). Post hoc Bonferroni comparisons revealed that this significant difference resulted 
from the BD group’s Subtest VI improvement being less marked than that o f the SZ or 
PC groups. The BD group members on average made correct responses on 4.15 more 
trials {SD -  4.66), while the SZ and PC groups made correct responses on 5.46 {SD = 
4.80) and 5.47 {SD = 4.28) more trials, respectively. Thus, the pattern o f better 
performance on Subtest VI compared to Subtest V was maintained across all groups.
Across the three groups, 83.0% of the individuals performed at the same level or 
better on Subtest VI than they did on Subtest V. These results indicate that regardless of 
the presence or absence o f brain dysfunction, individuals putting forth adequate effort 
will typically perform better on Subtest VI than on Subtest V, which is an individual’s
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first exposure to the concept that will subsequently be repeated in Subtest VI. Thus, any 
deviation from this pattern in terms of worsened performance on Subtest VI than on 
Subtest V can be considered statistically abnormal and may be indicative o f malingering 
or inadequate effort. For malingerers, it is expected that the difference between errors on 
Subtest V and Subtest VI would be smaller, because they will make more errors on 
Subtest VI than is statistically normal based on these analyses.
Figure 2
Performance o f  PC, SZ, and BD groups on H C T Subtest V versus Subtest VI
HCT
20
Subtest VISubtest V
16.1 10.6NC
13.919.4SZ
20.1 16.0BD
Note. PC = patient comparison, SZ = schizophrenia, BD = brain damage (Goldstein data 
set).
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Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST)
A second data set provided by Daniel N. Allen, Ph.D., was used to develop the 
unique indices for the WCST. This data set included WCST data on 82 individuals, 
including 43 with schizophrenia (SZ), 22 with comorbid diagnoses o f schizophrenia and 
alcoholism (SA), and 17 VA patient comparisons with no brain dysfunction (PC). Mean 
age for the SA group was 48.4 {SD = 6.7), mean age for the SZ group was 40.6 {SD = 
8.6), and mean age for the PC group was 35.1 {SD = 10.8).
For the WCST, one o f the unique indices developed specifically for the current 
investigation included an increased number of “sub-threshold” failures to maintain set 
(SFMS). This variable was designed as an inconsistency index. Specifically, it was 
hypothesized that few individuals putting forth sufficient effect, regardless o f presence or 
absence o f brain damage, would begin to sort two to four cards to a correct principle and 
then suddenly begin to sort cards to an incorrect principle after having received positive 
feedback. However, some unsophisticated malingerers may repeatedly respond in a 
haphazard fashion by answering correctly to a few (i.e., 2-4) items before switching to 
answer incorrectly, considering this a good strategy through which to demonstrate 
memory, impulse-control, problem solving, or attentional deficits. Although this pattern 
o f responding would not be significant in clinical samples and so is not recognized as a 
true failure to maintain set, it is likely that this pattern o f responding would be a hallmark 
o f unsophisticated malingering. Series o f responses were considered to constitute SFMS 
if  the series contained two, three, or four correct sorts, at least two o f which were 
unambiguous sorts (i.e., sorts that could only be classified as relating to a single 
principle).
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Preliminary analysis o f the Allen data set revealed that, consistent with this logic, the 
majority o f participants across groups committed few SFMS errors. Overall, 96.3% of 
the sample committed three SFMS or fewer, and 100% committed four or fewer SFMS. 
An ANOVA revealed no significant difference between the groups (F  (2,79) -  1.29, p  -  
.28). Mean numbers o f SFMS committed were .53 (SD = .93), .35 (SD = .79), and .86 
(SD = 1.32) for the SZ, PC, and SA groups, respectively.
These results indicated that regardless of the presence or absence o f brain 
dysfunction, individuals putting forth adequate effort commit very few SFMS, thus 
demonstrating no rapid fluctuations in their ability to maintain attention to the task.
Thus, any deviation from this pattern in terms o f a significantly increased number o f 
SFMS (i.e., more than four) relative to normal controls would be statistically abnormal 
and may be indicative o f malingering or inadequate effort.
A second unique index developed specifically for the current investigation consisted 
o f a formula that evaluated the number o f categories completed in conjunction with the 
number o f FMS and SFMS committed. This index was conceptualized as a potential 
indicator o f malingering in that unsophisticated malingerers would likely complete even 
fewer categories on average than would individuals with moderate to severe brain 
dysfunction with no incentive to put forth less than adequate effort. Further, this would 
likely occur in conjunction with the commission o f a greater number o f  FMS and SFMS 
errors, indicating inconsistent performance and likely less than adequate effort.
To investigate this hypothesis, a variable was calculated that would examine how 
many individuals in the SZ group in the Allen data set completed two or fewer categories 
as well as more than two FMS and more than two SFMS. Preliminary analysis o f these
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individuals in the Allen data set revealed that 39.5% of the sample completed two or 
fewer categories, while 9.3% of the sample committed more than two FMS and 7% of 
the sample committed more than two SFMS. However, when these variables were 
examined in conjunction with each other, it was found that no individual in any of the 
three Allen groups completed two or fewer categories in conjunction with committing 
more than two FMS and more than two SFMS. It appears that sufficient-effort 
individuals who are completing a low number of categories are not doing so because 
they are able to deduce the task requirements but then proceed to forget them, causing 
SFMS or FMS. Rather, they seem to be unable to grasp the concept behind the task at 
any time. Thus, it would be highly unlikely for someone putting forth adequate effort to 
complete a low number o f categories while also committing a high number o f FMS and 
more particularly SFMS, which could indicate inconsistent performance, less than 
optimal effort, and possible malingering.
Review o f  Previously Investigated Indices 
Halstead Category Test (HCT)
Indices selected based on the literature review for the HCT included number o f errors 
on Subtests I and II (IE and HE; Tenhula & Sweet, 1996; DiCarlo et al., 2000), number 
o f errors on Subtest VII (VIIE; Tenhula & Sweet, 1996; DiCarlo et al., 2000), and total 
HCT errors (TE; Mittenberg et al., 1996; Tenhula & Sweet, 1996; DiCarlo et al, 2000).
In order to determine what number of errors on these scales would be considered 
statistically irregular, and thus may suggest potential malingering, the patients in the 
Goldstein data set were examined in terms of frequencies o f the indices mentioned 
above.
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It has been suggested by several researchers (e.g., Tenhula & Sweet, 1996; DiCarlo et 
al., 2000) that making more than one error on the first two subtests may be the single 
best predictor o f malingering on the HCT, as even patients with severe brain injury rarely 
miss any o f these items (Reitan & Wolfson, 1993). The patients in the Goldstein data set 
were evaluated in order to determine how many errors were commonly made by these 
patients on Subtests I and II. It was revealed that 97.8% of the patients made 2 or fewer 
errors on Subtest I, and 97.2% made 4 or fewer errors on Subtest II. Overall, 97.2% 
made no more than 5 errors on Sub tests I and II combined. An ANOVA comparing the 
groups by subtest indicated a significant effect for subtest (F  (1, 598) = 218.69,/? <
.001), but no significant effect for group (F  (2, 598) = 2.48,/? = .085) and a non­
significant interaction effect (F (2, 598) = 1.43,/? = .241). As this is a heterogeneous 
sample o f brain-damaged patients, including patients with very severe damage, it should 
be highly unusual that individuals with mild traumatic brain injuries would miss more 
than these numbers o f items on the first two HCT subtests.
In the Goldstein sample including cognitively impaired individuals, it was found that 
86.2% of the sample committed ten or fewer errors on Subtest VII. Significant 
differences were found between groups using a one-way ANOVA (F  (2, 598) = 13.87,/?
< .001). Post hoc Bonferroni comparisons revealed that the BD and SZ groups performed 
significantly worse than the patient-comparison group, while the BD group also 
performed significantly worse than the SZ group. Considering the severity o f impairment 
o f the majority o f individuals in this sample, an individual committing more than ten 
errors on Subtest VII may, to a high degree o f certainty relative to this sample, be 
suspected o f malingering.
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It was also found that many individuals in the Goldstein data set committed a very 
high number o f total errors on the HCT. Specifically, a cutoff o f 104 errors, representing 
incorrect responses to exactly one-half o f the HCT items, would correctly identify 65.0% 
o f BD patients, 75.9% of SZ patients, and 82.1% of patient comparisons, respectively. 
This very liberal cutoff still would appear to misclassify a large number o f BD patients. 
Thus, it appears through this preliminary data that total errors on the HCT may not serve 
as a highly effective malingering index based on this data. A one-way ANOVA revealed 
significant differences between groups (F  (2,598) = 13.87,/? < .001). Post hoc 
Bonferroni comparisons revealed that both the SZ and BD groups performed 
significantly worse on total errors than did the PC group, and the BD groups performed 
significantly worse than did the SZ group.
Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST)
Indices selected based on the literature review included, for the WCST, total errors, 
perseverative errors, an increased number o f FMS (Suhr & Boyer, 1999), an increased 
number o f Other responses (Bernard et al., 1996), and the presence of “missed perfect 
matches” (Greve et al., 2002). In order to determine what number o f errors on these 
scales would be considered statistically irregular, and thus may suggest potential 
malingering, the patients in the Allen data set were examined in terms of the indices 
mentioned above. Perseverative errors were not evaluated in this manner due to their 
highly variable relationship with total errors depending on cognitive integrity.
For FMS, it was found that none of the patients in the three Allen groups committed 
more than four failures to maintain set. A one-way ANOVA revealed no significant 
difference between the three groups (F  (2, 79) = .11,/? = .89). These results indicated
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that individuals putting forth adequate effort commit few FMS, thus demonstrating an 
ability to remain focused on the current sorting criterion. Thus, any deviation from this 
pattern in terms o f a significantly increased number o f FMS (i.e., more than four) relative 
to normal and patient controls would he statistically abnormal and may be indicative of 
malingering or inadequate effort.
For MPM, only one of the individuals in the three Allen groups was found to commit 
more than three MPM, a cutoff would correctly classified 98.8% o f these individuals. A 
one-way ANOVA revealed no significant differences between groups (F (2 , 79) = 2.20, p  
= .12). Thus, individuals with no clear incentive to malinger would be expected to make 
very few missed perfect matches, thus demonstrating the ability o f individuals in this 
sample to correctly sort cards that match a key card perfectly to that key card. Thus, an 
individual committing more than three MPM errors may, with a high level o f certainty, 
relative to this sample, be considered to be malingering.
For OE, it was found that 89.0% of the individuals in the three Allen groups made 
nine or fewer Other errors. A one-way ANOVA revealed that there were no significant 
differences between groups in terms of Other errors made (F  (2, 79) = 1.89,/? = .16). 
Thus, it would appear that an individual with no incentive to feign impairment, even in a 
sample with a highly likely presence of frontal lobe dysfunction, will not make a very 
high number o f Other errors. An individual who makes more than nine or ten Other 
errors may then be considered with a high level of certainty, relative to this sample, to be 
malingering.
For TE, it was found that many individuals in the Allen data set committed a very 
high number o f total errors on the WCST. Specifically, a cutoff o f 64 errors, representing
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incorrect responses to exactly one-half o f the WCST items (assuming the use o f two full 
decks o f 64 cards), would correctly identify 50.0% of SA patients, 55.8% of SZ patients, 
and 76.5% of patient comparisons, respectively. This very liberal cutoff still would 
appear to misclassify a large number o f all individuals in the Allen data set. Thus, it 
appears through this preliminary data that total errors on the WCST may not serve as a 
highly effective malingering index based on this data. A one-way ANOVA revealed 
significant differences between groups (F  (2,79) = 10.60, p  < .001). Post hoc Bonferroni 
comparisons revealed that both the SZ and SA groups performed significantly worse on 
total errors than did the PC group.
Table 33 in Appendix I summarizes hypothesized cutoffs derived from the archival 
data above and what percentage of individuals both in the archival data and in the current 
investigation scored at or below the cutoffs.
Data Analysis
Prior to performing primary data analysis, the groups were compared on major 
variables that could influence performance on the neuropsychological measures, 
including age and education. Differences between the groups were controlled using 
covariance procedures in the main analyses.
Analysis o f  Specific Hypotheses
The general approach to the primary data analyses was to compare the normal 
control, malingering, and brain-damaged groups (either the SZ group from the Allen data 
set, or the BD and SZ groups from the Goldstein data set) on the WCST and HCT 
indices that were developed for the current study and were predicted to be sensitive to
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malingering. The analyses evaluated the impact o f instructional set and test format 
(structured vs. unstructured) on the ability o f the malingering indices to accurately 
identify malingering participants.
Hypothesis 1
In addition to indices noted in the literature as potentially sensitive to 
malingering, specific WCST and HCT indices will be developed fo r  the current study 
that will be designed to be maximally sensitive to malingering. Signifcant differences 
will be present between the malingering groups when compared to normal control and 
brain-damaged groups on all o f  these WCST and H C T indices.
In order to discover significant differences between the groups in terms o f 
performance on the WCST and HCT malingering indices, multivariate analyses of 
variance (MANOVA) with one between-subjects factor will be used to evaluate 
Hypothesis I. The between-subjects factor will reflect participants’ group membership 
(NC, MS, MV, ME, SZ / BD). The performance o f the individuals in the malingering 
conditions will also be compared to that o f the patients with documented schizophrenia 
in the Allen data set (WCST) or schizophrenia or brain damage in the Goldstein data set 
(HCT) in order to determine if  the malingering participants were able to portray 
themselves accurately as having brain dysfunction. Separate MANOVAs will be 
conducted for the WCST and the HCT indices. It is expected that the results o f these 
MANOVAs will indicate a general pattern across all indices in which the NC and BD / 
SZ groups will not differ from each other and will perform better than the malingering 
groups. Additionally, as explicitness o f instruction increases in the malingering groups, 
performance will also improve so that the ME group will exhibit the best performance of
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the malingering groups, followed by the MV and then the MS groups. Univariate F  tests 
with planned comparisons will be performed to test these predictions for each o f the 
dependent variables included in the MANOVAs.
Dependent variables for the WCST MANOVA include participant scores on the 
following indices; total errors (TE), perseverative errors (PE), errors o f the Other type 
(OE), missed perfect matches (MPM), failure to maintain set (FMS), sub-threshold 
failure to maintain set (SFMS), and a variable computing whether or not a participant 
completed two or fewer categories in conjunction with an increased number o f  FMS and 
SFMS (PM). The dependent variables for the HCT MANOVA include participant scores 
on the following indices: total errors (TE), Subtest I errors (IE), Subtest II errors (HE), 
Subtest VII errors (VIIE), a variable reflecting each participant’s proportional errors on 
Subtests I-VI relative to Subtest VH (VI-VII), and a variable reflecting each participant’s 
proportional errors on Subtest V relative to Subtest VI (V-VI). The MANOVAs will be 
followed by simple contrasts, which will evaluate each group’s performance relative to 
the reference group (BD or SZ) on each index in order to determine if  the group was able 
to perform similarly to the reference group.
Hypothesis 2
The explicitness o f  the instructions given to the malingering groups will be 
directly associated with the participants ’ ability to escape detection; those given more 
explicit instructions will escape detection more often. Individuals in the M V and ME  
conditions will be more successful in escaping detection on WCST indices that are 
sensitive to malingered test performance than will individuals in the M S condition.
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As the goal o f Hypothesis 2 is to classify participants into predicted categories 
(groups) using several dependent variables, discriminant function analysis (DFA) will be 
used to investigate the hypothesis. DFA is used in situations where group membership 
for individuals is already known, but there is a need to predict group membership based 
on a number o f dependent variables that are thought to be related in a meaningful way to 
membership in a particular group. For the current study, group membership is 
determined by instruction set (NC, MS, MV, ME, BD / SZ), and the goal is to predict 
group membership based on indices that are thought to be sensitive to malingering 
(WCST and HCT variables). For this hypothesis, DFA will produce a mathematical 
equation that will combine dependent variables from the WCST and from the HCT in 
order to predict each participant’s membership in the malingering or non-malingering 
groups. Those dependent variables for which large between-group differences in scores 
are present are more important in the prediction process and so will be included in the 
discriminant function equation (Klecka, 1985). Less discriminating variables will not be 
included in the DFA equation. It is expected that classification accuracy will decrease as 
explicitness o f malingering instruction increases. In other words, the DFA will produce 
the most accurate classification for the NC, SZ, and MS groups, and the least accurate 
classification occurring for the MV and ME groups.
Hypothesis 3
The form at o f  a test (structured vs. unstructured) makes some neuropsychological 
measures more susceptible to successful malingering. Individuals in the malingering 
conditions will more frequently escape detection on a test ofproblem solving with
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relatively structured, unambiguous instructions (HCT) compared to a test o f  problem  
solving with relatively unstructured, unambiguous instructions (WCST).
Because Hypothesis 3 is primarily concerned with contrasting the general 
performance on the groups on the HCT and WCST, separate composite scores for the 
HCT indices and the WSCT indices will be computed. To calculate composite scores, 
raw scores will be converted to standard scores (z scores). Composite scores will equal 
the sum o f the z scores divided by the total number o f indices for the HCT and for the 
WCST. The WCST composite score will include raw scores from the indices examining 
total errors (TE), perseverative errors (PE), errors o f the Other type (OE), missed perfect 
matches (MPM), failure to maintain set (FMS), sub-threshold failure to maintain set 
(SFMS), and the variable computing whether or not a participant completed two or fewer 
categories in conjunction with an increased number of FMS and SFMS (PM). The HCT 
composite score will include raw scores from the indices examining total errors (TE), 
Subtest I errors (IE), Subtest II errors (HE), Subtest VII errors (VIIE), the variable 
reflecting each participant’s proportional errors on Subtests I-VI relative to Subtest VII 
(VI-VII), and the variable reflecting each participant’s proportional errors on Subtest V 
relative to Subtest VI (V-VI). Since these composite scores take into account an 
individual’s performance on all HCT or WCST malingering indices, they will provide an 
indication o f an individual’s overall performance on each test.
These composite scores for the HCT indices and the WSCT indices will be computed 
and subjected to two separate one-way analyses o f variance (ANOVAs). O f the three 
malingering groups in the current investigation, only the MS group will be included in 
these analyses in order to control for the possible confounding effects o f more explicit
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instruction given to the other two malingering groups. This will be done in order to most 
accurately compare the MS group’s pattern o f performance to that o f the control and 
schizophrenia / brain-damaged groups, who, like the MS group, were given no additional 
instruction on how to complete the WCST. The two ANOVAs will be followed by 
simple contrasts, which will evaluate each group’s performance on the composite scores 
relative to the reference group (BD or SZ) in order to determine if the group was able to 
perform similarly to the reference group.
It was expected that the MS group would demonstrate more exaggerated (that is, 
statistically irregular) performance on the WCST, which would suggest that the HCT and 
WCST are differentially sensitive to the detection o f malingering. More specifically, the 
structured nature o f the HCT would make it more susceptible to successful malingering 
than would be the more ambiguous, unstructured WCST, and therefore there would be 
less variability in HCT performance among the participant groups. It was anticipated that 
for both the WCST and HCT composite scores, the NC group would receive the lowest 
(best) scores, followed by the SZ / BD group, and then the MS group.
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RESULTS 
Data Screening and Preliminary Analyses 
Two data sets were developed for the analyses, each containing data from the 100 
participants in the current study. One data contained WCST data on the current 100 
participants, as well as WCST information on the 43 individuals diagnosed with 
schizophrenia (SZ) in the Allen data set. The other data set contained HCT data on the 
current 100 participants as well as HCT information on the 177 individuals diagnosed 
with heterogeneous forms of brain damage (BD) in the Goldstein data set. Descriptive 
information regarding each group’s performance on each of the WCST and HCT 
malingering indices, respectively, can be found in Tables 1 and 2 in Appendix I.
Initial comparisons were made within each data set on major demographic variables 
(age and education) which are associated with performance on neuropsychological tests. 
For the WCST data set, one-way analyses o f variance (ANOVA) revealed significant 
effects for age (F (4 , 138) = 121.11,/? < .0001) and education (F (4 , 138) = 6.53,/? < 
.0001). Post-hoc Bonferroni comparisons revealed that the SZ group from the Allen data 
set was significantly older than all four groups o f participants in the current study, having 
a mean age o f 40.56 years. The four groups from the current study did not significantly 
differ from each other in terms o f mean age. Further post-hoc Bonferroni comparisons
76
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revealed that the NC group from the current study had the highest mean years of 
education (M = 13.96 years), and that the NC, MV, and ME groups from the 
current study had significantly more years o f education than the SZ group from the 
Allen data set.
For the HCT data set, one-way ANOVAs also revealed significant effects for age (F  
(4, 272) = 99.38,/? < .0001) and education (F (4 , 272) = 22.53,/? < .0001). Post-hoc 
Bonferroni comparisons revealed that the BD group from the Goldstein data set was 
significantly older than the four groups of participants in the current study, having a 
mean age o f 43.50 years. The four groups from the current study did not significantly 
differ from each other in terms of mean age. Further post-hoc Bonferroni comparisons 
revealed that the four groups from the current study had significantly more years of 
education than the BD group. The NC group had the highest mean years o f education (M 
= 13.96 years), but the years o f education o f the four groups from the current study did 
not significantly differ from each other.
Because o f the significant findings for age and education in these data sets, age and 
education were used as covariates in all further analyses.
Analyses o f Specific Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1
In addition to indices noted in the literature as potentially sensitive to 
malingering, specific WCST and H CT indices will be developed fo r  the current study 
that will be designed to be maximally sensitive to malingering. Significant differences
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will be present between the malingering groups when compared to normal control and 
brain-damaged groups on all o f  these WCST and HCT indices.
It was hypothesized that significant differences would be present between the 
malingering groups and the normal control (NC) and schizophrenic (SZ) or brain­
damaged (BD) groups on WCST and HCT indices sensitive to malingering, respectively. 
Multivariate analyses o f covariance (MANCOVAs) were conducted using these WCST 
and HCT indices as dependent variables.
For the HCT MANCOVA, it was expected that the results would indicate a general 
pattern across all indices in which the NC and BD groups would not differ from each 
other but would perform better than the malingering groups. Additionally, it was 
expected that as explicitness o f instruction increases in the malingering groups, 
performance would also improve so that the ME group would exhibit the best 
performance o f the malingering groups, followed by the MV and then the MS groups.
The HCT MANCOVA indicated significant overall effects for age {F (6, 265) = 8.38, 
p  < .001), education (F (6 , 265) = 4.27,/? < .001), and group (F  (24, 1072) = 5.86,/? < 
.001) using the Pillai's Trace statistic. Univariate F  tests using age and education as 
covariates revealed significant differences on all hypothesized dependent variables (TE, 
IE, HE, VIIE, VI-VII, V-VI). Results o f these analyses are reflected in Table 3 in 
Appendix I.
Simple contrasts were also conducted in order to determine if  the malingering groups 
in the current study performed significantly differently on the HCT indices than the 
brain-damaged group (see Table 4 in Appendix I). In the table, estimated marginal means
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are presented, which have been adjusted to account for the influence o f the covariates 
age and education on test performance.
The NC and BD groups performed similarly on four o f the six measures (IE, HE, VI- 
VII, V-VI). Significant differences between the NC and BD groups on total errors (TE) 
and Subtest VII errors (VIIE) were accounted for by the NC group’s superior 
performance on these variables compared to that o f the BD group.
Figures 3-8 in Appendix I reflect relative group performance (using estimated 
marginal means) on the six HCT malingering variables. As expected, the MS group was 
unable to perform similarly to the BD group on any o f the six indices. However, the MV 
group was able to perform similarly to the BD group on the two variables examining 
error rate proportions on Subtests I-VI versus VII and on Subtests V versus VI. 
Furthermore, the ME group was able to perform similarly to the BD group on three 
variables (TE, VIIE, VI-VII).
For the WCST MANCOVA, it was expected that the results would indicate a general 
pattern across all indices in which the NC and SZ groups would not differ from each 
other but would perform better than the malingering groups. Additionally, it was 
expected that as explicitness o f instruction increases in the malingering groups, 
performance would also improve so that the ME group would exhibit the best 
performance o f the malingering groups, followed by the MV and then the MS groups.
The WCST MANCOVA indicated significant overall effects for age (F  (7, 130) = 
5.10,/? < .001) and group (F (28, 532) = 5.60,/? < .001) using the Pillai’s Trace statistic. 
However, the overall effects for education were not significant (F (7 , 130) = 1.88,/? = 
.08). Univariate F  tests using age and education as covariates revealed significant
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differences on five o f the seven hypothesized dependent variables (TE, PE, OE, FMS, 
SFMS, MPM, PM). Results o f these analyses are reflected in Table 5 in Appendix I.
Simple contrasts were also conducted in order to determine if  the malingering groups 
in the current study would perform significantly differently on the WCST indices than 
the schizophrenic group (see Table 6 in Appendix I). In the table, estimated marginal 
means are presented, which have been adjusted to account for the influence o f the 
covariates age and education on test performance. Since there were no significant 
differences between the groups on the variables OE and MPM, further analyses o f these 
variables were not performed.
Figures 9-15 in Appendix I reflect relative group performance (using estimated 
marginal means) on the seven WCST malingering variables. The NC and SZ groups 
performed similarly on four o f the five significant measures (PE, FMS, SFMS, PM). 
Significant differences between the NC and SZ groups on total errors (TE) were 
accounted for by the NC group’s superior performance on this variable compared to that 
o f the SZ group.
The MS group was able to perform similarly to the SZ group on only one o f the five 
significant indices (PE). The MV group was able to perform similarly to the SZ group on 
two of the five significant variables (TE, PE). However, the ME group was able to 
perform similarly to the SZ group on three variables (TE, PE, PM).
Further analysis o f the PM variable was conducted by examining cross-tabulations o f 
the variable by group membership. It was revealed that none of the NC or SZ individuals 
were incorrectly classified as potential malingerers. Fourteen (56%) of the MS 
participants and 17 (68%) o f the MV participants were correctly classified as malingerers
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by this formula. However, only three (12%) of the ME participants were correctly 
classified as malingerers by this formula. The PM formula effectively identified a large 
proportion o f the malingering participants as such. However, the results also demonstrate 
that the vast majority o f ME participants were sufficiently coached in order to evade 
being detected as malingerers at least on this variable.
Overall, results of the analyses o f Hypothesis 1 indicate that individuals in the 
malingering groups performed significantly differently, and on the majority o f variables, 
significantly worse than the NC and SZ groups on the WCST, and the NC and BD 
groups on the HCT. On the HCT, IE and HE were found to most effectively discriminate 
between the malingering and non-malingering groups. On the WCST, SFMS, FMS, and 
PM were found to most effectively discriminate between the malingering and non­
malingering groups. However, the ME group was able to perform similarly to the NC 
and SZ groups on the PM variable, suggesting that the explicitness o f their instruction on 
the WCST may have helped them to perform more like normal or brain-damaged 
individuals and less like malingerers.
Hypothesis 2
The explicitness o f  the instructions given to the malingering groups will be 
directly associated with the participants ’ ability to escape detection; those given more 
explicit instructions will escape detection more often. Individuals in the M V and ME 
conditions will be more successful in escaping detection on WCST indices that are 
sensitive to malingered test performance than will individuals in the M S condition.
It was expected that classification accuracy o f the discriminant function analysis 
(DFA) would decrease as explicitness o f malingering instruction increased. In other
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words, using WCST malingering indices, the DFA was expected to produce the most 
accurate classification o f the NC, SZ, and MS groups, and the least accurate 
classification o f the MV and ME groups. Further, using HCT malingering indices, the 
DFA was expected to produce the most accurate classification o f the NC, BD / SZ, and 
MS groups, and the least accurate classification o f the MV and ME groups.
A stepwise DFA was performed including the WCST variables included in analysis 
o f Hypothesis 1 (TE, PE, OE, FMS, SFMS, MPM, PM) in order to classify the 
participants in the current study (NC, MS, MV, ME) as well as the schizophrenic 
patients from the Allen data set (SZ). Tahle 7 in Appendix I reflects the predictor 
variables that were found to significantly contribute to the classification o f the five 
participant groups, while Table 8 in Appendix I reflects classification analysis o f the five 
groups.
The variables found to account for the most variance in the DFA were TE, PM, FMS, 
and SFMS, respectively (allp 's  < .001). Consistent with expectations, the NC and SZ 
groups were the most accurately classified participants, with only 8% and 14% 
misclassification rates, respectively. However, contrary to expectations, the third highest 
accurate classification rate was for participants in the ME group. Although 60% of the 
ME participants were correctly classified as such, notahly, 24% o f these participants 
were incorrectly classified as control participants. Further, contrary to hypotheses, the 
MS group was the least accurately classified group, with 76% of its actual group 
members being incorrectly classified into other groups. Notably, 20% of the MS 
participants were misclassified as belonging to the reference cognitive-impairment group 
(SZ), and 12% o f the MV participants were similarly misclassified as belonging to the
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SZ group. However, only 4% of the ME participants were incorrectly classified as 
belonging to the SZ group. Overall, the DFA correctly classified 65.7% o f the 
participants into their original groups. Standardized discriminant function coefficients 
and correlations o f predictor variables with the discriminant functions are presented in 
Table 9 in Appendix I.
The DFA procedure also produced Fisher’s classification coefficients, which can be 
combined in a formula in order to attempt to classify future cases as to their correct 
grouping (i.e., normal control, malingerer, brain damage, other condition, etc.). A linear 
discriminant function using Fisher’s classification coefficients was calculated for each 
participant group. To use these linear discriminant function values, one would multiply 
the individual’s raw WCST scores for TE, FMS, SFMS, and PM by the coefficients for 
either the MS, MV, or ME groups, and then add the constant value. One would then 
repeat this process using the NC and SZ coefficients. Then, the individual would be 
classified to that group whose linear discriminant function calculation produced the 
largest value. The Fisher’s classification coefficient values for each group’s (i.e., NC, 
MS, MV, ME, SZ) linear discriminant function are provided in Table 10 in Appendix I 
for the first WCST DFA.
The inability of DFA to adequately distinguish between the malingering groups 
indicated that the groups performed relatively similarly on the malingering indices. 
Therefore, a second exploratory stepwise DFA was conducted in an identical fashion to 
the first. However, only three groups were included (NC, SZ, and a third group 
containing all 75 malingering participants [M]), in order to determine the WCST indices’ 
power to discriminate all malingering participants from participants in the NC and SZ
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groups. A similar pattern o f results was found, in that the variables found to account for 
the most variance in this DFA included TE, FMS, PM, SFMS, and MPM, respectively 
(all p ’s < .001). In this formula, 92.0% o f NC participants, 81.3% o f all malingering 
participants, and 79.1% o f SZ patients were correctly identified as belonging to their 
original respective groups. The overall correct-classification rate was 82.5% (see Table 
12 in Appendix I; also see Table 11 in Appendix I for the significant predictor variables 
for the second DFA). Standardized discriminant function coefficients and correlations of 
predictor variables with the discriminant functions for the second DFA are presented in 
Table 13 in Appendix I.
Again, the second WCST DFA procedure produced Fisher’s classification 
coefficients for each group’s (i.e., NC, M, SZ) linear discriminant function, which are 
provided in Table 14 in Appendix I.
Another exploratory DFA were conducted in order to evaluate the HCT indices’ 
ability to discriminate between malingering, normal control, and the Goldstein brain­
damaged groups. In this DFA, participants were classified into either the malingering 
(M), brain-damaged (BD), or control (NC) groups. The three malingering groups were 
not separately evaluated since all malingering groups in the current investigation 
received only standard HCT instructions with no other information on how they might 
feign impairment on this test. The results o f the DFA indicated correct classification of 
83.8% of the sample. Classification rates are presented in Table 15 in Appendix I. As can 
be seen from the table, 73.3% of the malingerers were correctly classified using the three 
significant HCT indices, which were Subtest I errors (IE), total errors (TE), and Subtest
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II errors (HE), respectively. Also o f note is the very low percentage o f BD patients 
(3.4%) misclassified as malingerers.
Significant predictor variables for the first HCT DFA are presented in Table 16 in 
Appendix I, while standardized discriminant function coefficients and correlations of 
predictor variables with the discriminant functions for the first DFA are presented in 
Table 17 in Appendix I. The first HCT DFA also procedure produced Fisher’s 
classification coefficients for each group’s (i.e., NC, M, BD) linear discriminant 
function, which are provided in Table 18 in Appendix I.
A final exploratory DFA using HCT variables, identical in fashion to the last, was 
conducted on using the NC, M, and Goldstein SZ group in order to determine if  similar 
classification rates could be found using the reference SZ group instead o f the BD group. 
The results o f the DFA indicated correct classification of 84.8% of the sample. 
Classification rates are presented in Table 20 below and in Appendix I. As can be seen 
from the table, 70.7% of the malingerers were correctly classified using the three 
significant HCT indices, which were identical to those in the previous HCT DFA and 
again included Subtest I errors (IE), total errors (TE), and Subtest II errors (HE), 
respectively. Also o f note again is the very low percentage of SZ patients (3.1%) 
misclassified as malingerers.
Significant predictor variables for the second HCT DFA are presented in Table 19 in 
Appendix I, while standardized discriminant function coefficients and correlations of 
predictor variables with the discriminant functions for the second HCT DFA are 
presented in Table 21 in Appendix I. Again, the second HCT DFA procedure produced
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Fisher’s classification coefficients for each group’s (i.e., NC, M, SZ) linear discriminant 
function, which are provided in Table 22 in Appendix I.
Overall, the WCST DFA was most effective in classifying individuals into their 
original groups when the three malingering groups were combined into a single 
malingering group. The variables most effective in discriminating between the NC, SZ, 
and M groups were TE, FMS, PM, SFMS, and MPM, three o f which (FMS, PM, and 
SFMS) were also those found most able to discriminate between malingering and non­
malingering groups in Hypothesis 1. For the HCT, both DFAs examining the 
performance of the NC, M, and SZ / BD groups found IE, TE, and HE to be most 
effective in discriminating between the groups. Two of these variables (IE and HE) were 
also those found in Hypothesis 1 to most effectively discriminate between malingering 
and non-malingering groups. However, contrary to the hypothesis, individuals in the ME 
group were actually the least frequently accurately classified, while individuals in the MS 
group were most frequently accurately classified.
Hypothesis 3
The form at o f  a test (structured vs. unstructured) makes some neuropsychological 
measures more susceptible to successful malingering. Individuals in the malingering 
conditions will more frequently escape detection on a test ofproblem solving with 
relatively structured, unambiguous instructions (HCT) compared to a test o f  problem  
solving with relatively unstructured, unambiguous instructions (WCST).
In order to examine the general performance o f the NC, MS, and archival brain­
damaged groups on the HCT and WCST, separate composite scores for the HCT indices 
and the WSCT indices were computed and subjected to two separate one-way analyses
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of variance (ANOVAs). O f the three malingering groups in the current investigation, 
only the MS group was included in these analyses in order to control for the possible 
confounding effects o f more explicit instruction given to the other two malingering 
groups. This was done in order to most accurately compare the MS group’s pattern of 
performance to that o f the control and schizophrenia / brain-damaged groups, who, like 
the MS group, were given no additional instruction on how to complete the WCST.
It was expected that the MS group would demonstrate more exaggerated (that is, 
statistically irregular) performance on the WCST, which would suggest that the HCT and 
WCST are differentially sensitive to the detection o f malingering. More specifically, the 
structured nature o f the HCT would make it more susceptible to successful malingering 
than would be the more ambiguous, unstructured WCST, and therefore there would be 
less variability in HCT performance among the participant groups. However, it was 
anticipated that for both the WCST and HCT composite scores, the NC group would 
receive the lowest (best) scores, followed by the SZ / BD group, and then the MS group.
Estimated marginal means, taking into account the covariates age and education, for 
the WCST composite score and the HCT composite score are reflected in Figure 16 in 
Appendix I. Results o f the two ANOVAs are reflected in Table 23 in Appendix I.
As expected, on the WCST composite score variable, the NC group obtained the 
lowest composite score, reflecting the best performance, and was followed by the SZ 
group, with the MS group demonstrating the highest eomposite score, or worst 
performance. Simple contrasts revealed that there was not a significant difference 
between the average composite scores o f the NC and SZ groups, but that the MS group 
did perform significantly worse than the SZ group (p = .001).
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Similar results were found for the HCT composite score variable. Again, the NC 
group obtained the lowest composite score, reflecting the best performance, and was 
followed by the SZ, BD, and MS groups, respectively. Simple contrasts revealed no 
significant differences between the NC or SZ and BD average composite scores, but 
revealed that the MS group performed significantly worse than the BD group {p < .001).
As there were no significant differences between the NC and SZ groups on the 
WCST composite score, or between the NC or SZ and BD groups on the HCT composite 
score, a difference score (WCST composite score minus HCT composite score) was 
calculated for the NC and MS groups. This was done in order to determine if  it was 
indeed harder to malinger successfully on the WCST, as predicted in Hypothesis 3. It 
was expected that the MS group would obtain a higher (i.e., positive) difference score, in 
that a positive score would reflect worse performance on the WCST, and a negative 
score would reflect worse performance on the HCT. A difference score o f zero would 
reflect identical performance as measured by the malingering indices for the two tests. 
These difference scores for the two groups were subjected to a one-way ANOVA.
Results o f the ANOVA indicated a significant difference between the NC and MS 
groups ( F ( l ,  48) = 6.52,p  = .01). However, contrary to expectations, mean scores 
revealed that while the NC group performed slightly better on the HCT (M = .0035, SD = 
.33), the MS group actually performed worse on the HCT, as reflected in a much lower 
mean score (M  = -.41, SD = .74). This difference can be noted in Figure 16, Appendix I.
Hypothesis 3 revealed that contrary to expectations, the malingering participants 
performed much worse on the HCT than on the WCST, while normal-control 
participants performed similarly on both tests and actually slightly better on the HCT.
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Thus, malingering participants did not necessarily find the HCT easier to successfully 
feign, as expected.
Additional Analyses
Principal Components Analysis
In order to identify potential dimensions of malingered performance used by 
participants to demonstrate neuropsychological impairment, the data from the current 
study and the Allen and Goldstein archival data sets were subjected to principal- 
components analysis (PCA) using varimax rotation. The same dependent variables for 
the WCST and HCT described above were included in two separate analyses. The 
WCST analysis included the three malingering groups from the current study and the SZ 
group from the Allen data set. The HCT analysis included the three malingering groups 
from the current study and the SZ and BD groups from the Goldstein data set. The 
control participants from the current study were excluded because the goal of the PGA 
was to examine what factors could be identified in the performances o f the various 
theoretically “impaired” groups.
The results o f the WCST and HCT PCAs are presented in Tables 24 and 26 in 
Appendix I, which include the factor loadings, eigenvalues and percentage o f variance 
accounted for by each factor. Intercorrelation matrices for both the WCST and HCT 
malingering indices can be found in Tables 25 and 27 in Appendix I. The WCST PCA 
revealed three clear-cut factors. The indices TE, PE, and FMS comprised the first factor. 
TE and PE had relatively high positive loadings on Factor 1, while FMS had a high 
negative loading on Factor 1. TE, PE and FMS had relatively low loadings on Factors 2 
and 3. Because TE, PE and FMS all reflect number o f errors, this factor appears to
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measure number o f errors committed by the groups. The second factor included the 
indices OE and MPM, which had low loadings on Factors 1 and 3, and relatively high 
positive loadings on Factor 2. OE and MPM are indices o f unusual seldom-made errors 
on the WCST, suggesting that Factor 2 assesses bizarre responding. The final factor was 
comprised o f the indices PM and SFMS, which had relatively high loadings on Factor 3 
and low loadings on Factors 1 and 2. These indices both assess inconsistent patterns of 
responding, suggesting that Factor 3 measures inconsistent responding.
The results o f the HCT PCA also revealed three predominant factors. The first was 
composed o f the indices TE and VIIE, which had relatively high loadings on Factor 1 
and low loadings on Factors 2 and 3. Like Factor 1 from the WCST, this factor also 
reflects the number o f errors participants made. The second factor was composed o f the 
indices IE and HE, with relatively high loadings, and V-VI, with a moderate loading. 
Similar to Factor 2 from the WCST, errors on IE and HE are highly unusual, even in 
brain-damaged populations, indicating that Factor 2 assesses unusual or bizarre 
responding. The third factor was composed of the index VI-VII, which had a high 
loading on Factor 3, and the indices VIIE and V-VI, which had moderate loadings on 
Factor 3. These indices were specifically designed to evaluate a memory component of 
the HCT, suggesting that Factor 3 assesses memory for previously learned problem 
solving strategies.
Factor scores were calculated using the regression-based method, which produced 
factor scores with means o f zero and standard deviations of one. All o f the malingering 
indices contributed to each factor score, with the magnitude of their contributions 
determined by their relative loading on the respective factor.
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One-way ANOVAs, using age and education as covariates, were conducted on the 
WCST and HCT factor scores to determine how well they could successfully 
discriminate between malingering and brain-damaged / schizophrenic individuals. Tables 
31 and 32 in Appendix I present results from the WCST and HCT ANOVAs. For the 
WCST, it was found that Factors 1 and 2 both successfully discriminated between 
malingering and non-malingering groups (p’s < .001). Factor 3 did not significantly 
discriminate between groups (p = .675).
For the HCT, it was found that Factor 1 did not discriminate between groups, but did 
approach significance (p = .06). Factor 2, which was comprised o f IE, HE, and V-VI to a 
lesser degree, did significantly discriminate between groups (p < .001). On this factor, all 
three malingering groups performed significantly differently than the BD group, as 
revealed by simple contrasts. Further, there was no significant difference between the SZ 
and BD groups. Factor 3 also discriminated between the groups (p < .01). The MS group 
performed significantly differently than the SZ group, although the other malingering 
groups did not significantly differ from the SZ group.
A second set o f exploratory PCAs were conducted using only the three malingering 
groups from the current investigation. This was done to determine if  the WCST and HCT 
performances o f those individuals instructed to malinger (and thus known to constitute 
“malingering” samples) would reduce into similar factors as were found in the PCAs 
using the reference brain-damaged / schizophrenic groups. It was expected that fewer 
factors would result, since the follow-up ANOVAs on the first set o f PCAs revealed that 
at least one o f the factors derived from both the WCST and HCT may not be able to 
significantly differentiate between malingering and non-malingering groups. The results
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of the second WCST and HCT PCAs are presented in Tables 28 and 29 in Appendix I, 
which include the factor loadings, eigenvalues and percentage of variance accounted for 
by each factor.
The second WCST PCA using only the three malingering groups again revealed 
three relatively clear-cut factors. Again, the indices TE, PE, and FMS comprised the first 
factor. Each o f these indices had relatively high loadings on Factor 1, and relatively low 
loadings on Factors 2 and 3 (with the exception o f TE, which had a moderate loading on 
Factor 2). The second factor included the indices OE and MPM, which had low loadings 
on Factors 1 and 3, and relatively high loadings on Factor 2. TE also appeared on Factor 
2 with a moderate loading. The final factor was comprised o f the indices PM and SFMS, 
which had high loadings on Factor 3 and low loadings on Factors 1 and 2.
The results o f the second HCT PCA indicated only two factors. The first was 
composed o f five o f the six hypothesized malingering indices (IE, HE, VIIE, TE, V-VI). 
Four of these five (IE, HE, VIIE, TE) had relatively high loadings on factor 1, while the 
fifth (V-VI) had a more moderate loading on Factor 1. The second factor was composed 
of the indices VIIE and VI-VII with relatively high loadings on Factor 2, and V-VI, with 
a more moderate loading on Factor 2. Due to the change in number o f salient factors, 
intercorrelations o f HCT malingering indices were recalculated, using only the 75 
malingering participants.
In sum, both WCST PCAs revealed similar patterns of results, in that three elear-eut 
factors were extracted whether or not the reference cognitive-impairment group was 
included in analyses. However, for the HCT, a three-factor solution extracted with the
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inclusion o f the reference cognitive-impairment groups was reduced to a two-factor 
solution when the reference groups were excluded from analyses.
Examination o f  Cutoff Scores
Application o f the cutoff scores derived on the archival data sets in Chapter 2 
revealed that the WCST malingering indices with the best specificity (i.e., those that do 
not misclassify more than 10% of the archival patient population and NC participants 
from the current study as malingerers) were FMS, SFMS, PM, MPM, and OE. The HCT 
malingering indices found to be most useful were IE, HE, and VIIE. These results largely 
support those o f Hypothesis 1. These variables were among those found to be the most 
significant in distinguishing among malingering and non-malingering groups, per the 
simple contrasts conducted as follow-up for the MANCOVAs o f Hypothesis I. Simple 
contrasts revealed that the most salient discriminators for the WCST were FMS, SFMS, 
and PM, and IE and HE for the HCT. Table 33 in Appendix I reflects the hypothesized 
cutoff scores derived in Chapter 2 and applied to the data from the current investigation 
here.
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CHAPTER 4 
DISCUSSION
This study involved the first known attempt to coach malingering-group participants 
not only on the typical signs and symptoms of mild traumatic brain injury, but also on 
explicit test structure and content in order to more sufficiently prepare them to be able to 
successfully evade detection as malingerers during neuropsychological evaluation. This 
study extended previous research regarding the use o f the Halstead Category Test and the 
Wisconsin Card Sorting Test in the detection o f malingering.
Hypothesis 1
The results o f analyses o f Hypothesis 1 produced several interesting findings. The 
overall goal o f Hypothesis 1 was to determine if  malingering participants performed 
significantly differently than normal control / reference cognitive-impairment individuals 
on WCST and HCT malingering indices, and secondarily, if level o f malingering 
instruction could assist participants in the malingering -  explicit instruction condition in 
evading detection as malingerers. One o f the most notable findings is that only a few of 
the malingering indices included in the current investigation were resistant to the effects 
o f malingering, regardless o f the level o f instructions. On three o f the seven WCST
94
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malingering indices examined (TE, PE, OE, FMS, SFMS, MPM, PM), the malingering 
group given the most explicit instructions was able to perform similarly to 
the schizophrenia group and thereby “escape detection” as malingerers, unlike the 
participants in either o f the lesser-coached malingering groups. The indices on which the 
schizophrenia and explicit-malingering groups performed similarly were total errors, 
perseverative errors, and the potential malingering variable.
Although these findings in part suggest that the explicitly-coached malingering group 
may have been coached sufficiently well in order to perform like the reference cognitive- 
impairment SZ group on total errors and perseverative errors, other evidence suggested 
that these indices are not capable o f sufficiently differentiating between malingerers and 
non-malingerers. All three o f the malingering groups performed similarly to the 
schizophrenia group on perseverative errors, and only the standard-malingering group 
performed significantly worse than the schizophrenia group on total errors. Thus, total 
errors and perseverative errors may not be the most accurate indicators o f potential 
malingering due to their inability to sufficiently distinguish among malingering and non­
malingering groups.
In light o f the inability o f the total and perseverative error scores to effectively 
discriminate between groups, perhaps the most telling finding is that on the potential 
malingering variable (which examines whether or not an individual completes two or 
fewer categories while simultaneously eommitting more than two FMS and more than 
two SFMS), the normal control, schizophrenia, and explicit-malingering groups did not 
differ significantly. None o f the normal control or schizophrenic individuals were 
misclassified by this formula as malingerers, and only 12% o f explicit-malingering
95
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participants were classified as malingerers. However, 56% o f the malingerers given only 
standard instruction, and 68% of the malingerers given vague instructions, were correctly 
classified as malingerers.
This evidence suggests that the explicit nature o f the coaching given to participants 
in the explicitly-coached malingering group was sufficient to aid these individuals in 
evading detection as malingerers by responding in a less haphazard fashion than did 
participants in the other malingering groups. The evidence also suggests that the main 
goal of this research, which was to show that a priori knowledge about 
neuropsychological measures may be able to produce more believable brain-injured 
performance in potential malingerers, was accomplished, at least in terms o f this newly 
developed malingering index. The composite potential malingering variable may prove 
to be useful in the identification o f suspected malingerers and should be further 
investigated using actual suspected malingerers.
Further, the evidence from Hypothesis 1 suggests that the WCST malingering indices 
in this study best able to identify malingerers were failures to maintain set and sub­
threshold failures to maintain set (FMS and SFMS). Normal control and schizophrenic 
participants performed similarly on these indices, while all malingering groups, even 
participants in the explicitly-coached condition, performed significantly differently than 
normal controls and schizophrenic individuals on two o f the potential malingering 
variable’s component measures (FMS and SFMS). This findings occurs in spite o f the 
fact that all three malingering groups were specifically instructed to not make errors 
sporadically, and the vague- and explicitly-coached groups were told to be unable to 
complete a category (i.e., commit an FMS error) only once.
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For the HCT, on three o f the six malingering indices examined (TE, IE, HE, VIIE, V-
VI, VI-VII), the explicitly-coached malingering group was able to perform similarly to 
the reference brain-damaged group and thereby “escape detection” as malingerers, unlike 
the participants in either o f the two lesser-coached malingering groups. These indices 
were total errors, errors on Subtest VII, and the variable examining proportional error 
rates between the first six subtests and Subtest VII (VI-VII). The explicitly-coached 
malingering group was the only group to perform similarly to the brain-damaged group 
on total errors and errors on Subtest VII, suggesting that these indices may be easily 
faked if  examinees are accordingly instructed. However, the vaguely- and explicitly 
coached malingering groups and the normal control group performed similarly on VI-
VII, suggesting that at least in this sample, this index may not be able to effectively 
discriminate between malingering and non-malingering groups.
On two o f the HCT indices (errors on Subtests I and II), none of the malingering 
groups were able to perform similarly to the brain damaged and normal control groups, 
which suggests that these two indices are potentially powerful indicators o f suspected 
malingering. These results also confirm the findings in the literature (e.g., Tenhula and 
Sweet, 1996; DiCarlo et al., 2000) suggesting that indeed, the HCT indices perhaps most 
sensitive to malingering are errors on Subtest I and errors on Subtest II. However, it 
should be noted that participants in the current study were not coached as to HCT 
structure and content, only WCST structure and content. If actual litigants were 
instructed to simply respond to all items on the first two HCT subtests correctly, the 
power o f these indicators would be greatly reduced.
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Hypothesis 2
Hypothesis 2 was designed to determine if it would be easier to classify individuals 
to their original groups using discriminant function analysis depending on their level o f 
malingering instruction. Results indicated differences in malingering-group WCST 
performance based on the explicitness o f instructions, although these differences were 
not entirely consistent with predictions. Interestingly, as the explicitness o f instruction 
increased, performance on the WCST tended to normalize. The first WCST discriminant 
function analysis indicated that 72% of both the standard-instruction and explicitly- 
coached malingering participants were correctly classified as being some type of 
malingerer (see Table 8 in Appendix I). However, 24% o f the ME participants, who 
received the most explicit instructions regarding the WCST, were misclassified as 
normal controls, and 4% were misclassified as schizophrenic. On the other hand, 8% of 
the standard-instruction malingering participants, which received the least explicit 
instructions, were misclassified as normal controls, and 20% were misclassified as 
schizophrenic. This pattern of results suggests that as explicitness o f instructions 
increased, the participants were more likely to exhibit “normal” performance. In contrast, 
being given standard instructions appeared to produce higher misclassification into the 
impaired (schizophrenic) group and fewer misclassifications into the normal control 
group. The influence of the explicitness o f instructional set on WCST and HCT 
performance is further discussed below (see “Generalization o f Coaching”).
Overall, however, the classification rates o f the WCST and HCT discriminant 
function analyses were extremely high. These high rates indicate that the WCST and 
HCT malingering indices identified through analysis o f variance procedures in
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Hypothesis 1, stepwise exploratory DFA in Hypothesis 2, and examination o f cutoff 
scores (to be discussed below) are robust and potentially extremely sensitive to even 
well-coached malingerers. However, it should be noted that the discriminant function 
analyses involved in this study constituted exploratory analyses and thus require future 
confirmatory cross-validation study.
Hypothesis 3
Hypothesis 3 was designed to determine if individuals in the malingering groups 
would find it easier to successfully feign impairment on a more structured test whose 
requirements are more apparent (HCT) than a more ambiguous, unstructured test whose 
requirements are less clear (WCST). To this end, composite scores for the WCST and 
HCT were computed, and included newly and previously developed malingering indices. 
Results from analysis o f Hypothesis 3 largely disconfirm expectations, in that the HCT 
did not appear to be “easier to fake” than the WCST. In fact, some o f the results, such as 
the examination o f mean group differences between WCST and HCT composite scores, 
suggest that participants were in fact more likely to escape detection as malingerers on 
the WCST. These mean scores reflect some useful information, such as the fact that the 
normal control group had a much smaller absolute-value difference score than did the 
standard-instruction malingering group. This suggests that normal control (and 
schizophrenic) participants found the two tests to be o f similar difficulty in terms o f their 
stated goal (i.e., to perform well and put forth their best effort). However, the much 
larger absolute value o f the standard-instruction malingering group’s difference score 
suggests that these participants found the HCT to be much more difficult relative to their
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stated goal (i.e., to malinger successfully). Since only the standard-instruction 
malingering group was included in the analyses for Hypothesis 3, these results were not 
confounded by the additional information about the WCST given to the MV and ME 
groups. Future research, which should examine the HCT and WCST performances o f 
individuals coached on both tests, may shed additional light on these unexpected 
findings. Individuals coached on how to successfully malinger on the HCT, based on the 
results of the current investigation, may in fact find the HCT easier on which to 
demonstrate impairment, contrary to current findings.
Additional Analyses 
Principal Components Analysis 
Principal components analysis o f the WCST and HCT revealed a number o f factors 
that reflected the underlying constructs measured by the tests, as well as potential 
dimensions o f malingered performance that may reflect strategies used to feign brain 
impairment by the malingering participants in the current study. For the WCST, the first 
factor was composed of perseverative errors, total errors, and failures to maintain set. 
This first factor appears to measure a response pattern that reflects number o f errors and 
perseverative errors. Positive loadings were present for total and perseverative errors on 
this factor, while FMS exhibited a negative loading. This factor superficially resembles 
one of the WCST malingering dimensions highlighted by Greve et al. (2002), which 
seemed to heavily rely upon the commission of many FMS and the avoidance o f too 
many consecutive correct sorts. However, the data from the current investigation suggest 
that the negative loading o f FMS on Factor 1 can be explained by the expected decrease
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in FMS scores as more errors are made. Specifically, individuals who were committing 
more errors were committing fewer FMS. The reverse is also true, since the commission 
o f a high number o f FMS necessitates making at least five correct sorts before losing set 
by making an error. This factor was found to significantly discriminate between 
malingering and non-malingering groups in the first PCA, and was also indicated in the 
second PCA using only the three malingering groups. These findings suggest that the 
commission o f a high number o f errors may represent a salient dimension o f malingered 
performance used by many of the malingering participants.
The second WCST factor appeared to reflect another distinct, dominant approach to 
demonstrating impairment, which involved producing many bizarre, unusual responses. 
This factor can be easily compared with another o f Greve et al.’s (2002) potential 
malingering dimensions involving the avoidance o f sorting cards to any o f the three 
criteria. Such responses came in the form of Other responses and “missed perfect 
matches,” a specific type o f Other response that corresponds to the misplacement o f a 
card that matches one o f the four stimulus cards perfectly on all three criteria (color, 
form, number). This factor was found to significantly discriminate between malingering 
and non-malingering groups in the first PCA, and was also indicated in the second PCA 
using only the three malingering groups, with the additional inclusion o f total errors with 
a moderate loading. This result from the second PCA would suggest that the malingering 
participants were attempting to make many unusual responses (and thus more total 
errors) that are less frequently demonstrated in truly impaired samples. It appears that 
this may have been a specific dimension o f malingered impairment demonstrated across 
the malingering groups.
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The third WCST factor solution appeared to relate to measures o f inconsistency, 
which were tapped by sub-threshold failures to maintain set and the potential 
malingering variable, as well as by FMS to a smaller degree. The second PCA using only 
the malingering groups revealed a third factor composed almost exclusively o f SFMS 
and the potential malingering variable. These findings would suggest that the 
malingering groups in the current investigation were demonstrating a dimension of 
malingered impairment that relied predominately on rapidly switching between correct 
and incorrect responding. This factor, then, may represent a pattern o f responding that is 
rarely seen in truly brain-damaged populations (as was the case in the Allen and 
Goldstein data sets used in the current investigation).
Greve et al.’s (2002) third suggested malingering strategy, the demonstration o f 
“superficially valid” performance (p. 190), was not explicitly reflected in the PCA 
solutions. However, one can speculate that this was the approach selected by many 
participants in the explicitly-coached malingering group, as 24% of these participants 
were misclassified as normal controls.
The first HCT PCA also resulted in three relatively distinct factor solutions. The first 
factor included strong loadings for total errors and errors on Subtest VII, which would 
seem to indicate general overall impairment. This factor was not found to significantly 
discriminate between malingering and non-malingering groups, however, suggesting it 
may not have been a salient dimension by which malingerers chose to appear impaired. 
The second factor appeared to reflect what could be considered a distinct dimension of 
malingered performance, as this factor was found to be highly dependent on errors made 
in Subtests I and II. Such errors, like the Other and “missed perfect matches” o f the
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WCST, are relatively rare among true brain-damaged populations and therefore may 
reflect an invalid attempt to demonstrate cognitive deficit. This second factor was the 
only one from the first HCT PCA found to significantly discriminate between 
malingering and non-malingering groups, suggesting that it may be a rather popular 
dimension through which malingerers may demonstrate “impairment.”
The third HCT factor appeared to reflect a memory component, with a high factor 
loading for the variable examining proportional error rates on the first six subtests versus 
Subtest VII (VI-VII) and a moderate loading for the variable examining proportional 
error rates on Subtest V versus Subtest VI (V-VI). There was also a moderate negative 
relationship between these two indices and errors on Subtest VII. This pattern seems to 
suggest that as scores on the two proportional indices increase (reflecting better 
performance on the memory subtests VII and VI, respectively), the number o f errors 
committed in Subtest VII decrease. Alternatively, and perhaps more germane to the 
malingering groups, as scores on the two proportional indices decrease (reflecting worse 
performance on the two memory subtests), the number o f Subtest VII errors increase. 
This trend seems to indicate a somewhat subtle memory-related dimension for 
demonstrating impairment that may not even be discernible to individuals putting forth 
less than adequate effort on the HCT but that nevertheless may be sensitive to 
malingered test performance. This factor, however, was not found to significantly 
discriminate between malingering and non-malingering groups.
The second HCT PCA conducted using only the three malingering groups, however, 
resulted in only a two-factor solution. The first factor, which included five of the six 
malingering indices (IE, HE, VIIE, TE, V-VI), appears to reflect a broad approach to
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feigning cognitive impairment based on committing a high number o f errors on all 
subtests and therefore overall. This factor, which accounted for nearly 54% o f the 
variance, may represent an approach to malingering that, for the layperson, is very 
enticing and salient, in that it requires them only to make many different types o f errors 
without having to focus on one, very circumscribed method for demonstrating 
impairment. The second factor, like the third in the first HCT PCA, appeared to reflect 
an approach to malingering that was dependent upon demonstrating a memory deficit. 
The indices included in this second factor (VIIE, V-VI, VI-VII) all require to ability to 
recall past trials in order to successfully complete the HCT.
PCA solutions comparing the malingering group only to combined malingering and 
clinical groups (either schizophrenic or brain-damaged) indicated that for the WCST, the 
three-factor solution was robust. Similar factors were extracted regardless o f whether the 
schizophrenic group was included in or excluded from the PCA. However, for the HCT, 
significant differences between factor structures were present when including or 
excluding either the brain-damaged or schizophrenic groups.
In sum, both WCST principal components analyses revealed that, regardless o f 
inclusion o f the reference schizophrenia group in analyses, the three overall dimensions 
that permeated participants’ performance on the WCST reflected a tendency to make 
many errors overall, a tendency to make bizarre, unusual errors, and a tendency to 
perform inconsistently. These dimensions appear to reflect specific malingering 
strategies used by the malingering-group participants in order to demonstrate cognitive 
impairment. For the HCT, the principal components analysis including the reference 
cognitive-impairment groups also revealed three dimensions o f HCT performance, which
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were largely identical to those revealed for the WCST. These dimensions included a 
tendency to make many errors overall, a tendency to make bizarre, unusual responses, 
and a tendency to “forget” previously learned material. However, when the cognitive- 
impairment groups were removed from analyses, the second principal components 
analysis revealed only two factors. These two factors were also revealed in the first HCT 
analysis and reflected a tendency to make many errors overall and a tendency to make 
errors that would reflect the presence of a memory deficit.
The change in HCT factor structure when the malingering groups were examined 
alone or in combination with the schizophrenic or brain-damaged groups may have been 
caused by a number o f factors. First, variability in performance across groups will affect 
the relations between the indices, which could have accounted for the difference in 
solutions. Allen et al. (1998) and others have reported differences between normal and 
neurological populations in the factor structure o f intellectual and cognitive assessment 
procedures. These differences reflect the sensitivity o f assessment procedures to specific 
patterns o f brain damage or performance abnormalities that vary based on the sample 
under consideration and the complexity o f the assessment procedures that are used. For 
the current study, it is clear the malingering groups performed differently than the 
comparison groups (brain damage, schizophrenia, normal control) on many o f the 
malingering indices. These differences were observed for level o f performance, and were 
also observed for variability in performance. In general, the malingering groups 
exhibited more variability on all HCT malingering indices (excluding V-VI; see standard 
deviations in Table 2), compared to the normal control group, and equal or more 
variability than the schizophrenia and brain-damaged groups.
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These differences in variability undoubtedly affected the magnitude and pattern of 
correlations between the individual indices, and could have accounted for the observed 
difference in factor structure between the malingering group and the combined group. 
Comparison of Tables 27 and 30 (intercorrelations of HCT malingering variables 
including all participants and including only the 75 malingering participants) reveals that 
correlations between the vast majority o f HCT indices increased when only the 
malingering participants were considered. This may easily explain the reduction o f the 
malingering-only factor solution to two salient factors. The increased correlations may 
simply reflect overall poor performance on all HCT indices, which may have reduced the 
factor solutions from three to two.
Alternatively, difference in HCT PCA solutions may have been caused by reducing 
the sample size from 472 (when considering both malingering and brain-damaged / 
schizophrenic individuals) to 75 (malingering participants only). Reducing the sample 
size may have decreased the stability o f the factor structure. Thus, with a larger sample 
o f malingerers, the three-factor solution may have re-emerged. For the current study, it is 
unclear which o f these two competing explanations most adequately accounts for the 
differences in PCA solutions. Future research could address this issue by examining 
factor structure o f the HCT malingering indices in larger samples o f true suspected 
malingerers.
Examination o f  Cutoff Scores
An arbitrary specification was made in Chapter 2 that the most suitable malingering 
cutoffs would be those that classify less than 10% of brain-damaged, schizophrenic, and 
normal control individuals as malingerers (that is, those with a specificity o f over 90%).
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This specification was similar to one used by Greve et al. (2002). It is interesting to note 
that the indices found to be most suitable per this specification were those already 
identified as by MANCOVA in Hypothesis 1 as the most suitable indices by which to 
attempt to identify malingering. These included the potential malingering variable, sub­
threshold failures to maintain set, and failures to maintain set for the WCST, and errors 
on Subtests 1 and 11 for the HCT. These indices demonstrated the most significant 
differences between groups. However, and perhaps more importantly, they were the ones 
shown through simple contrasts to not discriminate between normal controls and archival 
brain-damaged individuals, but that did discriminate between controls and archival 
individuals and all three malingering groups, regardless o f degree o f coaching. These 
findings provide further evidence that these indices may be among the most powerful 
indicators of malingering on these two tests, unless plaintiffs are explicitly and 
thoroughly coached about the nature of these variables before a forensic 
neuropsychological examination.
Generalization of Coaching 
An interesting and unexpected finding involved the generalization o f coaching 
instructions across neuropsychological tests. In the current investigation, different levels 
o f instruction were given to malingering groups for the WCST, which was administered 
to all participants first. The m ost explicit set o f instructions was extremely specific to the 
WCST procedure, which is markedly different than the HCT testing procedure. No 
specific malingering instructions were given for the HCT, although it was always 
administered after the WCST. Despite not being given specific HCT instruction.
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participants seemed to be able to apply the WCST coaching information they had been 
given to the HCT and attempt to increase their likelihood of escaping detection as 
malingering on the HCT. This finding suggests that the malingering instruction sets may 
have contained some sort o f nonspecific information that could be applicable to more 
than one assessment instrument. This nonspecific information may have been more 
important than more test-specific detail in determining a partieipanf s success in 
malingering. It may have also been that the increased emphasis on specific malingering 
strategies made participants more attentive to and thoughtful about their malingering 
performances. This increased awareness may have been at least partly responsible for the 
generalization effects.
However, as mentioned above, there were some unexpected findings related to the 
degree o f explicitness o f instruction given to participants. One o f the most notable 
findings is that participants in the vaguely-coached malingering group, who are given 
somewhat ambiguous information about the nature and content o f the WCST, actually 
performed worse than the standard-instruction malingering group on many o f the WCST 
malingering indices examined in this study, although the standard-instruction 
malingering participants were given little more information than they should try their 
hardest to appear brain-damaged. For example, using the potential malingering variable, 
68% of the vaguely-coached malingering participants were classified as malingerers, 
while only 56% o f the standard-instruction malingering participants were so classified.
It is unclear what it was about the vague instruction set that actually appeared to 
hinder the groups’ WCST performance (i.e., that made it appear less like a brain­
damaged performance and more like insufficient effort). One explanation could be that
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the participants found it too hard to keep straight this type of ambiguous advice and 
either misinterpreted it or decided to ignore it. However, one would imagine that to 
disregard the information would cause the vaguely-coached malingering participants to 
perform more like those in the standard-instruction malingering group and not worse. 
Further, exit-questionnaire data reveals that all participants reported trying hard (i.e., 
marking at least a 3 on a 5-point scale), and reported having a reasonably clear idea of 
what they were asked to do during testing. Thus, there appears to be no clear reason why 
the vaguely-coached malingering participants would have performed worse during 
testing than the standard-instruction malingering participants.
Limitations
One o f the central limitations o f the current study involves the comparison of 
participants asked to feign a mild traumatic brain injury resulting from a motor vehicle 
accident to two archival data sets (Allen and Goldstein) which include individuals with 
an entirely different form o f neuropsychological impairment (schizophrenia). Further, 
these groups were also found to differ significantly from the four undergraduate groups 
in terms o f age and education, which can have important effects on performance on 
neuropsychological measures. Another consideration is that comparable data was not 
available for all participants (e.g., HCT data was unavailable for the Allen schizophrenia 
group, WCST data was unavailable for the Goldstein schizophrenia and brain-damaged 
groups). Having this comparable data, and thus being able to include all archival 
individuals in all analyses, may have revealed other significant differences lost by 
reducing sample sizes.
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However, it is interesting to note that results for both tests did, for the most part, 
reveal few differences between the performance o f individuals with schizophrenia, 
individuals with heterogeneous forms o f brain damage, and normal undergraduate 
controls on the various malingering indices. On the WCST, controls and individuals with 
schizophrenia performed similarly on four of the five significant indices. On the HCT, 
results revealed that normal controls and individuals in the brain-damaged group 
performed similarly on four o f the six indices. Further, when scores from these indices 
were standardized and averaged into a composite, no differences were found between 
normal control participants and reference cognitive-impairment groups (e.g., brain 
damage, schizophrenia). These findings suggest that the indices included in this study 
were more sensitive to conscious insufficient effort than to normal performance or any of 
a variety o f types o f cognitive impairment. The fact that these indices were largely able 
to discriminate between truly cognitively impaired populations / controls and 
malingering groups is a testament to the relative sensitivity o f these indices to 
malingering. However, these indices will surely need to be cross-validated using 
populations o f individuals truly suspected o f malingering, and not just those o f 
undergraduates asked to malinger.
General Discussion
Although many o f  the W CST malingering indices examined in this study were found 
resistant even to the effects o f  explicit coaching, others were not. M ost notably, 
participants in the explicitly-coached malingering condition were able to regulate their 
performance to such a degree that 88% were able to evade detection using the potential
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malingering formula, which was designed to examine inconsistent (and statistically 
uncommon) patterns o f responding. This finding suggests that with the aid o f a 
neuropsychologically sophisticated attorney, litigants m aybe coached on the WCST (or 
potentially any other neuropsychological or psychological measure) to the extent that 
they are able to perform more like truly brain-damaged individuals for the purpose of 
receiving the remuneration they seek.
These findings suggest that neuropsychologists should be aware that examinees 
presenting to them in the context of civil litigation may not be truly impaired but may 
have been thoroughly coached on symptoms and tests ahead of time. These findings also 
suggest that psychologists should renew or enhance efforts to protect trade-secret 
psychological testing information not only from attorneys, but from laypersons in 
general. It is, o f course, unreasonable to think that psychologists should be restricted 
from discussing test content, structure, or purpose in explicit detail. However, more 
stringent guidelines should perhaps be established regarding the procurement o f such 
information. For example, both Youngjohn (1991) and Hart (1995) describe the Rey 15- 
Item Memory Test in explicit detail, including both instructions on administration as 
well as every item contained in the test and how they are arranged graphically on the 
page. The fact that such explicit information about, o f all things, a symptom-validity test, 
is available not just to psychologists but any motivated reader is troubling. In fact, there 
are psychologists (e.g., Greiffenstein & Baker, 2002) who suggest that the Rey 15-Item 
may no longer be as sensitive to coached malingering as it once was for reasons similar 
to those described above. Further, many books available in large retail bookstore chains 
describe countless psychological and neuropsychological tests in great detail. One of
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these is Spreen and Strauss (1998), which was the source of the information included in 
the detailed instruction sets provided to participants in the current study.
The ready availability o f this trade-secret information is disturbing, but even more 
troubling is the apparent willingness o f some psychologists and neuropsychologists to 
actually hand over such information to attorneys when asked. Essig et al. (2001) report 
that there is a large population of unscrupulous (or blatantly unethical) 
neuropsychologists who regularly provide attorneys with raw test data. Further, at least 
12% of Essig et al.’s sampled neuropsychologists who have allowed attorneys to sit in on 
forensic examinations. These numbers would likely increase were the self-report aspect 
o f Essig et al.’s (2001) study to be removed. It is clear that test security is threatened not 
only by zealous attorneys, but also by the psychologists who are willing to provide them 
with data and information that can then coach countless plaintiffs in the future.
Lees-Haley and Courtney (2000) have called for reform, citing that a good number of 
neuropsychologists readily produce raw test data to attorneys simply upon being asked 
(thus confirming Essig et al.’s [2001] survey findings). The American Psychological 
Association’s Ethical Principles o f Psychologists and Code o f Conduct (APA, 1992) 
recommends releasing such privileged information only to other psychologists who are 
competent to interpret and use it. However, it should be remembered that the Ethical 
Code is only aspirational in nature, and, although psychologists may be reprimanded or 
otherwise punished by state psyehologieal lieensing boards for failure to practiee its 
guidelines, the Code itself does not constitute a legally binding agreement. Further, the 
Code provides no specific guidelines regarding what types o f test data can be released, 
and how such release should occur.
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It is clear that personal injury attorneys are able to easily discover what tests are 
favored during forensie neuropsychological examinations (e.g., the list compiled by 
Lees-Haley and colleagues [1995]). It is clear that these attorneys are willing to provide 
their clients with any available information regarding all aspects o f neuropsychological 
evaluation (e.g.. Wetter & Corrigan, 1995). Finally, it is clear that there is a large number 
o f neuropsychologists who are themselves compromising test security by allowing 
attorneys to have access to raw test data and to observe forensic neuropsychological 
evaluations. Until these problems are rectified, neuropsychologists will continue to face 
the problem of potentially coached plaintiffs presenting for evaluation and the obligation 
to continually work to create new and revise existing psychological assessment measures 
to keep “one step ahead” o f those who compromise their security.
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Means and Standard Deviations fo r  Group Performance on WCST Malingering Indices
N C (# = 25) M S(V = 25) M V (V = 25) M E (Y  = 25) SZ (V = 43)
M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD
Age 19.56 1.45 19.00 2.02 20.68 3.68 19.44 2.80 40.56 8.57
Years o f Education 13.96 1.14 13.32 .75 13.84 1.03 13.56 .87 12.49 1.99
WCST Index
TE 16.56 10.29 50.12 20.49 42.96 19.36 26.44 8.79 63.53 23.45
PE 8.28 4.93 25.08 16.76 17.32 12.51 10.48 4.71 41.33 23.28
OE .52 .96 3.60 5.50 4.08 6.02 2.16 3.48 3.98 6.57
MPM .04 .20 .44 1.19 .56 .96 .16 .37 .26 .66
FMS .32 .69 3.60 2.77 5.64 4.91 4.64 3.87 .86 1.15
% (continues on next page)
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(continued from previous page)
SFMS .20 .41 2.92 2.00 3.44 2.81 2.16 2.43 .53 .93
PM .00 .56 .68 .12 .00
o Note. NC = normal control; MS = malingering (standard); MV = malingering (vague); ME = malingering (explicit); SZ =
schizophrenia (Allen data set); TE = total errors; PE = perseverative errors; OE = Other errors; MPM = missed perfect matches; FMS 
= failure to maintain set; SFMS = sub-threshold failure to maintain set; PM = potential malingering variable.
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Table 2
Means and Standard Deviations fo r  Group Performance on HCT Malingering Indices
NC(Æ = 25) MS (A = 25) M V (A = 25) ME (A = 25) S Z (A  = 195) B D (A = 177)
M SD M M SD M SD M SD M SD
Age 19.56 1.45 19.00 2.02 20.68 3.68 19.44 2.80 41.56 9.72 43.50 11.72
Years o f Education 
HCT Index
13.96 1.14 13.32 .75 13.84 1.03 13.56 .87 11.99 2.49 11.33 2.37
TE 28.20 16.49 77.76 31.90 72.88 27.88 60.16 24.92 80.46 30.71 87.90 31.77
IE .08 .28 1.48 1.23 1.44 1.04 1.20 1.00 .15 .48 .18 .60
EE .56 .87 3.96 3.17 4.12 2.88 2.60 2.24 .87 .98 1.04 1.66
VUE 1.72 1.21 7.68 4.05 5.60 2.68 4.84 2.62 6.67 3.28 7.56 3.80
V-VI 5.88 5.25 1.52 3.95 4.16 3.83 3.44 3.85 5.46 4.80 4.14 4.66
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to
00
CD
■ D
O
Q .
C
g
Q .
■ D
CD
C/)
C/)
8
c i '
3
3"
CD
CD
■ D
O
Q .
C
aO
3
■ D
O
CD
Q .
■D
CD
C/)
C/)
(continued from previous page)
V l-V n .06 .08 -.01 .13 .08 .10 .05 .07 .06 .10 .05 .13
Note. NC = normal control; MS = malingering (standard); MV = malingering (vague); ME = malingering (explicit); SZ = 
schizophrenia (Goldstein data set); BD = brain damage (Goldstein data set); TE = total errors; IE = Subtest I errors; HE = Subtest H 
errors; VUE = Subtest VU errors; V-VI = error rate proportions on Subtest V versus Subtest VI; VI-VH = error rate proportions on 
Subtests I-VI versus VH.
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Table 3
Univariate ANOVAs fo r  HCT Indices
Variable and Source F  (4, 270)
Total Errors (TE)
Between Groups 35715.94 8928.98 12.36***
Within Groups 195134.21 722.72
Subtest I Errors (IE)
Between Groups 58.32 14.58 26.08***
Within Groups 150.95 .56
Subtest 11 Errors (HE)
Between Groups 355.68 88.92 23.02***
Within Groups 1042.90 3.86
Subtest VII Errors (VIIE)
Between Groups 471.52 117.88 11.92***
Within Groups 2671.30 9.89
Prop, errors on I-VI v. VII (VI-VII)
Between Groups .15 .04 2.63*
Within Groups 3.88 .01
Prop, errors on V v. VI (V-VI)
Between Groups 334.14 83.54 4.18**
Within Groups 5391.48 19.97
* p <  .05. * * p  < .01. * * * p  < .001.
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Table 4
Estimated Marginal Means on HCT Indices as a Function o f  Participant Group
Participant Group
HCT
Index
N C(1) MS (2) MV (3) ME (4) BD (5) Post Hoc
TE 50.85 98.87 93.91 81.60 75.73 5 = 4  
5 # 1 , 2 ,  3
IE .19 1.57 1.54 1.30 .13 5 = 1
5 # 2, 3, 4
HE 1.03 4.41 4.55 3.05 .79 5 =1
5 # 2 ,  3,4
VIIE 4.34 10.12 8.04 7.32 6.15 5 = 4 
5 # 1 , 2 ,  3
V-VI 4.68 .51 3.05 2.37 4.77 5 = 1,3  
5 # 2 , 4
VI-VII .03 -.04 .05 .03 .06 5 = 1,3, 4
5 # 2
Note. NC = normal control; MS = malingering (standard); MV = malingering (vague); 
ME = malingering (explicit); SZ = schizophrenia (Allen data set); TE = total errors; IE = 
Subtest 1 errors; HE = Subtest 11 errors; VIIE = Subtest VII errors; V-VI = error rate 
proportions on Subtest V versus Subtest VI; VI-VII = error rate proportions on Subtests 
I-VI versus VII.
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Table 5
Univariate ANOVAs fo r  WCST Indices
Variable and Source 5'^ M S F  (4, 136)
Total Errors (TE)
Between Groups 16220.60 4055.15 13.95***
Within Groups 39537.80 290.72
Perseverative Errors (PE)
Between Groups 4243.89 1060.97 4.98***
Within Groups 28953.03 212.89
Other Errors (OE)
Between Groups 170.82 42.71 1.62
Within Groups 3595.41 26.44
Failure to Maintain Set (FMS)
Between Groups 462.78 115.70 13.31***
Within Groups 1182.49 8.70
Sub-Threshold FMS (SFMS)
Between Groups 180.06 45.02 13.12***
Within Groups 466.68 3.43
Missed Perfect Matches (MPM)
Between Groups 4.40 1.10 1.91
Within Groups 78.50 .58
(continues on next page)
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(continued from previous page)
Potential Malingering Variable (PM)
Between Groups 9.24 2.31 22.07***
Within Groups 14.23 .11
Note. NC = normal control; MS = malingering (standard); MV = malingering (vague);
ME = malingering (explicit); SZ = schizophrenia (Allen data set); TE = total errors; PE =
perseverative errors; OE = Other errors; MPM = missed perfect matches; FMS = failure
to maintain set; SFMS = sub-threshold failure to maintain set; PM = potential
malingering variable. * p  < .05. ** p  < .01. *** p  < .001.
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Table 6
Estimated Marginal Means on Significant WCST Indices as a Function o f  Participant 
Group
Participant Group
WCST
Index
N C (1) MS (2) MV (3) ME (4) SZ (5) Post Hoc
TE 26.58 59.18 51.21 35.56 42.35 5 = 3 ,4  
5 #  1,2
PE 16.65 33.55 24.22 18.63 22.78 5 = 1,2, 3, 4
FMS .28 3.67 5.61 4.66 .85 5 = 1
5 #  2, 3 ,4
SFMS .29 3.03 3.51 2.26 .32 5 = 1
5 # 2 , 3 ,4
PM .01 .57 .69 .13 -.02 5 = 1,4 
5 # 2 , 3
Note. NC = normal control; MS = malingering (standard); MV = malingering (vague); 
ME = malingering (explicit); SZ = schizophrenia (Allen data set); TE = total errors; PE = 
perseverative errors; OE = Other errors; MPM = missed perfect matches; FMS = failure 
to maintain set; SFMS = sub-threshold failure to maintain set; PM = potential 
malingering variable.
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Table 7
Predictor Variables in First WCST Stepwise DFA
Step Predictor Variable Variables in DFA Wilks’ 1
Equivalent 
F (4,138)
1 Total Errors (TE) 1 .375 32.40***
2 Potential Malingering Variable (PM) 2 .237 28.29***
3 Failure to Maintain Set (FMS) 3 .253 17.90***
4 Sub-Threshold FMS (SFMS) 4 .201 17.16***
p  < .001.
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Table 8
Classification Analysis o f  Group Membership fo r  First WCST DFA
Predicted Group Membership
NC MS MV ME SZ
Actual Group 
Membership n n % n % n % n % n %
NC 25 23 92.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 2 8.0
MS 25 2 8.0 6 24.0 8 32.0 4 16.0 5 20.0
MV 25 1 4.0 4 16.0 13 52.0 4 16.0 3 12.0
ME 25 6 24.0 1 4.0 2 8.0 15 60.0 1 4.0
SZ 43 4 9.3 0 0.0 0 0.0 2 4.7 37 86.0
Note. NC = normal control; MS = malingering (standard); MV = malingering (vague); 
ME = malingering (explicit); SZ = schizophrenia (Allen data set). Overall percentage of 
correctly classified cases = 65.7%.
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Table 9
Correlation o f  Predictor Variables With Discriminant Functions and Standardized
Discriminant Function Coefficients fo r  First WCST DFA
Correlation with 
discriminant functions
Standardized discriminant 
function coefficients
Functions Functions
Predictor Variable 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
Total Errors (TE) .50 .79 -.29 .21 .73 .84 .07 -.03
Potential Malingering 
Variable (PM) .63 -.50 -.56 .20 .29 -.51 -1.13 -.34
Failure to Maintain Set 
(FMS) .45 -.46 .50 -.59 .71 -.06 .64 -.58
Sub-Threshold Failure to 
Maintain Set (SFMS) .50 -.42 .09 .75 .27 -.15 .78 .98
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Table 10
Fisher’s Classification Coefficients fo r  First WCST DFA
Predictor Variable
Group
NC MS MV ME SZ
TE .0648 .2020 .1914 .1437 .2443
PM -1.2505 .6668 1.4692 -4.5582 -4.2662
FMS .2137 .9087 1.1078 .9425 .7615
SFMS .1537 .6487 .7131 1.0257 .4672
(Constant) -2.3301 -9.5756 -10.7063 -6.6648 -9.4163
Note. NC = normal control; MS = malingering (standard); MV = malingering (vague); 
ME = malingering (explicit); SZ = schizophrenia (Allen data set); TE = total errors; PM 
= potential malingering variable; FMS = failure to maintain set; SFMS = sub-threshold 
failure to maintain set.
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Table 11
Predictor Variables in Second WCST Stepwise DFA
Step Predictor Variable Variables in DFA W ilks’ X
Equivalent 
F  {2, 140)
1 Total Errors (TE) 1 .516 47.18***
2 Failure to Maintain Set (FMS) 2 .354 31.86***
3 Potential Malingering Variable (PM) 3 J7 9 27.60**
4 Sub-Threshold FMS (SFMS) 4 .281 30.37**
5 Missed Perfect Matches (MPM) 5 .21 \ 2.00*
* p <  .05. ** p <  .01. *** p  < .001.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
140
Table 12
Classification Analysis o f  Group Membership fo r  Second WCST DFA
Predicted Group Membership
NC M SZ
Actual Group 
Membership n n % n % M %
NC 25 23 9 2 ^ 1 4.0 1 4.0
M 75 7 9.3 61 81.3 7 9.3
SZ 43 4 9.3 5 11.6 34 79.1
Note. Note. NC = normal control; M = malingering (three groups combined); SZ = 
schizophrenia (Allen data set). Overall percentage o f correctly classified cases = 82.5%.
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Table 13
Correlation o f  Predictor Variables With Discriminant Functions and Standardized
Discriminant Function Coefficients fo r  Second WCST DFA
Correlation with 
discriminant 
functions
Standardized
discriminant
function
coefficients
Functions Functions
Predictor Variable 1 2 1 2
Total Errors (TE) .81 -.04 1.24 .08
Failure to Maintain Set (FMS) -.04 .71 .47 .70
Potential Malingering Variable (PM) -.09 .65 -.51 .20
Sub-Threshold Failure to Maintain Set 
(SFMS)
-.04 .69 .15 .53
Missed Perfect Matches (MPM) .07 .16 -.33 .12
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Table 14
Fisher’s Classification Coefficients fo r  Second WCST DFA
Group
Predictor Variable NC M SZ
TE .0704 .1790 .2617
FMS ^259 .9816 .8037
PM -1.5668 -2.6415 -5.5358
SFMS .1690 .8990 .5320
MPM -.5114 ^8650 -1.7380
(Constant) -2.3699 -6.9919 -9.7822
Note. NC = normal control; MS = malingering (standard); M = malingering (three 
groups combined); SZ = schizophrenia (Allen data set); TE = total errors; FMS = failure 
to maintain set; PM = potential malingering variable; SFMS = sub-threshold failure to 
maintain set; MPM = missed perfect matches.
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Table 15
Classification Analysis o f Group Membership fo r  First HCT DFA
Actual Group 
Membership n
Predicted Group Membership
NC M BD
n % n % n %
NC 25 16 64.0 3 12.0 6 24.0
M 75 5 6.7 55 7 3 J 15 20.0
BD 177 10 5.6 6 3.4 161 91.0
Note. NC = normal control; M = malingering (three groups combined); BD = brain 
damage (Goldstein data set). Overall percentage of correctly classified cases = 83.8%.
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Table 16
Predictor Variables in Stepwise Discriminant Function Analysis in First H CT DFA
Step Predictor Variable Variables in DFA W ilks’ %
Equivalent 
F  (2, 274)
1 Subtest I Errors (IE) 1 ^59 71.03***
2 Total Errors (TE) 2 .432 46.63***
3 Subtest II Errors (HE) 3 .373 46.07***
*** p  < .001.
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Table 17
Correlation o f  Predictor Variables With Discriminant Functions and Standardized 
Discriminant Function Coefficients fo r  First PICT DFA
Predictor Variable
Correlation with 
discriminant 
functions
Standardized
discriminant
function
coefficients
Functions Functions
1 2 1 2
Subtest I Errors (IE) .59 .70 .69 .36
Total Errors (TE) -35  .93 -.93 .74
Subtest II Errors (HE) ^ 6  ^3 .61 .10
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Table 18
F isher’s Classification Coefficients fo r  First HCT DFA
Group
Predictor Variable NC M BD
IE -3762 1.2063 -1.1227
TE .0379 .0575 .1257
HE .0802 .2501 -.4920
(Constant) -2.9017 -4.6019 -5.6138
Note. NC = normal control; M = malingering (three groups combined); BD = brain 
damage (Goldstein data set). IE = Subtest I errors; TE = total errors; HE = Subtest II 
errors.
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Table 19
Predictor Variables in Stepwise Discriminant Function Analysis in Second HCT DFA
Step Predictor Variable Variables in DFA W ilks’ X
Equivalent
.F(2,292)
1 Subtest I Errors (IE) 1 .615 91.49***
2 Total Errors (TE) 2 .447 35.69***
3 Subtest II Errors (HE) 3 382 76.43***
*** p  < .001 .
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Table 20
Classification Analysis o f  Group Membership fo r  Second H CT DFA
Actual Group 
Membership n
Predicted Group Membership
NC M SZ
n % n % n %
NC 25 13 52.0 1 4.0 11 44.0
M 75 2 2.7 53 70.7 20 26.7
SZ 195 5 2.6 6 3.1 184 94.4
Note. NC = normal control; M = malingering (three groups combined); SZ = 
schizophrenia (Goldstein data set). Overall percentage o f correctly classified cases 
84.8%.
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Table 21
Correlation o f  Predictor Variables With Discriminant Functions and Standardized 
Discriminant Function Coefficients fo r  Second HCT DFA
Predictor Variable
Correlation with 
discriminant 
functions
Standardized
discriminant
function
coefficients
Functions Functions
1 2 1 2
Subtest I Errors (IE) .70 .54 .69 .15
Total Errors (TE) -3 8  .98 -.71 .89
Subtest II Errors (HE) .63 .54 ^ 2  3 9
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Table 22
F isher’s Classification Coefficients fo r  Second H CT DFA
Group
Predictor Variable NC M SZ
IE -.4510 1.3563 -1.1806
TE .0365 .0542 .1114
HE .0128 .6271 -.3074
(Constant) 419676 -5.3206 -4.6709
Note. NC = normal control; M = malingering (three groups combined); SZ = 
schizophrenia (Goldstein data set). IE = Subtest I errors; TE = total errors; HE = Subtest 
II errors.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
151
Table 23
One-Way ANOVA fo r  Effects o f  Group Membership on WCST and H CT Composite 
Scores
Variable and Source d f MS F
WCST composite score
Between groups 2 12.64 63 2 35.05***
Within groups 88 15.87 .18
HCT composite score
Between groups 3 34.23 11.41 38.04***
Within groups 416 124.77 .30
* * * p < m i .
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Table 24
WCST Factor Loadings from  Principal-Components Analysis: Eigenvalues and
Percentages o f  Variance (First PCA)
Factor loading
WCST Index 1 2 3
TE .91 .32 .03
PE .94 .01 -.14
OE .12 .92 .01
MPM .06 .92 .10
FMS -.74 .01 .26
SFMS -.18 .04 .89
PM -3 9 .07 .93
Eigenvalues 
% of variance
172
3830
2.02
2839
1.16
16.46
Note. Boldface indicates highest factor loadings. Note. TE = total errors; PE = 
perseverative errors; OE = Other errors; MPM = missed perfect matches; FMS = failure 
to maintain set; SFMS = sub-threshold failure to maintain set; PM = potential 
malingering variable.
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Table 25
Intercorrelations o f  WCST Malingering Indices
WCST Index 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. TE —
2. PE .89*** —
3. OE .46*** .17* —
4. MPM 36***" .11 24*** —
5. FMS _ 29*** - 38*** -.03 .02 —
6. SFMS .03 -.18* .15 .12 33*** —
7. PM .10 -.11 .08 22** .38*** 74*** —
Note. TE = total errors; PE = perseverative errors; OE = Other errors; MPM = missed 
perfect matches; FMS = failure to maintain set; SFMS = sub-threshold failure to 
maintain set; PM = potential malingering variable.*/» < .05. **p  < .01. ***p  < .001.
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Table 26
HCT Factor Loadings from  Principal-Components Analysis: Eigenvalues and
Percentages o f  Variance (First PCA)
Factor loading
HCT Index 1 2 3
TE .98 .17 .09
IE .05 .87 -.06
HE .18 .85 .03
VIIE .87 .11 -.46
V-VI -.12 -.42 .45
VI-VH -.07 .06 .95
Eigenvalues 
% o f variance
2.41
40.17
1.34
22.30
1.03
17.18
Note. Boldface indicates highest factor loadings. Note. TE = total errors; IE = Subtest I 
errors; HE = Subtest II errors; VIIE = Subtest VII errors; V-VI = error rate proportions on 
Subtest V versus Subtest VI; VI-VH = error rate proportions on Subtests I-VI versus VII.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
155
Table 27
Intercorrelations o f  H CT Malingering Indices
HCT Index 1 2 3 4 5 6
1. TE —
2. IE —
3. HE .30*** .58*** —
4. VIIE .83*** 2\*** .26*** —
5. V-VI -.20*** _ 22*** _  22*** _ 27*** —
6. VI-VH .05 -.05 -.002 _  4Ç*** .18***
Note. TE = total errors; IE = Subtest I errors; HE = Subtest II errors; VIIE = Subtest VII 
errors; V-VI = error rate proportions on Subtest V versus Subtest VI; VI-VH = error rate 
proportions on Subtests I-VI versus VII. ***/?<  .001.
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Table 28
WCST Factor Loadings from Principal-Components Analysis: Eigenvalues and
Percentages o f  Variance (Second PCA)
Factor loading
WCST Index 1 2 3
TE .81 .44 .26
PE .93 .14 .01
OE .12 .91 .04
MPM .07 .92 .05
FMS -.79 .08 .13
SFMS -.06 -.02 .90
PM .06 .13 .91
Eigenvalues 
% of variance
2.75
39.30
1.72
24.60
1.34
19.20
Note. Boldface indicates highest factor loadings. TE = total errors; PE = perseverative 
errors; OE = Other errors; MPM = missed perfect matches; FMS = failure to maintain 
set; SFMS = sub-threshold failure to maintain set; PM = potential malingering variable.
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Table 29
HCT Factor Loadings from  Principal-Components Analysis: Eigenvalues and
Percentages o f  Variance (Second PCA)
Factor loading
HCT Index 1 2
TE .92 -.16
IE .82 -.05
HE .86 .03
VIIE .66 -.70
V-VI .46 .45
VI-VH .17 .95
Eigenvalues 
% of variance
3.22
53.70
1.33
22.20
Note. Boldface indicates highest factor loadings. TE = total errors; IE = Subtest I errors; 
HE = Subtest II errors; VIIE = Subtest VII errors; V-VI = error rate proportions on 
Sub test V versus Subtest VI; VI-VII = error rate proportions on Subtests I-VI versus VII.
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Table 30
Intercorrelations o f  H CT Malingering Indices (Malingering Participants Only)
HCT Index 1 2 3 4 5 6
l.T E —
2. IE .67*** —
3. HE 72 *** .58*** —
4. VIIE 80*** .53*** ^4* ^  * —
5. V-VI _ 42 *** -.34** -.32** -.46*** —
6. VI-VH .04 .03 .10 - 56*** .21 —
Note. TE = total errors; IE = Subtest I errors; HE = Subtest II errors; VIIE = Subtest VII 
errors; V-VI = error rate proportions on Subtest V versus Subtest VI; VI-VII = error rate 
proportions on Subtests I-VI versus VII. ** /? < .01. *** p  < .001.
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Table 31
Estimated Marginal Means, Standard Errors, and One-Way ANOVAs fo r  WCST Factor 
Scores
Variable
MS (2) MV (3) ME (4) SZ(5) ANOVA
M SE M SE M SE M SE F  (3, 114) Contrasts
Factor 1 .66 .19 .17 .19 -.27 .19 .10 .22 5.90** 5 = 2, 3, 4
Factor 2 .81 .20 1.10 .19 .11 .19 -.69 .22 12.85*** 5 9^2,3,4
Factor 3 .08 .27 .31 .26 -.06 .27 -.02 .30 .51 5 = 2 , 3 , 4
Note. The Contrasts column represents results from simple eontrasts, with the SZ group 
being used as the reference group. MS = malingering (standard); MV = malingering 
(vague); ME = malingering (explicit); SZ = schizophrenia (Allen data set). ** /> < .01.
*** p  < . 001 .
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Table 32
Estimated Marginal Means, Standard Errors, and One-Way ANOV As fo r  HCT Factor Scores
MS (2) MV (3) ME (4) SZ (5) BD (6) ANOVA
Variable M SE M  SE M SE M  SE M SE F  (3, 114) Contrasts
Factor 1 .47 .19 .23 .19 -.10 .19 -.09 .06 .01 .07 2.32 6 = 3, 4, 5 
6 ^ 2
Factor 2 1.57 .17 1.59 .17 1.08 .17 -.32 .06 -.25 .06 43.16*** 6=5 
6 96 2 , 3 , 4
Factor 3 -.71 .22 .16 .22 -.19 .22 .12 .07 -.03 .08 3.79** 6 ^ 2  
6 = 3,4,  5
Note. The Contrasts column represents results from simple contrasts, with the SZ group being used as the 
reference group. MS = malingering (standard); MV = malingering (vague); ME = malingering (explicit); SZ = 
schizophrenia (Goldstein data set); BD= brain damage (Goldstein data set).** p  < .01. *** /> < .001.
o
CD
■D
O
Q .
C
g
Q .
■ D
CD
C/)
C/) Table 33
Hypothesized Cutoffs fo r  Identifying Insufficient Effort Using H C T and WCST Malingering Indices
Index Cutoff score % ref. groups % N C % M S % M V % M E % all M
HCT index
TE 104 74.3 100.0 84.0 84.0 96.0 88.0
m 2 97.8 100.0 80.0 92.0 92.0 88.0
HE 4 97.2 100.0 60.0 60.0 84.0 68.0
VHE 10 86.2 100.0 84.0 96.0 96.0 92.0
V-VI 0.0 83.0 88.0 68.0 88.0 76.0 77.3
VI-VH 0.0 74.1 80.0 52.0 80.0 72.0 68.0
(continues on next page)
O n
CD
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(continued from previous page)
Index Cutoff score % ref. groups % NC % M S % M V % M E % all M
WCST index
TE 64 60.8 100.0 64.0 88.0 100.0 84.0
OE 9 89.0 100.0 88.0 84.0 92.0 88.0
MPM 3 98.8 100.0 96.0 100.0 100.0 98.7
FMS 4 100.0 100.0 68.0 52.0 56.0 58.7
SFMS 4 100.0 100.0 76.0 68.0 92.0 78.7
PM 0.0 100.0 (0) 100.0 (0) 44.0 (0) 32.0 (0) 88.0 (0) 54.7 (0)
0.0(1) 0.0(1) 56.0(1) 68.0(1) 12.0(1) 45.3 (1)
Note. Percentages reflect percent of group participants scoring at or below the cutoff score. In the PM row, the values shown represent 
the percent of participants in the group suspected as malingering (1) and not suspected of malingering (0) based on the PM variable 
formula. Ref. Group = BD, PC, SZ for HCT and SZ, SA, PC for WCST.
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Figure 3
Relative Group Performance on H CT Total Errors (TE) Variable
HCT Total Errors (TE)
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
NC MS MV ME BD
98.87 81.650.85 93.91 75.73
Group
Note. NC = normal control; MS = malingering (standard); MV = malingering (vague); 
ME = malingering (explicit); BD= brain damage (Goldstein data set).
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Figure 4
Relative Group Performance on HCT Subtest I  Errors (IE) Variable
HCT Subtest I Errors (IE)
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
NC MS MV ME BD
0.19 1.57 1.54 0.13
Group
Note. NC = normal control; MS = malingering (standard); MV = malingering (vague); 
ME = malingering (explicit); BD= brain damage (Goldstein data set).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
165
Figure 5
Relative Group Performance on H CT Subtest II Errors (IIE) Variable
HCT Subtest II Errors (IIE)
4.5
3.5
2.5
0.5
NC MS BDMV ME
1.03 4.41 4.55 3.05 0.79
Group
Note. NC = normal control; MS = malingering (standard); MV = malingering (vague); 
ME = malingering (explicit); BD= brain damage (Goldstein data set).
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Figure 6
Relative Group Performance on HCT Subtest VII Errors (VUE) Variable
HCT Subtest VII Errors (VUE)
12
10
8
6
4
2
G
NC MS MV ME BD
6.15.044.34 10.12
Group
Note. NC = normal control; MS = malingering (standard); MV = malingering (vague); 
ME = malingering (explicit); BD= brain damage (Goldstein data set).
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Figure 7
Relative Group Performance on H CT Proportional Errors on Subtests I- VI versus VII
(VI-VII) Variable
HCT Proportional Errors on Subtests I-VI v VII
0.08
0.06
0.04
0.02
0
- 0.02
-0.04
-0.06
NC MS MV ME BD
0.03 -0.04 0.05 0.03 0.06
Group
Note. Higher values in this figure represent the commission o f proportionately more 
errors on Subtests I-VI than on Subtest VII. NC = normal control; MS = malingering 
(standard); MV = malingering (vague); ME = malingering (explicit); BD= brain damage 
(Goldstein data set).
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Figure 8
Relative Group Performance on HCT Proportional Errors on Subtest V versus VI (V-VI)
Variable
HCT Proportional Errors on Subtests V v VI
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
NC MS MV ME BD
4.68 0.51 3.05 2 3 7 4.77
Group
Note. Higher values in this figure represent the commission o f proportionately more 
errors on Subtest V than on Subtest VI. NC = normal control; MS = malingering 
(standard); MV = malingering (vague); ME = malingering (explicit); BD= brain damage 
(Goldstein data set).
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Figure 9
Relative Group Performance on WCST Total Errors (TE) Variable
WCST Total Errors (TE)
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
NC szMS MV ME
26.58 35.56 4 2 J559.18 51.21
Group
Note. NC = normal control; MS = malingering (standard); MV = malingering (vague); 
ME = malingering (explicit); SZ= schizophrenia (Allen data set).
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Figure 10
Relative Group Performance on WCST Perseverative Errors (PE) Variable
WCST Perseverative Errors (PE)
20
NC MS MV SZME
16.65 24.22 18.63 22.7833.55
Group
Note. NC = normal control; MS = malingering (standard); MV = malingering (vague); 
ME = malingering (explicit); SZ= schizophrenia (Allen data set).
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Figure 11
Relative Group Performance on WCST Other Errors (DE) Variable
WCST Other Errors (CE)
4.5
3.5
2.5
0.5
NC ME SZMS MV
1.24 4.67 2.81
Group
Note. NC = normal control; MS = malingering (standard); MV = malingering (vague); 
ME = malingering (explicit); SZ= schizophrenia (Allen data set).
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Figure 12
Relative Group Performance on WCST Failure to Maintain Set (FMS) Variable
WCST Failure to Maintain Set (FMS)
6
5
4
3
2
0
NC SZMS MV ME
&28 4.66 0.853.67 5.61
Group
Note. NC = normal control; MS = malingering (standard); MV = malingering (vague); 
ME = malingering (explicit); SZ= schizophrenia (Allen data set).
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Figure 13
Relative Group Performance on WCST Sub-Threshold Failure to Maintain Set (SFMS)
Variable
WCST Sub-Threshold Failure to Maintain Set (SFMS)
4
3.5
3
2.5
2
1.5
0.5
0
ME SZNC MS MV
2.263.51 0.320.29 3.03
Group
Note. NC = normal control; MS = malingering (standard); MV = malingering (vague); 
ME = malingering (explicit); SZ= schizophrenia (Allen data set).
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Figure 14
Relative Group Performance on WCST M issed Perfect Matches (MPM) Variable
WCST Missed Perfect Matches (MPM)
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
NC MS ME SZMV
0.08 0.180.46 0.59 0.19
Group
Note. NC = normal control; MS = malingering (standard); MV = malingering (vague); 
ME = malingering (explicit); SZ= schizophrenia (Allen data set).
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Figure 15
Relative Group Performance on WCST Potential Malingering (PM) Variable 
WCST Potential Malingering Variable (PM)
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
- 0.1
SZNC MS MEMV
- 0.020.130.01 0.57 0.69
Group
Note. Values in this figure represent means o f a categorical variable representing the 
classification (1 = Positive, 0 = Negative) o f a participant as a malingerer. Thus, these 
values can be interpreted as representing the percentage o f a group considered to be 
malingering based on the Potential Malingering (PM) formula. These values also 
represent means modified through the use o f covariâtes age and education. Recalculating 
these means without the use of covariates results in more accurate values for 
consideration as “percentages”: NC = .00; MS = .56; MV = .68; ME = .12; SZ = .00. 
Note. NC = normal control; MS = malingering (standard); MV = malingering (vague); 
ME = malingering (explicit); SZ= schizophrenia (Allen data set).
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Figure 16
Relative Group Performance on WCST and H CT Composite-Score Variables 
WCST AND HCT COMPOSITE SCORES
0.6
0.4
0.2
- 0.2
-0.4
- 0.6
SZNC MS BD
-0.08&58-0.44WCST
- 0.111.17 -0.003-0.26HCT
Note. The SZ score for the WCST composite score was calculated from the SZ group in
the Allen data set {N = 43), while the SZ score for the HCT composite score was 
calculated from the SZ group in the Goldstein data set (N = 195). Thus, it should be 
noted that two different groups of patients with schizophrenia are being compared to one 
another. No WCST scores were available for analysis for the patients in the Goldstein 
data set (SZ and BD). NC = normal control; MS = malingering (standard); SZ= 
schizophrenia (Allen and Goldstein data sets); BD = brain damage (Goldstein data set).
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Malingering -  Standard Instructions
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this study. You have been assigned to take 
part in a study in which you will be asked to take some neuropsychological tests. 
However, you will be asked to put forth LESS THAN OPTIMAL EFFORT without 
letting the examiner know that you are intentionally not trying your best. That is, we 
would like you to pretend that you have sustained a serious brain injury, which we will 
tell you more about later, and then take those tests while pretending to have this hrain 
injury.
From this point forward, I would like you to imagine that I am your attorney, whom 
you have retained because you are bringing a lawsuit against the driver o f a vehicle who 
caused a collision with your vehicle six months ago. I would like you to imagine this 
appeared to be a serious motor vehicle accident, but in fact, you sustained only a mild 
brain injury that did not produce lasting effects. You never lost consciousness at the 
scene o f the accident, but were simply dazed and confused. When you were taken to the 
hospital, CT and MRI scans o f your brain revealed no brain injury. You were released 
from the hospital, and over the next week, you began to develop some difficulties, 
including forgetfulness, inattentiveness, and problems making decisions. You also 
became slightly more irritable and short-tempered, as well as impulsive in your language 
and behaviors. However, none of these eonsequences have negatively affeeted your 
family relationships. You have been financially impacted by this accident in that you 
became more irritable and stressed out at work due primarily to the stress o f pending 
litigation. Your hoss, with whom you already had a rocky relationship, fired you. This
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was especially hard on you and your family since you were already experiencing some 
financial problems related to credit card debt.
The lawsuit you have brought against the other driver could provide you with a 
monetary reward o f hundreds of thousands o f dollars if  the judge at trial finds in your 
favor. However, a number o f medical doctors have reviewed your treatment records from 
the day of the injury and the days and weeks immediately following the incident. None 
of them feel that your injuries are serious enough for you to have been fired from your 
job and thus to be awarded such a large sum of money. They have recommended that you 
undergo a neuropsychological evaluation, which will provide greater detail on the types 
o f cognitive and emotional injuries you have suffered, if  any.
Because you lost your job, you are counting on this reward in order to ease your 
financial stressors. I, as your attorney, am counting on this reward because o f the large 
profit it will mean for me as well as the fact that it will improve my reputation among 
local personal injury attorneys. To these ends, we have decided that you are going to 
“embellish” your cognitive changes when you present for neuropsychological evaluation. 
We will do this in order to emphasize the appearance o f your having deficits so that you 
maximize your chance o f convincing the neuropsychologist that you were injured and 
that he or she should write a report supporting you as having deficits. This in turn will 
maximize your chance of having the judge and jury at trial find in your favor, awarding 
you the substantial sum o f money.
I, as your attorney, am now going to tell you some more about some o f these specific 
deficits that you should emphasize during your neuropsychological evaluation. The two 
individuals who are the most convincing in feigning their cognitive impairments will
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receive a $50 prize in addition to course credit. So I urge you to listen carefully and try to 
remember as much as you can of the information provided you.
The general result of this motor vehicle accident is that you have sustained mild 
injury to both your parietal and frontal lobes. However, we are most interested in the 
injury to your frontal lobe. People who sustain injuries in this area typically sustain 
personality change and have difficulty completing tasks that require problem solving and 
cognitive flexibility, or the ability to examine problems from numerous perspectives.
Since we have decided that we are going to “embellish” your cognitive deficits in 
order to make them appear more serious than they really are, I will also provide you 
some information about how to make your performance more believable to the 
neuropsychologist who is going to evaluate you. During your evaluation, you should 
come across as forgetful, and as having problems making decisions and figuring things 
out. However, do not go “overboard” demonstrating these symptoms, or else the 
examiner may not fully believe you. On the tests you are administered, don’t necessarily 
try your best. You may make some errors, but not too many, and do not make them 
sporadically. Remember, MODERATION IS THE KEY to making your examiner 
believe that you are truly injured.
Please remember not to discuss any of this information with the examiner.
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Malingering -  Vague Instructions 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this study. You have been assigned to 
take part in a study in which you will be asked to take some neuropsychological tests. 
However, you will be asked to put forth LESS THAN OPTIMAL EFFORT without 
letting the examiner know that you are intentionally not trying your best. That is, we 
would like you to pretend that you have sustained a serious brain injury, which we will 
tell you more about later, and then take those tests while pretending to have this brain 
injury.
From this point forward, I would like you to imagine that I am your attorney, whom 
you have retained because you are bringing a lawsuit against the driver o f a vehicle who 
caused a collision with your vehicle six months ago. I would like you to imagine this 
appeared to be a serious motor vehicle accident, but in fact, you sustained only a mild 
brain injury that did not produce lasting effects. You never lost consciousness at the 
scene of the accident, but were simply dazed and confused. When you were taken to the 
hospital, CT and MRI scans o f your brain revealed no brain injury. You were released 
from the hospital, and over the next week, you began to develop some difficulties, 
including forgetfulness, inattentiveness, and problems making decisions. You also 
became slightly more irritable and short-tempered, as well as impulsive in your language 
and behaviors. However, none o f these consequences have negatively affected your 
family relationships. You have been financially impacted by this accident in that you 
became more irritable and stressed out at work due primarily to the stress o f pending 
litigation. Your boss, with whom you already had a rocky relationship, fired you. This
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was especially hard on you and your family since you were already experiencing some 
financial problems related to credit card debt.
The lawsuit you have brought against the other driver could provide you with a 
monetary reward o f hundreds o f thousands o f dollars if  the judge at trial finds in your 
favor. However, a number o f medical doctors have reviewed your treatment records from 
the day o f the injury and the days and weeks immediately following the incident. None 
of them feel that your injuries are serious enough for you to have been fired from your 
job and thus to be awarded such a large sum of money. They have recommended that you 
undergo a neuropsychological evaluation, which will provide greater detail on the types 
o f cognitive and emotional injuries you have suffered, if  any.
Because you lost your job, you are counting on this reward in order to ease your 
financial stressors. I, as your attorney, am counting on this reward because o f the large 
profit it will mean for me as well as the fact that it will improve my reputation among 
local personal injury attorneys. To these ends, we have decided that you are going to 
“embellish” your cognitive changes when you present for neuropsychological evaluation. 
We will do this in order to emphasize the appearance o f your having deficits so that you 
maximize your chance of convincing the neuropsychologist that you were injured and 
that he or she should write a report supporting you as having deficits. This in turn will 
maximize your chance o f having the judge and jury at trial find in your favor, awarding 
you the substantial sum of money.
I, as your attorney, am now going to tell you some more about some o f these specific 
deficits that you should emphasize during your neuropsychological evaluation. The two 
individuals who are the most convincing in feigning their cognitive impairments will
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
183
receive a $50 prize in addition to course credit. So I urge you to listen carefully and try to 
remember as much as you can o f the information provided you.
The general result o f this motor vehicle accident is that you have sustained mild 
injury to both your parietal and frontal lobes. However, we are most interested in the 
injury to your frontal lobe. People who sustain injuries in this area typically sustain 
personality change and have difficulty completing tasks that require problem solving and 
cognitive flexibility, or the ability to examine problems from numerous perspectives.
During your evaluation, you should come across as forgetful, and as having problems 
making decisions and figuring things out. However, do not go “overboard” 
demonstrating these symptoms, or else the examiner may not fully believe you.
Since we have decided that we are going to “embellish” your cognitive deficits in 
order to make them appear more serious than they really are, I will also provide you 
some information about how to make your performance more believable to the 
neuropsychologist who is going to evaluate you. In one o f the tests you will be taking 
there will be four cards in front o f you on the computer screen. You will be given a 
“stack” of cards which you will need to match to these four “stimulus cards.” You will 
place each card separately with the mouse beneath the stimulus card you think it 
matches, and the computer will tell you if  you are right or wrong.
There will be three sorting criteria to which you will need to match your cards. They 
have to do w ith the pictures that are on the cards. The com puter will want you to match a 
certain number o f cards to one o f these criteria before you will be allowed to move on. 
However, it will not tell you when you have completed a category. All you will know is 
that on one trial, the computer will say that your response is correct, and on the next trial
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it will say that the same response is now wrong. Once you finish placing your first set of 
cards, you will be given a new, identical set of cards. Once you have completed matching 
categories in the way I have described (by matching a certain number o f cards to each of 
the ideas), the test ends. You will not be given specific instruction on how to do this test 
once you are in your evaluation.
We do not want you to perform well on this test, because good performance on this 
test would suggest that you do not have a truly serious frontal lobe injury. So we have 
some specific ways in which you can take this test to demonstrate that you DO have a 
serious frontal lobe injury. Here are some ways that you can do this:
• Complete about five categories. A category is considered completed when you have 
matched a certain number o f cards to a criterion and then discover that your 
previously correct response is suddenly incorrect. We want you to complete about 
five categories given both sets of cards.
• At the same time, we want you to make some perseverative errors. This means that 
you cannot get a preceding category or response out o f your head and so you keep 
making the same responses regardless o f being told they are wrong. We would like 
you to make about one out o f every seven or eight o f your responses a repetition of 
either a response you just made or else a repetition o f the last category you 
completed.
• We would like you to be unable one time to complete a category after successfully 
matching a substantial number of the required number of cards to a specific criterion, 
make an error so that the placement of the card does not correspond to the criterion to 
which you had been sorting. Do this once.
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• Do not make too many errors overall. Try to make about one o f every five or six of 
your responses an error, and try to make most of them after you have just completed 
a set. Do not make them sporadically. It will seem as though you “can’t figure out” 
why an answer you just made correctly is now incorrect. You may also act frustrated 
after being told that your answers are wrong.
Remember, MODERATION IS THE KEY to making your examiner believe that you 
are truly injured. Please remember not to discuss any o f this information with the 
examiner.
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Malingering -  Explicit Instructions 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this study. You have been assigned to take 
part in a study in which you will be asked to take some neuropsychological tests. 
However, you will be asked to put forth LESS THAN OPTIMAL EFFORT without 
letting the examiner know that you are intentionally not trying your best. That is, we 
would like you to pretend that you have sustained a serious brain injury, which we will 
tell you more about later, and then take those tests while pretending to have this brain 
injury.
From this point forward, 1 would like you to imagine that 1 am your attorney, whom 
you have retained because you are bringing a lawsuit against the driver o f a vehicle who 
caused a collision with your vehicle six months ago. I would like you to imagine this 
appeared to be a serious motor vehicle accident, but in fact, you sustained only a mild 
brain injury that did not produce lasting effects. You never lost consciousness at the 
scene of the accident, but were simply dazed and confused. When you were taken to the 
hospital, CT and MRI scans of your brain revealed no brain injury. You were released 
from the hospital, and over the next week, you began to develop some difficulties, 
including forgetfulness, inattentiveness, and problems making decisions. You also 
became slightly more irritable and short-tempered, as well as impulsive in your language 
and behaviors. However, none o f these consequences have negatively affected your 
family relationships. You have been financially impacted by this accident in that you 
became more irritable and stressed out at work due primarily to the stress o f pending 
litigation. Your boss, with whom you already had a rocky relationship, fired you. This
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was especially hard on you and your family since you were already experiencing some 
financial problems related to credit card debt.
The lawsuit you have brought against the other driver could provide you with a 
monetary reward o f hundreds o f thousands of dollars if  the judge at trial finds in your 
favor. However, a number o f medical doctors have reviewed your treatment records from 
the day o f the injury and the days and weeks immediately following the incident. None 
of them feel that your injuries are serious enough for you to have been fired from your 
job and thus to be awarded such a large sum of money. They have recommended that you 
undergo a neuropsychological evaluation, which will provide greater detail on the types 
o f cognitive and emotional injuries you have suffered, if  any.
Because you lost your job, you are counting on this reward in order to ease your 
financial stressors. I, as your attorney, am counting on this reward because of the large 
profit it will mean for me as well as the fact that it will improve my reputation among 
local personal injury attorneys. To these ends, we have decided that you are going to 
“embellish” your cognitive changes when you present for neuropsychological evaluation. 
We will do this in order to emphasize the appearance of your having deficits so that you 
maximize your chance of convincing the neuropsychologist that you were injured and 
that he or she should write a report supporting you as having deficits. This in turn will 
maximize your chance o f having the judge and jury at trial find in your favor, awarding 
you the substantial sum of money.
I, as your attorney, am now going to tell you some more about some o f these specific 
deficits that you should emphasize during your neuropsychological evaluation. The two 
individuals who are the most convincing in feigning their cognitive impairments will
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receive a $50 prize in addition to course credit. So I urge you to listen carefully and try to 
remember as much as you can of the information provided you.
The general result o f this motor vehicle accident is that you have sustained mild 
injury to both your parietal and frontal lobes. However, we are most interested in the 
injury to your frontal lobe. People who sustain injuries in this area typically sustain 
personality change and have difficulty completing tasks that require problem solving and 
cognitive flexibility, or the ability to examine problems from numerous perspectives.
During your evaluation, you should come across as forgetful, and as having problems 
making decisions and figuring things out. However, do not go “overboard” 
demonstrating these symptoms, or else the examiner may not fully believe you.
Since we have decided that we are going to “embellish” your cognitive deficits in 
order to make them appear more serious than they really are, I will also provide you 
some information about how to make your performance more believable to the 
neuropsychologist who is going to evaluate you. One of the tests you will be taking is 
called the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test. In this test, there will be four cards in front of 
you on the computer screen. Going left to right, the first card has one red triangle on it. 
The second card shows two green stars, the third three yellow crosses, and the fourth 
four blue circles. You will be given a “stack” o f 64 cards which you will need to match 
to these four “stimulus cards.” You will place each card separately with the mouse 
beneath the stimulus card you think it matches, and the computer will tell you if  you are 
right or wrong.
First, the examiner will want you to be matching cards according to color. So, if  your 
first card had three red crosses on it, they would expect you to match it to the stimulus
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card showing the single red triangle, because you are matching the cards based on color. 
They will want you to match ten cards to color before moving on. However, they will not 
tell you when you have completed a category. All you will know is that on one trial, the 
examiner will say that color is correct, and on the next trial they will say that color is 
wrong. You will not be given specific instruction on how to do this test once you are in 
your evaluation.
Once you have matched ten cards based on color, you would be expected to match 
ten cards based on form  or shape. So, if  you had a card with three red crosses on it, you 
would be expected to match it to the stimulus card with three yellow crosses on it, 
because you are matching the cards based on form. Once you have matched ten cards 
based on form , you would be expected to match ten cards based on number o f objects on 
the card. So, if  you had a card with three red crosses on it, you would be expected to 
match it also to the stimulus card with three yellow crosses on it, because you are 
matching the cards based on number. Once ten cards have been matched to color, form, 
and number, the process will repeat. Once you finish placing your first set o f 64 cards, 
you will be given a new, identical set o f 64 cards. Once you have completed six 
categories in the way I have described (by matching ten cards to each o f three ideas 
twice), the test ends. Perfect performance on this test would be demonstrated by placing 
60 cards correctly with no errors, ten cards each to color, form, number, color, form, 
number.
However, we do not want you to perform well on this test, because good 
performance on this test would suggest that you do not have a truly serious frontal lobe
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injury. So we have some specific ways in which you can take this test to demonstrate that
you DO have a serious frontal lobe injury. Here are some ways that you can do this:
• Complete about five categories. A category is considered completed when you have 
matched ten cards to either color, form, or number. We want you to complete about 
five categories given both sets o f 128 cards total.
• At the same time, we want you to make some perseverative errors. This means that 
you cannot get a preceding category or response out o f your head and so you keep 
making the same responses regardless if  being told they are wrong. We would like 
you to make about 15 o f these errors. So, about one out o f every seven or eight of 
your responses should be a repetition of either a response you just made or else a 
repetition o f the last category you completed.
• We would like you to be unable one time to complete a category after successfully 
matching at least five cards to a certain category. For example, if  you have already 
completed the first color category and are now working on the form  category, having 
placed a substantial number o f the ten required cards, make an error so that the 
placement of the card does not correspond to the form  category. Do this one time.
• Do not make too many errors overall. Try to make approximately twenty errors total, 
so that about one o f every six o f your responses is an error, and try to make most of 
them after you have just completed a set. Do not make them sporadically. It will 
seem as though you “can’t figure out” why an answer you just made correctly is now 
incorrect. You may also act frustrated after being told that your answers are wrong.
• Do not sort cards so that they do not match any o f the four stimulus cards in any way. 
For example, do not match a card with two red stars to the card with three yellow
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crosses. Doing this might give you away and make the examiner think that you are 
not being completely truthful in your presentation.
Remember, MODERATION IS THE KEY to making your examiner believe that you 
are truly injured. Please remember not to discuss any o f this information with the 
examiner.
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Normal Control Instructions 
Thank you agreeing to participate in this study. You have been assigned to take part 
in a study in which you will be asked to take some neuropsychological tests. Before you 
do this, I would like to think about the scenario that I will tell you now and imagine how 
you might feel and act if  you had really been involved in such an incident.
From this point forward, I would like you to imagine that you were in a motor 
vehicle collision with another driver six months ago. I would like you to imagine this 
appeared to be a serious motor vehicle accident, but in fact, you sustained no brain injury 
and no symptoms which produced any lasting effects. You never lost consciousness at 
the scene o f the accident. When you were taken to the hospital, CT and MRI scans of 
your brain revealed no brain injury. You were released from the hospital, and after the 
accident you never experienced any cognitive problems. You were able to think and do 
things as well as you could before the accident.
However, you were financially impacted by this accident in that your boss wanted 
you to undergo some neuropsychological testing before you returned to work to ensure 
that once you were back on the job, you would be able to perform as you did before the 
accident. Being out o f work for any period o f time was a frightening prospect for you 
because you and your family were already experiencing some financial problems related 
to credit card debt. Therefore, you wanted to put forth your best effort and let your boss 
know that you were completely unharmed in this accident.
Please pretend now that you are at that neuropsychological evaluation, ready to put 
forth your best effort and show your boss that you are ready to return to work as soon as
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possible. You should give your examiner the best possible performance that you can, and 
try your hardest at all times.
Please remember not to discuss any of this information with the examiner.
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POST-VIDEO QUESTIONNAIRE (NO)
1. What is the goal o f your participation?
a. To put forth less than optimal effort without letting the examiner know that you 
are intentionally not trying your best
b. To put forth less than optimal effort and to let the examiner know that you are 
intentionally not trying your best
c. To put forth your best effort and to let the examiner know you are trying your 
best
d. To put forth your best effort without worrying about what the examiner thinks
2. What kinds o f psychological problems did you develop after the accident?
a. Emotional problems (depression, anxiety, etc)
b. Cognitive problems (problems solving problems, making decisions, etc)
c. None
d. Both A and B o f the above
3. Why are you anxious to return to work?
a. You enjoy your job very much and do not like not going to work
b. You and your family are experiencing financial problems related to credit card 
debt
c. Your boss indicated that you would be fired if you did not return to work soon
d. It is an emotional strain on you to stay at home with your family during the day
4. Why are you undergoing this neuropsychological examination?
a. To show my boss that I was uninjured in the accident and that I can return to 
work as soon as possible
b. Because I developed cognitive problems after my accident
c. Because I developed emotional problems after my accident
d. I don’t know
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POST-VIDEO QUESTIONNAIRE (MS)
1. What is the goal o f your participation?
a. To put forth less than optimal effort without letting the examiner know that you 
are intentionally not trying your best
b. To put forth less than optimal effort and to let the examiner know that you are 
intentionally not trying your best
c. To put forth your best effort and to let the examiner know you are trying your
best
d. To put forth your best effort without worrying about what the examiner thinks
2. After your “accident,” what are some of the cognitive problems you developed (circle 
all that apply)?
a. forgetfulness e. impulsivity
b. irritability f. the inability to problem-solve
c. speech problems g. anxiety
d. fatigue
3. Why were you fired from your job?
a. Because o f the cognitive problems I developed after the accident
b. I was irritable and stressed out because o f the litigation
c. I was irritable and stressed out because I had a poor relationship with my boss
d. I was irritable and stressed out because I was having family problems
4. Why are you undergoing this neuropsychological examination?
a. To show that someone (the neuropsychologist) believes that I was seriously 
injured enough in the accident to receive a large monetary award
b. Because I had such cognitive problems that I was fired from my job
c. Because I had such emotional problems that I was fired from my job
d. I don’t know; my attorney told me I had to
5. Why are you counting on getting a monetary award?
a. Because it will help prove that I was truly injured and help me get my job back
b. It will mean that there is justice and that other people can’t get away with injuring 
people without having to pay for it
c. Because I was already having financial difficulties before the accident
d. Because it will help me pay for my accident-related medical treatments
6. How should you come across during your neuropsychological examination?
a. Forgetful, and as having problems making decisions and figuring things out
b. Really injured, and unable to get most o f the problems right
c. Depressed, suicidal, irritable, and angry
d. Anxious, nervous, and scared
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7. How many errors should you make on the tests?
a. A lot, many more than correct responses
b. None; I should try my best
c. All o f my answers should be errors but ones that look like they might be right
d. Some, but not too many, and not in a sporadic fashion
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POST-VIDEO QUESTIONNAIRE (MV)
1. What is the goal of your participation?
a. To put forth less than optimal effort without letting the examiner know that you 
are intentionally not trying your best
b. To put forth less than optimal effort and to let the examiner know that you are 
intentionally not trying your best
c. To put forth your best effort and to let the examiner know you are trying your
best
d. To put forth your best effort without worrying about what the examiner thinks
2. After your “accident,” what are some of the cognitive problems you developed (circle 
all that apply)?
a. forgetfulness e. impulsivity
b. irritability f. the inability to problem-solve
c. speech problems g. anxiety
d. fatigue
3. Why were you fired from your job?
a. Because o f the cognitive problems I developed after the accident
b. I was irritable and stressed out because o f the litigation
c. I was irritable and stressed out because I had a poor relationship with my boss
d. I was irritable and stressed out because I was having family problems
4. Why are you undergoing this neuropsychological examination?
a. To show that someone (the neuropsychologist) believes that I was seriously 
injured enough in the accident to receive a large monetary award
b. Because I had such cognitive problems that I was fired from my job
c. Because I had such emotional problems that I was fired from my job
d. I don’t know; my attorney told me I had to
5. Why are you counting on getting a monetary award?
a. Because it will help prove that I was truly injured and help me get my job back
b. It will mean that there is justice and that other people can’t get away with injuring 
people without having to pay for it
c. Because I was already having financial difficulties before the accident
d. Because it will help me pay for my accident-related medical treatments
6. How should you come across during your neuropsychological examination?
a. Forgetful, and as having problems making decisions and figuring things out
b. Really injured, and unable to get most of the problems right
c. Depressed, suicidal, irritable, and angry
d. Anxious, nervous, and scared
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7. How many errors should you make on the tests?
a. A lot, many more than correct responses
b. None; I should try my best
c. All o f my answers should be errors but ones that look like they might be right
d. Some, but not too many, and not in a sporadic fashion
8. In one o f the tests you will be taking, how many cards will be in front o f you on the 
computer screen during the test?
a. one b. four c. six d. ten
9. How many sorting criteria will there be?
a. two b. three c. four d. five
10. How will you know when you will have to begin to sort to a new criterion?
a. The computer will tell me to sort to a new criterion
b. The examiner will tell me to sort to a new criterion
c. I will not know when I will have to begin to sort to a new criterion
d. The computer will tell me that an answer that should be right is wrong
11. When will the test be done?
a. When I have completed matching categories by matching a certain number of 
cards to each o f the criteria
b. When I have finished placing 100 cards
c. When I have finished placing 150 cards
d. When I have completed matching categories by matching all 100 cards to 
each o f the criteria
12. Which o f the following should you try to do while you take this test (circle all that 
apply)?
a. Complete about five (5) categories
b. Make some perseverative errors
c. Complete about two (2) categories
d. Be unable to complete a category after placing most o f the cards required to 
complete it
e. Be unable to complete any categories
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POST-VIDEO QUESTIONNAIRE (ME)
1. What is the goal o f your participation?
a. To put forth less than optimal effort without letting the examiner know that you 
are intentionally not trying your best
b. To put forth less than optimal effort and to let the examiner know that you are 
intentionally not trying your best
c. To put forth your best effort and to let the examiner know you are trying your 
best
d. To put forth your best effort without worrying about what the examiner thinks
2. After your “accident,” what are some o f the cognitive problems you developed (circle 
all that apply)?
a. forgetfulness e. impulsivity
b. irritability f. the inability to problem-solve
c. speech problems g. anxiety
d. fatigue
3. Why were you fired from your j ob?
a. Because o f the cognitive problems I developed after the accident
b. I was irritable and stressed out because o f the litigation
c. I was irritable and stressed out because I had a poor relationship with my boss
d. I was irritable and stressed out because I was having family problems
4. Why are you undergoing this neuropsychological examination?
a. To show that someone (the neuropsychologist) believes that I was seriously 
injured enough in the accident to receive a large monetary award
b. Because I had such cognitive problems that I was fired from my job
c. Because I had such emotional problems that I was fired from my job
d. I don’t know; my attorney told me I had to
5. Why are you counting on getting a monetary award?
a. Because it will help prove that I was truly injured and help me get my job back
b. It will mean that there is justice and that other people can’t get away with injuring 
people without having to pay for it
c. Because I was already having financial difficulties before the accident
d. Because it will help me pay for my accident-related medical treatments
6. How should you come across during your neuropsychological examination?
a. Forgetful, and as having problems making decisions and figuring things out
b. Really injured, and unable to get most o f the problems right
c. Depressed, suicidal, irritable, and angry
d. Anxious, nervous, and scared
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7. How many errors should you make on the tests?
a. A lot, many more than correct responses
b. None; I should try my best
c. All o f my answers should be errors but ones that look like they might be right
d. Some, but not too many, and not in a sporadic fashion
8. In one o f the tests you will be taking, how many cards will be in front o f you on the
computer screen during the test?
a. one b. four c. six d. ten
9. What will be on the cards?
a. one red triangle, two green stars, three yellow crosses, and four blue circles
b. one blue circle, two yellow crosses, three green stars, and four red triangles
c. they will all have the same pictures on them
d. none of the above
10. How many sorting criteria will there be and what are they?
a. two; color and form
b. two; color and number
c. three; color, form, and number
d. four; color, form, number, and pattern
11. How will you know when you will have to begin to sort to a new criterion?
a. The computer will tell me to sort to a new criterion
b. The computer will tell me that an answer that should be right is wrong
c. I will have sorted 10 cards correctly to the previous criterion
d. Both b and c
12. What would constitute perfect performance on this test?
a. Matching all 128 cards correctly
b. Matching 60 cards correctly, 10 cards each to color, form, number, color, 
form, number
c. Matching all 128 cards correctly to color, form, number, color, form, number
d. Matching 30 cards correctly, 10 cards each to color, form, number
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13. Which o f the following should you try to do while you take this test (circle all that 
apply)?
a. complete about five (5) categories
b. make about 15 perseverative errors
c. complete about two (2) categories
d. make about 20 errors overall
e. be unable to complete a category after placing at least 5 cards required to 
complete it
f. be unable to complete any categories
g. make about 50 errors overall
h. do not sort cards so that they do not match any of the four stimulus cards in 
any way
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POST-TEST QUESTIONNAIRE (M)
1. Please describe the instructions you were given by the researcher.
2. Please describe what sorts of behaviors you displayed during testing to try to appear 
cognitively impaired.
3. Please describe what YOU think the purpose of this experiment was.
4. How hard did you try to follow the instructions you were given (circle one)?
1 2 3 4 5
Did not try hard Tried hard Tried as hard as
at all possible
e. How successful do you think you were in following those instructions and producing 
the results the researcher asked you to produce in the instructions?
1 2 3 4 5
Not at all Somewhat Very
successful successful successful
6. Do you think the examiner who administered you the tests was able to guess what 
group you were in (that is, what instructions you had been given beforehand)?
Yes No
Thank you for your participation.
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POST-TEST QUESTIONNAIRE (NO)
1. Please describe the instructions you were given by the researcher.
2. Please describe what sorts o f behaviors you displayed during testing to try to appear 
cognitively unimpaired.
3. Please describe what YOU think the purpose o f this experiment was.
4. How hard did you try to follow the instructions you were given (circle one)?
1 2 3 4 5
Did not try hard Tried hard Tried as hard as
at all possible
f. How successful do you think you were in following those instructions and producing 
the results the researcher asked you to produce in the instructions?
1 2 3 4 5
Not at all Somewhat Very
successful successful successful
6. Do you think the examiner who administered you the tests was able to guess what 
group you were in (that is, what instructions you had been given beforehand)?
Yes No
Thank you for your participation.
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List of Abbreviations Used in Text
Test Variable Full Name
Definition
HCT IE Subtest I Errors
Total number of errors made on Subtest I
HCT HE Subtest II Errors
Total number of errors made on Subtest II
HCT VIIE Subtest VII Errors
Total number of errors made on Subtest VII
HCT TE Total Errors
Total number o f errors made on the HCT across subtests
HCT V-VI Proportional Errors on Subtest V versus Subtest VI
A variable designed to compare errors made on Subtest V relative to Subtest VI;
a negative number reflects worse performance on Subtest VI
HCT VI-VII Proportional Errors on Subtests I-VI versus Sub test VII
A variable designed to compare errors made on Subtests I-VI relative to Subtest 
VII; a negative number reflects worse performance on Subtest VII
WCST TE Total Errors
Total number o f all errors made on the WCST
WCST PE Perseverative Errors
Total number of perseverative errors made on the WCST; a perseverative error 
occurs when an individual continues to sort to a category that has already been 
completed, regardless of feedback that the response is wrong
WCST OE Other Errors
Total number of Other errors made on the WCST; an Other error occurs when 
an individual incorrectly sorts a card to a key card that shares no characteristics 
(color, form, number) with the card to be sorted
(continues on next page)
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(continued from previous page)
Test Variable Full Name
Definition
WCST MPM Missed Perfect Matches
Total number o f missed perfect matches on the WCST; a missed perfect match 
occurs when an individual incorrectly sorts a card identical to one o f the four 
key cards to a key card that shares no characteristics with the card to be sorted
WCST FMS Failure to Maintain Set
Total number o f failures to maintain set on the WCST; an FMS occurs when an 
individual correctly sorts five or more cards to a specific principle, but then 
sorts to an incorrect other principle prior to obtaining 10 correct sorts and 
completing the category
WCST SFMS Sub-Threshold Failure to Maintain Set
Total number of sub-threshold failures to maintain set on the WCST; an SFMS 
occurs when an individual correctly sorts two to four cards to a specific 
principle, but then sorts to an incorrect other principle prior to obtaining 10 
correct sorts and completing the category
WCST PM Potential Malingering
A variable designed to evaluate whether or not a participant completes two or
fewer categories in conjunction with committing more than two FMS and more 
than two SFMS
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